This Constitution is still being worked on and is expected to be ratified after Gno.land genesis by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO.
We the gnomes of Gno.land, to bring to life a virtual world of structured information and logic expressed in a multiuser language based system, for bringing light to darkness by hosting all that will be known, hereby establish this Constitution for Gno.land.
-
AIB,Inc: All in Bits, Inc.
-
Bonded Auditor: A sufficiently $GNOT bonded user who submits newly discovered vulnerabilities to the Auditor and Audits Registry. See "Software Audits".
-
Bonded Vulnerability Report: A vulnerability report submitted by a Bonded Auditor for a vulnerability missed by any audit report. See "Software Audits".
-
Constitution: This Gno.land constitution document including modifications by Constitutional Amendments. This Constitution is considered independent of the Atom.One Constitution although some portions of the Atom.One Constitution may be referenced here for clarity or context.
-
Constitutional Amendment: A modification to this living Constitution by a Constitutional Majority Decision of GovDAO and any other requirements as defined in this Constitution; composed of diffs.
-
Constitution Only: When something is governed by the "Constitution Only" its governing rules must be specified within the living Constitution directly; not in any Laws, Bylaws, or Mandates.
-
Core DAO: GovDAO, the Oversight Body DAO, or any subDAO created or managed by any Core DAO implemented on Gno.land conforming to the Common DAO Spec.
-
Core Software: The minimal set of reference or standard software needed for the Gno.land blockchain and its users. See "Software Security".
-
GnotDAO: A $GNOT-bonded on-chain voting DAO for broader community participation in certain governance decisions. See "GnotDAO".
-
GovDAO DAO: "All GovDAO DAOs" or "GovDAO DAO Set" refers to GovDAO and all descendant subDAOs ultimately created or managed by GovDAO. "A GovDAO DAO" (or "relevant GovDAO DAOs") refers to one DAO within the GovDAO DAO Set (or any number of DAOs within the GovDAO DAO Set) that has a Mandate that matches the given scope.
-
Governing Documents: This Gno.land Constitution, its Laws, and any applicable Mandates and Bylaws (altogether Governing Documents).
-
ICS: Inter-Chain-Security, or the general service of validating a chain with the validator set of another chain, or a subset thereof.
-
Law Amendment: A modification to the Laws by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO. The procedure is similar to Constitutional Amendments. See "Gno.land Laws".
-
NT,LLC: NewTendermint, LLC.
-
Open Source IP: Intellectual Property that is made available freely under the Gno Network GPL or any liberal license compatible with the Gno Network GPL.
-
Oversight Body: Initially NT,LLC as represented by a multisig account, but eventually represented by an Oversight DAO on Gno.land.
-
Qualified Auditor: An auditing entity vetted and whitelisted by GovDAO Supermajority Decision on the Auditor and Audits Registry. See "Software Audits".
-
Qualified Audit Report: An audit report produced by a Qualified Auditor. See "Software Audits".
-
Qualified Candidate: A candidate who meets all GovDAO Membership Criteria including General Membership Criteria and Diversification Requirements. See "GovDAO Membership Criteria".
-
Qualified Fork: A fork of Gno.land created through the procedures defined in "Forking Gno.land".
-
Revenue: Transaction fees collected in $GNOT or $PHOTON on Gno.land. See "Gno.land Revenue".
-
SDDCAs (Storage Deposit Discount Credit Accounts): Excess $GNOT deposits from the reduction in price of $GNOT/byte deposit ($GNOT Storage Deposit Price). See "Excess $GNOT Deposits".
-
Seven Mandates of Gno.land: The following immutable mandates:
- Protect the user; preserve user data and intent.
- Preserve the spirit of the Genesis Constitution.
- Safety over everything else, followed by intuitive simplicity.
- Factor (keep minimal) Constitutional and Legislative Amendments.
- Do not require a name or identity for any core services.
- Aim to be perfect to serve one thousand years.
- Expand the light unto the multitude and nations.
-
Simple Majority, Supermajority, and Constitutional Majority Decision: See "GovDAO Decisions" and "Common DAO Spec".
-
State Freeze Transaction: A blockchain transaction that freezes a realm, package, or account, preventing further mutations without purging state. See "User Rights and Limitations".
-
State Purge Transaction: A blockchain transaction for deleting state from a Gno.land realm or package. See "State Purge Transactions".
-
Treasury: See "Gno.land Treasuries".
At Gno.land Genesis there will be 1.333 billion $GNOT tokens.
- Airdrop1: 350M (26.26%) - from partial Cosmos governance snapshot 3 years ago
- Airdrop2: 231M (17.33%) - from recent AtomOne snapshot prior to launch
- Core Treasury: 40M (3.00%) - for paying for core development
- Ecosystem Treasury: 60M (4.50%) - for prior and future Gno.land ecosystem development
- Validator Treasury: 20M (1.50%) - for paying validators
- Investors: 300M (22.51%) - for past and future investors
- NT,LLC: 332M (24.91%) - for use at NT,LLC discretion
$GNOT will not be transferrable initially except for whitelisted addresses. Whitelisted addresses include "Ecosystem" and "Investors" funds and any additional addresses needed for the operation of the chain, and funding needs or payment of investors. Whitelisted funds remain subject to the vesting schedule below.
All Genesis $GNOT allocations vest on a common schedule: 4% unlocked on the day $GNOT becomes transferrable (aka the mainnet), and a 4% unlock every subsequent month for 24 months (fully vested 24 months after the mainnet).
As an exception, 150,000,000 tokens from the Investors allocation are unlocked at the mainnet, with the remaining Investors tokens subject to the same vesting schedule.
GovDAO is responsible for distributing the $GNOT of the Ecosystem Treasury allocation to prior and future Gno.land ecosystem contributors (as well as those contributing to the Core Software). For more information see "Gno.land Treasuries".
$ATONE : like a Bitcoin miner
$PHOTON : like a BTC token
$GNOT : storage deposit token
First a primer on Atom.One tokenomics. $ATONE and $PHOTON are tightly coupled:
- $ATONE is an inflationary staking token capped at 20% inflation.
- $PHOTON is a deflationary transaction gas-fee (spam-prevention) token.
- If all $ATONE burned there would be one billion $PHOTON.
- Burning is one way; $PHOTON cannot be burned back to $ATONE.
- $ATONE targets 2/3 to be staked, thus inflationary staking "rewards" are not
income.
- Any tax authority that says otherwise is robbing you.
While $PHOTON has no voting rights and cannot be used for staking on Atom.One, it nevertheless has unique advantages enforced by the Atom.One constitution:
- All transaction fee payments on Atom.One must be paid with $PHOTON.
- Atom.One ICS Consumer Chains (aka ICS shards)
including Gno.land after migration must accept $PHOTON as the gas-fee token.
- Each may also accept other gas-fee tokens but ultimately the chain must pay $PHOTON to Atom.One for security.
- Atom.One ICS sovereign (consumer) chains may exit (change validator-sets) Atom.One and become self-validating or become hosted by another ICS hub.
Gno.land will launch independently of Atom.One so Gno.land will initially require $GNOT for transaction fee payment. Before and after Gno.land migrates to be hosted by Atom.One ICS $GNOT will function as a byte storage deposit token.
- Every transaction that ends up increasing the amount of persistent state will require a bond deposit of $GNOT.
- Every transaction that ends up freeing up persistent state space will receive a refund of $GNOT.
- 1.333 billion $GNOT corresponds to 13.33TB of persistent state space.
