deny.toml

# cargo-deny configuration — supply-chain gate for the dependency tree.
#
# Run locally with `just audit`; CI runs the same command on every PR and on a
# nightly schedule (an advisory published after a merge still needs to be caught).
#
# Scope: this file gates **security advisories** and **duplicate versions**.
# License policy is deliberately not configured yet — see the note at the bottom.

[advisories]
# Fail on any advisory affecting a crate we actually build, except the
# individually justified exceptions below. Each entry must say why it is
# tolerated and what would remove it; an exception without an exit path is a
# bug, not a policy.
ignore = [
    # RUSTSEC-2025-0141 — bincode 1.3.3 is unmaintained (the team ceased
    # development; not a vulnerability). We use it for the control-plane codec.
    # No known exploit; migration to bincode 2.x or postcard is a wire-format
    # change and needs its own issue.
    "RUSTSEC-2025-0141",

    # RUSTSEC-2025-0057 — fxhash is unmaintained (not a vulnerability). Pulled
    # in transitively by monoio 0.2.4, which is the io_uring data-plane runtime.
    # Not directly reachable from our code; removal depends on monoio.
    "RUSTSEC-2025-0057",

    # RUSTSEC-2026-0177 — pyo3 <0.29 missing `Sync` bound on
    # `PyCFunction::new_closure`. The Python client does not call that API
    # (verified by grep over clients/python/src). Fixing means pyo3 0.22 -> 0.29,
    # a semver-major bump with its own migration.
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0177",

    # RUSTSEC-2025-0020 — pyo3 <0.24.1 buffer overflow risk in
    # `PyString::from_object`. Same reasoning: the API is not called by the
    # Python client, and the fix is the same major bump.
    "RUSTSEC-2025-0020",
]

[bans]
# Duplicate major versions of the same crate bloat the binary and make it
# ambiguous which copy a CVE applies to. Warn rather than deny: the tree
# currently has legitimate duplicates via kube/tonic/etcd-client that we do not
# control, and turning this red would make the gate noise rather than signal.
multiple-versions = "warn"
# Every wildcard requirement in this workspace is an intra-workspace `path`
# dependency (`talon-core.workspace = true` and friends), which is normal and
# not a supply-chain risk. cargo-deny's `allow-wildcard-paths` exemption only
# applies to crates marked unpublishable, which ours are not, so this stays at
# `