- The $GNOT will not inflate, thus the total created $GNOT will never exceed 1.333 billion $GNOT.
- The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price (per byte) will never increase.
- The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price may decrease by at most 10% a year.
- The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price may not decrease if the total existing storage exceeds the size of a typical consumer internal hard-disk or solid-state drive. See also "Gno.land Storage Capacity".
Gno.land is obligated to migrate to be hosted/secured by Atom.One ICS when it is deemed ready according to this Constitution by GovDAO by Supermajority Decision.
After migration to Atom.One ICS hosting Gno.land should pay the Atom.One chain in $PHOTONs underneath the hood as the Atom.One constitution requires; an AMM exchange module should exist on the Gno.land shard/instance to facilitate the internal exchange of collected $GNOT to $PHOTON needed to pay Atom.One for its ICS services.
Once Gno.land migrates over to Atom.One after the Gno.land <> Atom.One IBC connection is complete and Atom.One ICS MVP is implemented $ATONE will be the staking and governance token on Atom.One (but with no voting rights for Gno.land itself), and $PHOTON will be primarily the CPU-time gas token paid to Atom.One (which in turn pays for all that is necessary to secure the chain via ICS validation), and $GNOT the dedicated byte-storage deposit token on Gno.land. Gno.land will become a key ICS consumer chain on Atom.One especially in the beginning even as Atom.One is free to offer its ICS services to other applications unrelated to Gno.land and $GNOT, or even those forked of Gno.land and the GnoVM in the future.
The Gno.land Treasuries are as follows:
- Core Treasury
- Ecosystem Treasury
- Validator Services Treasury (ValTreasury for short)
- Reserve Treasury
A Treasury is defined as account or DAO that can hold funds where its type, structure, governance (if any), and purpose are specified in the Constitution Only. If a Gno.land Treasury is defined without governance or conditions its funds can only be used with a Constitutional Amendment. The Reserve Treasury in particular is reserved for future uses.
A Treasury with a given purpose cannot be used for any other purpose even if there are excess funds in the Treasury account (or DAO). If GovDAO passes a Constitutional Amendment that violates this principle (such as by the deletion of this term) it is the responsibility of the Oversight Body to reject such proposals. Constitutional Amendments for clarification of language in the spirit of the terms prior to any such amendments are allowed for cases where the original language is ambiguous. The exception to this rule is as per the disclaimer at the top of this draft Constitution--the set of treasuries and their purposes, or even this term, may change under certain conditions until $GNOT is made transferrable.
No spending proposal should be voted on unless an accountability framework is first defined by a Constitutional Amendment pre-approved by the Oversight Body such that all spending is reviewed by independent committees or entities before and after the spending decision.
No subDAO of a top-level Core DAO may make funding decisions from the Core Treasury directly unless otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Funds from Gno.land Treasuries may be transferred to another Core subDAO ultimately managed by GovDAO such that the funds of any Core subDAO may be frozen or returned to the origin Treasury at any time with a Simple Majority Decision of the responsible Core DAO.
Funds that are transferred or assigned to any of these treasuries but not yet used (e.g. by a decision to fund an entity or a DAO) may not be clawed back or transferred to any other DAO or treasury nor burned without a Constitutional Amendment.
All spending for software or other IP must be for Open Source IP.
These funds are reserved for the development of Core Software and Essential Services.
All funding decisions from the Core Treasury require a Supermajority Decision by GovDAO.
The Core Software is the minimal set of reference or standard software needed for the Gno.land blockchain and its users and includes (and must prioritize):
- Gno.land node
- GnoWeb+Alts
- Tendermint2
- GnoVM
- Go
- Atom.One IBC and ICS
- Official standard reference browser extension wallet
- Official standard hardware wallet software
- All other software mentioned in the Constitution Only
Essential Services are the set of services rendered by machine or man that are deemed essential for the operation of Gno.land and for users to securely interact with Gno.land and includes (and must prioritize):
- Blockchain explorers
- Blockchain indexers
- User (customer) support
- Official community activities
All Core Software must be released under the Gno Network GPL License with the appropriate strong attribution clauses as determined by the owner of the software, except for pre-existing software that is already released with a compatible open source license.
Funding for Tendermint2, the GnoVM, and the gno cli is primarily the responsibility of NT,LLC. Funding for Atom.One IBC and ICS is primarily the responsibility of the Atom.One chain. That said, GovDAO should contribute to these projects (and any other projects of the Core Software owned by external entities) within reason as needed to complete the objectives mentioned in the relevant Governing Documents; and thereafter for as long as the software is deemed Core Software GovDAO must ensure the continuous and timely monitoring of future improvements and updates by reasonable funding if necessary from the Core Treasury to keep Gno.land and its users safe.
Funding from the Core Treasury for Essential Services software may only go toward Open Source IP that is fully audited.
Funding from the Core Treasury may also go toward validation services on an emergency basis if the Validator Services Treasury is insufficient.
GovDAO is required to use a legal entity such as NT,LLC or any new entities (Proxy Entity) to keep ownership of IP on behalf of the Gno.land chain. New Proxy Entities must be proven to be subservient to GovDAO in accordance with the Constitution such that no transfers of IP nor any changes to license terms may occur without the prior approval of the relevant GovDAO DAO and Oversight Body. Each IP repo must have a top-level Markdown file describing the proxy relationship (except for Tendermint2 and the GnoVM)
Refactoring of projects out of the genesis monorepo should preserve the history of all prior commits relevant to all the files of each project (via the git "--follow" flag). The expectation is for the Proxy Entity and GovDAO to come to agreement about serving as the Proxy Entity for some or most of the repos already hosted under the organization.
These funds are reserved for rewarding the creators of External Contributions defined as contributions of Open Source IP mentioned in any of the Governing Documents and Gno software not already paid for by other means. Recognizing and rewarding contributors is essential to the long-term health of Gno.land and its ecosystem.
At most 1/4 of the GovDAO-managed Ecosystem Treasury 4.50% (60M) genesis allocation may be distributed to prior contributors by GovDAO Supermajority Decision. Present GovDAO members are not eligible for any allocation from the Ecosystem Treasury genesis allocation.
All funding decisions from the Ecosystem Treasury require a Supermajority Decision by GovDAO.
All funding decisions from the Ecosystem Treasury must be based on well defined heuristics as defined in the Constitution Only, or based on quality as assessed by the review of council members of the relevant GovDAO DAO. Naturally council members must abstain from voting on matters with any conflict of interests, but the Oversight Body is specifically responsible for (and has the authority for) ensuring that council members do not collude to reward each other unfairly in any given proposal nor over multiple proposals.
All funding from the Ecosystem Treasury must go to contributors whose real human identity is known and recorded in accordance with the Constitution or relevant Laws of Gno.land.
The Validator Services Treasury may only be used to pay for validation services.
No Core DAO may vote for funding decisions from the Validator Services Treasury except immediately after genesis until automated payment mechanisms are implemented.
See also "Gno.land Pre-Migration Validators" and "Core Treasury".
No funding decisions are allowed from the Reserve Treasury without a GovDAO Constitutional Majority Decision.
Transaction fees collected in $GNOT or $PHOTON on Gno.land are called Revenue. Revenue is distributed in the following priority order. Each treasury receives its share from whatever remains after higher-priority treasuries have been funded.
-
ValTreasury receives a runway-based share of Revenue:
- 50% if less than 1 year of runway, or
- 25% if less than 2 years of runway, or
- 10% if less than 3 years of runway, or
- 5% if less than 5 years of runway, or
- 0% if more than 5 years of runway.
-
The remainder is split as follows:
- Core Treasury: 40%
- Ecosystem Treasury: 40%
- Reserve Treasury: 20%
ValTreasury has priority because the blockchain cannot function without validators or governance. The Core Treasury and Ecosystem Treasury receives the remainder to ensure meaningful and perpetual funding for essential software and services as well as contributor rewards.
When the $GNOT storage deposit rate per byte is decreased this results in excess $GNOT deposits per realm. This is not considered part of Revenue.
When the $GNOT storage deposit rate decreases (not automatically by the $GNOT burn mechanism described below, but by the decision of GovDAO to lower the rate) 25% of the excess $GNOT goes into the Security Treasury and the remainder goes to each segregated virtual account per realm ($GNOT of the realm's SDDCA) to be used only for future discounts on transactions for that specific realm. These SDDCA $GNOT tokens may be transferred to other SDDCAs by rules defined in the Governing Documents but their $GNOT may never be withdrawn even upon freeing storage, and transfers must be initiated by the present authority of the realm or containing organization.
DDCA $GNOTs may be burned automatically by a rate set by an amendment to the Gno.land Constitution not to exceed 10% a year. This is to prevent stagnant $GNOT from limiting the allocated storage capacity of Gno.land and thereby reducing its utility. $GNOT burned in this way will also reduce the $GNOT storage deposit rate automatically but not trigger any of the mechanisms described here.
See also "Security Treasury".
Until Atom.One ICS is ready, Gno.land's validator selection mechanism is determined by GovDAO Supermajority Decision.
Priority should be given to Atom.One validators and Gno.land core developers.
The number of validators prior to migration may not exceed 50.
No validators may operate on any cloud hosting provider, but must run their own hardware where they have physical access to the server at all times (such as in a co-location provider with 24/hour access).
Atom.One ICS may not be deemed suitable unless the Gno.land chain remains whole (not part of any "mega-block" system where the consensus engine process is shared with other applications) and Gno.land may migrate away from Atom.One by on-chain transactions.
GovDAO by Supermajority Decision may migrate Gno.land away from Atom.One ICS or fund the development of a fork of Atom.One if Atom.One fails to meet Gno.land's security or decentralization requirements. Such requirements include but are not limited to validators running their own hardware and reasonable limits on validator power concentration.
Pre-migration and post-migration validators are paid from the Validator Services Treasury. See also "Validator Services Treasury".
In the case of a fork of Atom.One the migration target chain may be changed by a Constitutional Amendment. Any GovDAO members who are involved in the creation or development of such a fork or have any additional relative ownership of staking tokens or fee tokens of the fork are considered to have a conflict of interest and must disclose so and abstain from voting. If a quorum cannot be reached due to this the quorum requirement may be waived by the Oversight Body.
GovDAO is the primary governing body of Gno.land with limitations by the Oversight Body and other terms and conditions of this Constitution.
There are three tiers: T1, T2, and T3.
T1 is the highest tier, T3 the lowest.
- T1: self-selecting "core" with supermajority vote from T1.
- T2: selected by GovDAO w/ T3 abstaining, with a Simple Majority Decision.
- T3: permissionless invitation from T1 and T2 according to a delegation mechanism.
The maximum age for any member is 70; after is automatically withdrawn.
T1, T2, and T3 membership can only be withdrawn by a GovDAO Supermajority Decision WITH CAUSE and Oversight Body pre-approval. Such members are considered "ejected". Ejected members are no longer eligible for membership in GovDAO.
Members may resign at any time with a signed transaction. Resigned members may be reinstated with a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO.
T1 members may not be actively contributing to the project but they must still be active in voting or their membership may be suspended if they miss 3 GovDAO proposal votes in a row until they return to activity with a simple declaration. The activity status of T1 or their suspension may not be deemed cause for removal from T1. In this way T1 is like "tenure", and generally the T1 members are expected to have made significant contributions to the project.
In general,
- a T1 member gets 3 votes.
- a T2 member gets 2 votes.
- a T3 member gets 1 vote.
However,
- T2 class is capped at 2/3 the voting power of T1 class.
- T3 class is capped at 1/3 the voting power of T1 class.
- --> T1 1/2, T2 1/3, T3 1/6 (unless...)
Example 1:
- T1 100 members --> 300 VP, 3 votes per member
- T2 100 members --> 200 VP, 2 votes per member
- T3 100 members --> 100 VP, 1 votes per member
Example 2:
- T1 100 members --> 300 VP, 3 votes per member
- T2 50 members --> 100 VP, 2 votes per member *
- T3 10 members --> 10 VP, 1 votes per member *
Example 3:
- T1 100 members --> 300 VP, 3 votes per member
- T2 200 members --> 200 VP, 1 votes per member *
- T3 100 members --> 100 VP, 1 votes per member
Example 4:
- T1 100 members --> 300 VP, 3 votes per member
- T2 200 members --> 200 VP, 1 votes per member *
- T3 1000 members --> 100 VP, 0.1 votes per member *
The target T1 membership size is a minimum 70 members in 7 years.
If the target minimum is not reached, at most 2 members may be elected by the usual process of election every quarter.
If the target minimum is not reached AND there are Qualified Candidates AND two quarters have passed with no new T1 members elected, 1 additional Qualified Candidate may be elected by GovDAO with T1 abstaining in the following quarter.
If the target minimum is not reached AND there are Qualified Candidates AND four quarters have passed with no new T1 members elected, 1 additional Qualified Candidate may be elected by GnotDAO.
The T2 membership size target minimum is floor(size(T1)/4). The T2 membership size target maximum is 2 x size(T1).
While size(T2) can be greater than 2 x size(T1) or less than 2 x size(T1), no more members may be added to T2 if size(T2) is greater than 2 x size(T1).
T3 membership is decided automatically based on a delegation system where:
- T1 members get 3 invitation points.
- T2 members get 2 invitation points.
- T3 members get 1 invitation point.
At least 2 invitation points from at least 2 members must be delegated for T3 membership. Invitation points are whole numbers; they are not divisible.
The T3 membership is determined automatically based on the current GovDAO membership and the latest delegations. Delegations may be changed at any time; thus a T3 member may lose their membership immediately as a consequence of undelegation, and this may cause another T3 member to lose their membership concurrently.
A Simple Majority Decision of GovDAO requires more than 1/2 of voting power of T1, T2, and T3 members according to the scoring mechanism defined in this Constitution.
A Supermajority Decision of GovDAO requires more than 2/3 of voting power of T1, T2, and T3 members according to the scoring mechanism defined in this Constitution. Most decisions require a Supermajority Decision.
A Constitutional Majority Decision of GovDAO requires more than 9/10 of voting power of T1, T2, and T3 members according to the scoring mechanism defined in this Constitution.
Some decisions may require additional conditions to be satisfied:
-
When a pre-approval is required the proposal must attach a valid cryptographically signed signature of pre-approval of the exact proposal body bytes. If no such automated mechanism is implemented on chain the proposal must be rejected by all members unless the aforementioned signature exists and is independently verified by each voting member. For example, a Constitutional Amendment requires the pre-approval of the Oversight Body.
-
When a post-approval is required the proposal must be appropriately constructed with a field set that prevents any automated action from taking place upon the passage of the proposal until the relevant post-approval conditions are met. If no such automated mechanism is implemented on chain the post-approval condition must be treated as a pre-approval condition. If all relevant conditions are not satisfied the proposal must be rejected by all members.
These GovDAO Membership General Criteria apply for all GovDAO member candidates:
-
No candidate is eligible who is or had been associated with any entity or organization that has confidential membership and requires members to protect each other (e.g. Freemasonry). If an existing member joins such they must declare a "spiritual conflict of interest" and resign immediately.
-
No candidate is eligible who has or has had any association with any government intelligence agency or program, any defense contractor, nor any law enforcement agency. Candidates may have served in a military but they may not be actively serving.
-
If an existing member gains any association that violates the above general requirements they must cease all GovDAO related activity and immediately declare their association within 24 hours and resign.
-
No candidate is eligible who has been convicted of a violent, property, white-collar, organized, or cyber crime.
The general requirements for T1, T2, and T3 membership are as follows:
-
All members must be publicly identifiable persons and declare their country of residence and citizenship and provide timely updates when it changes.
-
T1 members must meet T1,T2,T3 criteria.
-
T2 members must meet T2,T3 criteria.
-
T3 members must meet T3 criteria.
-
T1 criteria includes expertise in categories, significant contributions, and demonstration of value alignment, and when active must make public appearances promoting Gno.land or publications related to their contributions to Gno.land.
-
T2 criteria includes expertise in categories and continuing contributions including public appearances promoting Gno.land or publications related to their contributions to Gno.land.
-
T3 criteria includes significant experience in categories and continuing contributions.
-
T1 and T2 members are added via individual proposals, each with a markdown resume/portfolio application document.
-
Any members who have been proven to have lied or not disclosed material information must be demoted or ejected with a Simple Majority Decision with a pre-approval from the Oversight Body contingent on proof and evaluation.
-
Ejected members are never again eligible for membership in T1, T2, or T3.
The Diversification Requirements exists to prevent any single country or union from dominating GovDAO thereby ensuring a globally decentralized governance body.
-
No new candidates for T1 (or T2) may be proposed if their country or union of citizenship represents more than one third of T1 (or T2).
-
No new candidates for T1 (or T2) may be proposed if their country or union of residence represents more than one third of T1 (or T2).
All Core DAO members must annually sign and circulate to all T1 members a conflict of interest disclosure document.
All Core DAO members who have any conflict of interests with any proposals must declare their conflict of interest and abstain from voting on the spending proposal.
See also "General Membership Criteria" for additional terms related to conflict of interests.
Violations of the Conflict of Interest Policy as determined by the Oversight Body must result in punitive measures as determined by the Governing Documents including ejection, suspension, or demotion of membership, or the clawback of funds. That said, any punitive measure by the Oversight Body may be vetoed or overruled by a GovDAO Supermajority Decision at any time.
The Oversight Body is responsible for ensuring that all proposals (except proposals to replace Oversight Body DAO members) adhere to the Governing Documents with priority given to the Constitution in case of any conflicts.
The Oversight Body is initially NT,LLC as represented by a multisig account approved by NT,LLC. NT,LLC multisig signers must have an agreement with NT,LLC and only sign transactions explicitly pre-approved by NT,LLC. In the case of a breach of this requirement its signature may have no effect or its effect must be reversed promptly by GovDAO before any other decision.
Within 2 years after launch NT,LLC must delegate its Oversight Body role to a DAO (the Oversight Body DAO) on Gno.land, or by declaring its members in accordance with all requirements.
If after 2 years after launch NT,LLC does not determine the Oversight Body DAO or its members, GovDAO must remind NT,LLC to determine the Oversight Body DAO members. If after a month such members are not decided by NT,LLC, the Oversight Body DAO may be determined by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO, and no further decisions may be made by GovDAO until an Oversight Body DAO is determined that satisfies the requirements.
The Oversight Body DAO committee Requirements are as follows:
- One Oversight Body DAO member must be from T1 or T2 (First Oversight Member).
- One Oversight Body DAO member must be from T1 or T2 (Second Oversight Member).
- One Oversight Body DAO member must not be a GovDAO member but otherwise be a Qualified Candidate with no significant conflict of interests such as by being invested in a competing crypto project (Third Oversight Member).
Furthermore,
- Each member gets 1 vote. All decisions require 2 YES votes.
- Two or more members may not reside in the same country at the time of appointment.
- Two or more members may not be citizens of (or be automatically eligible for citizenship by birthright of) the same country or union.
- All Oversight Body DAO members must fully understand the Constitution and Laws as assessed in a live interview test with T1 members.
- Each member may serve a maximum term of three years, thereafter may not be eligible for re-election for another three years.
- All members must be considered working full time and paid as a typical T1 GovDAO member (including the Third Oversight Member) from the PayTreasury.
After the initial establishment of an Oversight Body DAO:
- The First Oversight Member may be replaced at any time by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO.
- The Second Oversight Member may be replaced at any time by NT,LLC.
- The Third Oversight Member who has served already for three months may be replaced at any time by a Supermajority Decision of GnotDAO (not GovDAO).
- The Third Oversight Member who has served already for three months may also be replaced at any time by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO AND the pre-approval of NT,LLC.
After any election by GnotDAO the candidate must pass the live interview test with T1 members (as determined by a Simple Majority Decision by GovDAO), and the test must be recorded and result shared with the public. The Third Oversight Member candidate who gets rejected in the live interview cannot be re-elected for another one year.
Any Oversight Member who gets replaced will be deemed to have served their full term and cannot be re-elected for another three years.
A vacancy (e.g. from resignation, incapacitation, disqualification, ejection from GovDAO etc) must be replaced before any Constitutional Amendment or Law gets passed; and furthermore must be replaced within 30 days before further proposals get passed save for any urgent Node Software Upgrades related to software bugs or Transaction Replay Forks.
The Oversight Body DAO members committee may not self-mutate except when a vacancy arises after which the two remaining members may self-elect by consensus a temporary Qualified Candidate (the Temporary Oversight Member) without restriction. This Temporary Oversight Member is expected to get superseded (or be voted in) by the usual election rules, but such a member will not be deemed to have been "replaced": they may be elected again soon after. Temporary Oversight Members may vote to elect more Temporary Oversight Members with any more vacancies.
With the exception of any Oversight Body DAO election proposals, the Oversight Body or its subDAOs have the authority to (and must block) any decision by GovDAO or Core DAOs if such decisions are determined to be:
- in violation of the Constitution or the spirit of the Constitution
- in violation of any Laws
- in violation of any Bylaws or Mandates of any Core DAOs
The Oversight Body may block any proposals that have otherwise passed in the prior month unless otherwise specified or a pre-approval was already granted. This is especially important for proposals that immediately pass due to a Supermajority Decision.
The Oversight Body does NOT have the sole authority to transfer, spend, freeze, or burn any funds or property.
After 3 years after the launch of Gno.land GovDAO must have implemented or chosen an implementation of GnotDAO where:
- GnotDAO is written in Gno.
- GnotDAO runs on a non-upgradeable (immutable) or system realm.
- Free trading $GNOT may be bonded by users.
- Users may use bonded $GNOT to vote on any number of valid proposals.
- Proposals are made from a list of templates as defined by this Constitution and are pre-approved by at least two existing GovDAO members.
- Proposals run with the same rules and duration as Atom.One proposals including any self-adjusting deposit limits to reduce spam.
- At the end of all proposal voting periods of proposals voted on by bonded users the $GNOT may be returned to the user immediately.
No Constitutional Amendments may inflate the $GNOT supply above what is already declared.
While Gno.land Constitutional Amendments require a Constitutional Majority Decision, Law Amendments only require a Supermajority Decision by GovDAO. Otherwise the procedure for making Law Amendments are similar to those for Constitutional Amendments.
Laws may apply to GovDAO, the Oversight Body, all Core DAOs and also all users and service providers of Gno.land.
If there are any conflicts between the Constitution and Laws the Constitution takes precedence over the Laws. Likewise if there are any conflicts between Bylaws of Core DAOs and Laws, the Laws take precedence over Bylaws.
Both GovDAO and the Oversight Body are responsible for ensuring that new Law Amendments are consistent with the Constitution.
NT,LLC retains the exclusive rights to word mark and brand "Gno", and "*Gno*". NT,LLC grants GovDAO the right to use the "Gno.land" brand, but NT,LLC is responsible for managing all domain and subdomains that include the "Gno" word mark unless otherwise delegated as decided by NT,LLC. In the case of the "gno.land" domain and subdomains NT,LLC must ensure that it points to the Gno.land chain, unless the Gno.land identity ceases to exist as defined in this Constitution.
For a period of 4 years after launch NT,LLC has the sole authority to determine reasonable guidelines for the content of the main entry pages ("gno.land" and "www.gno.land"). Thereafter the content of these main entry pages are determined by this Constitution and applicable laws and overseen by the Oversight Body. All Qualified Forks of Gno.land must be listed on these main pages at all times.
Gno.land and its Qualified Forks may only use the "Gno" word mark and brand and the "Gno.land" identity and domain and "gnoland*" chain ID for as long as Gno is the only contracting language on the chain as determined solely by NT,LLC; and for as long as GnoWeb is used to render the contents; or unless allowed by NT,LLC pre-approval on chain by cryptographic signatures by its multisig. Only NT,LLC may determine the identity of the Gno language for any version and may authorize releases of the GnoVM and GnoWeb. The implementation of Gno.land may not require the GnoVM if after GnoVM is finalized the alternative implementation is identical with the GnoVM as determined by NT,LLC and each release of the alternative implementation is approved by NT,LLC on chain by cryptographic signatures by its multisig.
Nothing prohibits Gno.land from changing its identity and adopting a different name that does not include the "Gno" wordmark and brand. GovDAO may choose to do so by a Constitutional Amendment. However in this case NT,LLC reserves the right to determine a fork of the Gno.land chain with any modifications to the constitution and with a new governance body. Such a fork will be considered a Qualified Fork even if its governance member set is completely independent of the original GovDAO members.
In all cases the latest released Gno.land node software must be able to run the transactions from the first Genesis launch until current latest transaction. This may be achieved by the following:
- A chain upgrade may have a sequential number in the chain ID.
- Each unique chain ID has its own Genesis State & transactions from index 0.
- The last transaction for a given chain ID results in the End State.
- The Genesis State of the next chain ID is composed of {End State, Migration Script, Other Genesis Params}.
- The Migration Script is applied to the End State to form a part of the next Genesis State.
- A folder with subfolders for each chain ID in sequence where each subfolder includes the blockchain of blocks of txs and a partial Genesis State that omits the End State of the previous chain ID; and also the last node release for that chain ID.
- A simple bash script to derive the latest state from the first Genesis by running all txs in sequence from the first chain ID to the last.
Blockchain nodes that have the full transaction history will always be able to sync to the latest state hash from genesis using the latest released node software and possibly also including previous node software releases. This is to preserve integrity. If validators and nodes are not allowed to store any offending transaction data they may prune past transactions as long as they maintain a recent qualified snapshot as determined by this Constitution or GovDAO and all transactions since the snapshot such that the latest blockchain state may be derived from the snapshot.
Until GNOT transfers are enabled, and for VM bugs that are best mitigated by replaying historical transactions or patching state, or in extreme cases of theft or exploits that affect large TVL, a transaction-replay hard-fork and/or state "surgery" may be performed a decided by GovDAO supermajority decision by those members who do not have a direct conflict of interest. While the number of transactions pruned from the hard-fork must be minimized, transactions dependent on said pruned transactions may also be pruned or fail if the dependency cannot be easily untangled. Independent transactions of unaffected realms will not be affected.
All upgrades to the Gno.land Node Software must be for Fully Audited Open Source IP (as any official software release) approved by GovDAO Supermajority Decision that includes the exact commit hash of the software release. The only exception to the Fully Audited requirement will be for emergency security patches as approved by Law.
No node operator may be required to run Gno.land Node Software that cannot be deterministically built with the source even in the case of security issues.
The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price (per byte) will never increase.
The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price may decrease by at most 10% a year.
The $GNOT Storage Deposit Price may not decrease if the total presently used storage exceeds the size of a typical consumer internal hard-disk or solid-state drive available for purchase by anyone for a PC; where such a storage drive is manufactured by independent manufacturers of at least three independent manufacturers and in three different countries; and such a storage drive is at least as good as the following in key performance metrics:
- Western Digital 10TB WD_Black Performance Internal Hard Drive HDD - 7200 RPM, SATA 6 Gb/s, 512 MB Cache, 3.5" - WD102FZBX
This is to keep the blockchain state at an accessible level for newcomers, developers, and hobbyists and also accounts for any future potential economic collapses.
State Purge Transactions are blockchain transactions for deleting state from a Gno.land realm or package. Transactions that depend on state purged by State Purge Transactions must fail with a special transaction response code. The Merkle-tree root hash must be derivable as if the data was there even after purge by State Purge Transactions. This helps preserve the integrity of the chain state for valid use-cases and makes it easier to undo when needed.
The procedures for State Purge Transactions including submission, signing, false-positive detection, and AI model registration are defined in the Laws.
See "Transaction Replay Forks".
See "Transaction Replay Forks".
All amendments (modifications) to this Constitution including changes to any definitions require a Constitutional Amendment pre-approved by the Oversight Body and passed by a Constitutional Majority Decision of GovDAO following all the rules of this Constitution.
Amendments to this Constitution must belong to one of several categories:
- Rewording of portions of the Constitution for clarity or refinement while maintaining the structure of the Constitution with no other additions or deletions.
- Restructuring to move portions of the Constitution for legibility without any changes to wording except for section headings or titles.
- Additions and deletions of portions of the Constitution without any other restructuring or rewordings.
Furthermore the Constitution must be one single markdown file and the latest constitution must be present in the repository under docs/CONSTITUTION.md.
Each amendment must be composed of up to three diff patches, one for each of the three categories in the order as declared above.
User rights, protections, and limitations will be determined by future Constitutional Amendments provided that freedom of speech will be protected with the following exceptions:
Pornographic material is defined as follows and can be further restricted by Law:
-
photographs or animated or AI rendered depictions of humans or animals or humanoid figures engaged in sexual activity or depicted in an arousing way including games or movies that include such material; except of classic art hand-painted prior to the year 1985 or classic sculptures hand-made prior to the year 1985.
-
photographs or animated or AI rendered depictions of naked minors under the age of 18 or humanoid figures that could reasonably be construed to be a minor including games or movies that include such material; except of classic sculptures hand-made prior to the year 1985.
Gore material is defined as follows:
- realistic depictions of gore whether photographic, video, animated, or AI rendered, and whether embedded in a movie or in a game; and excludes material that is submitted for educational purposes especially those related to political conflicts or abuses of power.
Harmful material (material harmful for users) is defined as:
- material that is determined to result in hacks or exploits of user devices unbeknownst to the user. This excludes material that is submitted for educational purposes and includes relevant disclaimers to make clear that the material is harmful and is unlikely to result in accidental hacks or exploits of user devices.
Pornographic, Gore, and Harmful material are altogether called Banned Offensive Material. Banned Offensive Material as determined by the relevant GovDAO DAO or as determined by the Oversight Body may be filtered by GnoWeb or the blockchain node in API responses in such a way that anyone who runs GnoWeb or the blockchain node can also replicate the filter without pay or conditions and without relying on any external service. This does not include hatespeech or misinformation: neither GovDAO nor the Oversight Body nor any Core DAOs may determine what is hatespeech or misinformation. This is to ensure freedom of speech.
For the avoidance of doubt, any files released to the public as a matter of public accountability regarding the Epstein files may reside on gno.land but with complete redaction of the offending materials (e.g. redacted photos are OK, explicit photos are not). The files are a matter of national and international security, and as such they belong on Gno.land as do any discussions. The privacy of individuals mentioned in those files is not yet protected by this Constitution but should be clarified with an amendment.
Only Banned Offensive Material may be purged from the blockchain state by marking code packages or state objects (including entire realms) as such with a State Purge Transaction.
The Principle of the Chain must be preserved at all times; that is, the blockchain of blocks of transactions will not itself be modified (but the state may be with subsequent transactions). See also "Principle of the Chain".
Code packages and realms that are primarily designed or used to bypass these checks may also be frozen with a State Freeze Transaction with a future Constitutional Amendment that defines the procedure and limitations but in no case may any state be purged except for the Banned Offensive Material. A porn realm may have all of its pornographic material purged but comments about the porn do not fall in this category so therefore cannot be purged. This is to prevent abuse and censorship of legitimate discussions.
DMCA or GDPR or similar that are concerned with intellectual property or privacy will not affect the Principle of the Chain; this is because such laws can be misused to censor information that the public ought to know. As with the aforementioned other offending material each validator or node is responsible for deleting old blockchain transaction history as needed. GovDAO may pass a Constitutional Amendment to include DMCA or GDPR issues in the class of material that may be purged from blockchain state with a Purge Transaction but only after a hierarchical bonded system of manual review first takes place to filter for a strict subset of DMCA or GDPR or similar requests in accordance with terms defined in the Constitution under "User Rights and Limitations". In no case will there be an automated system that purges such state, nor any guarantees of timeliness of processing such material be offered or required.
Notwithstanding the above, such material may be filtered by GnoWeb.
Any $GNOT byte deposit tokens of state purged from the blockchain state with State Purge Transactions (after a proving period of 6 months without being marked on-chain as a false-positive purge by any False Positive Purge Detection Transaction nor determined to be a false-positive by this Constitution or the Oversight Body) may only be used for the purpose of developing or acquiring self-contained open-source AI models and tools for automated or semi-automatic purging of state; or be used to pay a moderation team as determined by this Constitution. The confiscation of deposited $GNOT for such purposes must require a special Purge Deposit Confiscation Transaction signed by any parties as determined by this Constitution, and will fail if the purge occurred less than 6 months ago or if the state was marked since by a False Positive Purge Detection Transaction.
No more than half of such confiscated $GNOT deposits may be used to fund for any manual moderation--half or more must be used for the development of automated systems. The Oversight Body may redirect a third of these funds to fund for the development or acquisition of alternative moderation systems that conform to all requirements of this Constitution if it determines that the existing moderation system is not effective, or has an unacceptable amount of false-positives; but the adoption of any alternative system must require a GovDAO Simple Majority Decision contingent on there being no more false-positive purges and no more false-negatives as determined by this Constitution and the GovDAO voting members. The Oversight Body may also block the submission of any or all Purge Deposit Confiscation Transactions at any time if it determines that it is being misused; after which GovDAO is responsible for the continued funding for moderation from its own treasury until the Oversight Body resumes the submission Purge Deposit Confiscation Transactions.
User or realm tokens or property that are not $GNOT deposit tokens of purged state whether native tokens or Gno application derived may not be confiscated by any means, though they may be frozen by State Freeze Transactions.
User or realm tokens or property that are determined to be derived from any hacks, thefts, or exploits and are not determined to have already been transferred to unrelated parties may be frozen by a State Freeze Transaction or the funds used to recompense associated victims as determined by a future Constitutional Amendment and governed by the Constitution Only.
Each recompense decision must be independent of another and require a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO. The public must be provided sufficient information to judge the soundness of each decision.
At any time GovDAO by Supermajority Decision will have the right and authority to address bugs in the Core Software including the GnoVM, node software, and systems Gno code by filtering or annotating transactions or making adjustments to state (Transaction Replay Forks). This does not apply to general Gno ecosystem Gno code issues.
Before and until 1 year after $GNOT is transferrable GovDAO by Supermajority Decision has the right and authority to make Transaction Replay Forks for the purpose of addressing hacks, thefts, and exploits or other problems in the spirit of the Constitution.
The extra-blockchain information of a Transaction Replay Fork such as transaction annotations, filters, and state adjustments is considered a part of the node software and not a part of the blockchain structure (of blocks of transactions) itself, so as to preserve the Principle of the Chain.
These terms are expected to be modified before the 1 year mark to clarify or modify the Transaction Replay Fork rules.
GovDAO is responsible for ensuring that GnoWeb and Gno.land track audit reports of all code uploaded to Gno as well as the code of the blockchain and VM itself.
All auditing entities must be qualified; they must be vetted and whitelisted by GovDAO Supermajority Decision on a Gno.land realm managed directly by GovDAO (the Auditor and Audits Registry). The auditing entity must be vetted with sufficient due diligence and already have a good reputation and track record. This is to prevent malicious audit reports from confusing and exploiting users. The auditing reports by such Qualified Auditors are called Qualified Audit Reports.
Each auditing entity must be registered with general information such as the jurisdiction of the auditing entity and the public identity of its chief executives; and significant owners (more than 10%) of the auditing entity must be disclosed to GovDAO T1 members. The auditing entity may not be a DAO nor be fully automated based on AI. This is to ensure that there is a clear legal jurisdiction and accountability in case of abuse by any auditing entity.
The Auditor and Audits Registry must allow any sufficiently $GNOT bonded user (Bonded Auditor) from submitting newly discovered vulnerabilities missed by any audit report (whether qualified or not) and with some reasonable deposit per Bonded Vulnerability Report to be used for assessment of the validity of the submission. The submission should include a hash of the vulnerability report but not the vulnerability itself. The procedure to determine these reports will be defined by future Constitutional Amendments.
The Auditor and Audits Registry realm must track the scope of every audit report and vulnerability report and record all known relevant information such that any third party may independently derive a score for each auditing entity.
GnoWeb and all official alternatives (GnoWeb+Alts) must prominently link to any relevant Qualified Audit Reports and hosted on the Auditor and Audits Registry realm for all Gno hosted Gno code; but must not convey to the user any warrantees.
Audit reports from non-qualified auditors may also be displayed on GnoWeb+Alts, but they must be folded away and require at least one more click or user action to show along with a prominent warning that those auditors have not been vetted.
GnoWeb+Alts may display with any Gno code any overall audit status, badge, or similar (Audit Status) derived from all Qualified Audits and any standing Bonded Vulnerability Reports; however the Audit Status may not be numeric based on any line-count or file-count or similar so as to be misleading to the user. Code coverage of audits may be displayed as a percentage or numeric value(s) but must be clearly separate from the Audit Status.
In no case may GnoWeb+Alts display the best Audit Status or a "green" or "approved" status or badge or anything that can be construed as such for any code unless the entire scope of the code and its dependencies have been reviewed by at least one Qualified Audit Report and all Qualified Audit Reports are free of any critical or major vulnerabilities or any issue that may result in the loss of control or value by any user, and all Qualified Auditors are still in good standing, and no Bonded Vulnerability Reports have been submitted either that has not been dismissed explicitly as a false-positive for the code and all of its dependencies. Furthermore such a status or badge or anything that can be construed as such may only be displayed if manually reviewed by at least three GovDAO members two of whom are T1 or T2 members; and they will each be responsible for ensuring that all the conditions are satisfied; however they will not be responsible for the correctness of each Qualified Audit Report.
Realms must be clearly shown in GnoWeb to be upgradeable or not upgradeable (immutable).
-
An immutable realm may not revert to being upgradeable.
-
No types declared in upgradeable realms may be persisted in immutable realms.
-
No upgradeable realms may be imported by immutable realms.
This creates a two-class system where immutable realms only depend on other immutable realms. The state of immutable realms may be mutated by any logic as allowed, but the upgrading of upgradeable realms can not otherwise affect any immutable realms.
Library packages declared in /p/ may not be upgraded.
Gnoweb must make clear to users of upgradeable realms that any funds depend on the trust of the realm controller.
The only exception to the above rules may occur in response to a hack or exploit. GovDAO by Supermajority Decision and pre-approval by the Oversight Body may patch any realm package or library package if it is deemed to be in the best interest of the Gno.land users and $GNOT economy.
TODO Rest to be determined after launch by a Constitutional Amendment.
The primary purpose is for providing human readable names for package paths
(e.g. org_name in "gno.land/r/org_name/pkg_name").
Name registration will not initially be implemented.
There will be at most one core name registration system for Gno.land, though anyone may deploy their own for any purpose not managed by Gno.land, and as per the Seven Mandates of Gno.land no name is required for any core services (such as MsgAddPackage or MsgExec).
The name registration system must satisfy the following:
-
Only lowercase alphabetic ASCII characters are allowed with underscores not as the first character.
-
The length is between 5 and 25 characters.
-
The canonicalized name must not start with any of:
- "gl" (and neither "gi", so as to be distinct from "g1..." addresses)
- "gno"
- "cosmos"
- "atom"
- "admin" (and neither "admln")
- "support"
- and more prefixes as determined by GovDAO.
- and blacklists also determined by GovDAO.
-
Notwithstanding the above NT,LLC may reserve names that start with "gno".
-
The canonicalized name must not include (as prefix or suffix or otherwise) the canonicalized form of any reserved names as defined by handshake-org/hsd#819 without an on-chain transparent process approved by GovDAO to respect trademarks with priority given to US, then the EU; or only if the inclusion is deemed to be sufficiently unique by a reasonable algorithm implemented on chain but still preventing collisions in the canonicalized form; or on a case-by-case basis.
-
A registration of the name is permanent. Names may be disabled by a procedure defined by a Constitutional Amendment that defines the criteria for such disablement, but such names cannot be used again by anyone else.
-
The name registration takes learnings from the Handshake protocol including handshake-org/hsd#649
Each of the above mentioned treasuries may be separately diversified by Supermajority Decision by GovDAO of one proposal per treasury in accordance with the Constitution--but all GovDAO members with any conflicts of tokens (except $GNOT) above 3 months of salary for a typical senior software developer MUST abstain from voting. If a quorum cannot possibly be reached due to conflict of interests the Oversight Body may waive the quorum requirement.
Diversification for each treasury must adhere to a Treasury Diversification Template listed explicitly in this Constitution by a future amendment that declares the desired target ratio of Approved Treasury Diversification Tokens, and the following:
-
Besides $GNOT or the top two dominant Bitcoin fork tokens (presently $BTC and $BCH but may change in the future) which will always be approved, all other tokens of the Approved Treasury Diversification Tokens must be stablecoins FULLY backed by collateral.
- Coins that are FULLY backed by silver via decentralized and publicly auditable depositories approved by GovDAO are also considered stablecoins.
- Tether and all stablecoins backed by any amount of Tether are never permitted.
- Tokens that lose their approved status must be replaced (sold) for approved tokens as soon as reasonable.
- These subclauses and the parent clause cannot be removed by any constitutional amendment.
-
$PHOTON is not a stablecoin but it may be allowed by up to 20%.
-
$ATONE tokens or any other staking tokens are not allowed.
-
In no case may the amount of $GNOT sold per treasury per month for diversification purposes exceed 1% of $GNOT of that treasury as measured at the beginning of each month.
-
In no case may the total amount of $GNOT sold for all treasuries per month for diversification purposes exceed 50% of the past month's transaction fee revenue, with priority given to ValTreasury, then to CoreTreasury.
-
All trades for diversification purposes must be performed by audited and approved Gno logic for Gno AMM contracts running on Gno.land. No person or council may directly manage the diversification of treasury tokens except that GovDAO may delegate an oversight DAO to halt any diversification exchange transactions.
These are the procedures to create a Qualified Fork of Gno.land.
First, a fork proposal is voted on by all GovDAO members. The fork proposal must be voted YES by more than 1/3 of the total voting power of GovDAO (abstains do not count) by the end of the voting period of three weeks. There is no commitment yet for voting YES on this initial fork proposal.
If such a fork proposal reaches more than 1/3 of voting power, a second fork commitment proposal must be initiated with the same terms as the original within a week after the first fork proposal's voting period has ended. Again all GovDAO members vote on this second proposal. The second fork proposal must also be voted YES by more than 1/3 of all the total voting power of GovDAO by the end of the voting period of three weeks. Abstaining is equivalent to voting NO. Those who vote YES here are committing to join the others who voted YES and split from those who voted NO or abstained if it also reaches 1/3 of voting power--members may only serve on one chain.
If the second fork commitment proposal also reaches more than 1/3 of voting power, two concurrent proposals must be proposed to determine which fork retains the original Gno.land identity: one for the current chain, and another for the proposed fork. Only T1 members may vote on these proposals; and they may vote YES or NO on one or both proposals.
-
If the current chain wins a 2/3 supermajority of votes of the original T1 members (but not the proposed fork), everyone who voted YES on the fork commitment proposal are ejected from the GovDAO membership set, and the proposed fork is called a Qualified Fork.
-
If the proposed fork wins a 2/3 supermajority of votes of the original T1 members but not the current chain, everyone who did not vote YES on the fork commitment proposal are ejected from the GovDAO membership set to join their Qualified Fork, and the proposed fork retains the identity of the Gno.land chain.
-
If both proposals win a 2/3 supermajority, NewTendermint,LLC decides which gets to retain the identity of the chain (and the other is ejected from the GovDAO membership set to join their Qualified Fork).
-
If neither fork wins a 2/3 supermajority of votes, NewTendermint,LLC decides which fork gets to keep the identity of the chain, and whether the existing chain can retain the "Gno.land" name.
- If neither can keep the "Gno.land" name, the "Gno.land" name is deprecated and cannot be used by any chain ever again; and the exiting chain may be required to change its chain ID; and the Gno.land domain will be managed by NewTendermint,LLC to point to both chains; and both chains will be deemed to be Qualified Forks. Any royalty payments due to the original chain may be directed to either fork or split between the two forks as determined by NewTendermint,LLC.
In all cases any new forks that include "Gno" in the name or chain ID must get approved by NewTendermint,LLC.
All Qualified Forks may copy and use all of the state (including transaction data) and code as from before the fork.
Non-qualified forks are not hereby prohibited from copying the state or code of realms and packages of all forks of Gno.land. That is, everyone who submits code or transactions to Gno.land or any of its forks are agreeing to allow (and attesting to having the unencumbered rights to allow) the code and resulting blockchain state to be used freely as per the Gno Network GPL license (a copyleft license fork of the AGPL3.0 but with modifications to allow for "strong attribution"). However this is necessarily complicated when users submit Gno code that is not owned by them, so no rights are explicitly granted here by Gno.land or NewTendermint,LLC.
As with most of the software for the Gno.land stack including the GnoVM (except for Tendermint2 which is Apache2.0) and derived works, all users of the Gno code and blockchain state derived from Gno.land must abide by the same strong attribution terms as for the Gno.land and GnoVM software at the time the code is submitted--for example a non-qualified fork of Gno.land must give strong attribution to all of its users to Gno.land or another Qualified Fork as determined by the policy set forth by NewTendermint,LLC. NewTendermint,LLC may determine that giving attribution to a Qualified Fork is sufficient (as opposed to giving attribution to Gno.land), but a non-qualified fork will never benefit from strong attribution in this way. The policies may be updated by NewTendermint,LLC from time to time; and the goal is to finalize portions of the policy such that they may be embedded into the Gno.land Constitution.
These terms must be made clear in GnoWeb and gnocli for anyone submitting code or any transaction. Specifically for anyone uploading realm or library packages to Gno.land using gnocli they must first sign an approved CLA compatible with the above and include a hash of the CLA with each transaction.
All software including Core Software funded for by Gno.land must be Fully Audited before any release when funded by Gno.land. This condition and guidelines for compliance must be made explicit in any contract or agreement before any funding decisions are approved by any Core DAO.
Fully Audited means that all dependencies of the software are also audited by a Qualified Auditor unless exempt by the Constitution or Law. This requirement may be relaxed for a period of 4 years after launch for existing software unless otherwise stated by Law.
External dependencies must be regulated such that every update to the external dependency requires audits as well or manual review of each minimal security patch. No major or minor version upgrades will be allowed automatically for releases; that is, development branches may allow such automated updates but the release process must include a procedure for vetting any changes to dependencies since the last version.
All funding for Core Software must be toward the finalization of the software for the major version number of that software.
-
Funding for Core Software must include an estimate for the future time of finalization of the software which may be any number of years into the future.
-
Software development that exceeds 7 years of development without finalization for the software for the major version number may be halted by the Oversight Body unless an extension of up to 2 years is granted by a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO. Extensions may be granted at any time, and may be to another development party.
-
After the finalization of the software the only funding allowed is for the maintenance of that software
At no point may a GovDAO or Gno.land fund for the development of any software or team or anything else that allows or encourages the user to enter their private key or mnemonic on any online computer or mobile network-capable device. The only exception is for existing hardware wallets that allow for bluetooth, as some of these devices already support bluetooth, as long as bluetooth can be disabled.
Only 24 word mnemonics may be supported by Core Software; not 12 or 18.
Ephemeral private keys with limited capabilities and default reasonable limitations on losses (in the case of theft or exploit) may be generated on online computers or mobile network-capable devices, but no ephemeral keys may be imported manually by the user nor converted into a mnemonic so as to prevent any confusion. The term "mnemonic" must only refer to their master private key.
GovDAO must maintain a simple guide for users to harden their security as defined in the Laws.
GovDAO must ensure the timely development of Safety Wrapper Contracts for protecting users from theft or loss. The specifications are defined in the Laws.
Gno.land is committed to quantum-proof readiness for both user accounts and validators. The re-use of public keys should be prohibited when feasible, and Merkle hash based commitments should be explored for account recovery after quantum breakthroughs. The detailed roadmap is defined in the Laws.
New cryptographic primitives or implementations must be approved by a qualified Cryptography Committee as defined in the Laws.
GovDAO must pursue formal verification of Go or Gno programs when economically feasible. The conditions and procedures are defined in the Laws.
GovDAO must pursue the development of open hardware and forensic analysis of common hardware when economically feasible. The specifications and procedures are defined in the Laws.
This is based off of atomone-hub/genesis/CONSTITUTION.md and simplified.
These common DAO specifications apply for all Core DAOs unless otherwise specified, Special Purpose DAOs, and all sub-DAOs of these DAOs. Other DAOs that are not Core DAOs or Special Purpose DAOs or Descendants of these DAOs need not implement these specifications.
All sub-DAOs have parent DAOs. The parent DAO of the Core DAOs and Special Purpose DAOs is GovDAO itself. Therefore all Core DAOs and Special Purpose DAOs as well as their sub-DAOs and GovDAO itself altogether form a tree structure. The parent DAO and the parent DAO’s parent DAO and so on, all the way up to GovDAO are altogether called the Ancestors of a DAO. The sub-DAOs and their sub-DAOs and so on are called the Descendants of a DAO.
Every DAO, upon creation, must have a Charter (which is composed of Purpose and Description), an initial set of Council members (which may be empty) and may also have Bylaws and Mandates. The Purpose and Description must be plaintext files. The Bylaws and Mandates must be named plaintext files or folders of plaintext files, or folders of folders.
A DAO’s Charter, Bylaws, and Mandates may be changed by a Simple Majority vote from any of the DAO’s ancestors, except from GovDAO which requires a Supermajority vote.
A DAO’s Bylaws, Mandates, and the Bylaws and Mandates of its ancestor DAOs, the relevant Laws, and this Constitution, altogether are called the Governing Documents of the DAO.
A DAO has a Council composed of zero or more members, with no maximum number of members unless otherwise specified in its Governing Documents.
The Council of a DAO may change the Bylaws of the DAO, and otherwise make Decisions on behalf of the DAO by passing Proposals.
A DAO may establish any number of sub-DAOs through the DAO Council’s Simple Majority vote, with their own defined Charters and specific bylaws and mandates, as necessity may arise and in accordance with the parent DAO Charter and bylaws. Sub-DAOs are owned by and can be controlled by the parent DAO, and members are also subject to the ancestor DAOs’ bylaws and mandates.
A Simple Majority in DAO governance is defined to be exactly “more than half”. A Supermajority in DAO governance is defined to be exactly "two thirds or more". This is distinct from a Supermajority Decision of GovDAO.
By default, unless specified otherwise in its Governing Documents, the following rules apply for Council voting:
- each member has equal voting power (no member may occupy multiple seats)
- a Council member may resign and thereby remove themselves from the Council
- vote options are YES, NO, or ABSTAIN
- the tally denominator is the total number of voters (ABSTAINS do not count).
- voting for proposals are open until they are decided immediately by a supermajority of YES votes, or dismissed immediately by a simple majority of NO votes, or otherwise the voting period has passed.
By default, unless specified otherwise in its Governing Documents, the following rules apply for Council membership election:
- the Council may elect one or more new members, and/or remove one or more members, by Supermajority vote. (self mutating).
- the DAO’s Ancestors may modify the Council membership with a Supermajority vote.
Each DAO may have an associated crypto address which can hold any number of tokens.
DAOs may operate with logic on Gno.land, or, represented as a m-of-n multisig account on Gno.land where the signers are each members of the DAO’s council, where m is more than ½ n and also m is 3 or more. In all cases financial transactions from the DAO’s treasury must follow the passage of governance proposals on the DAO.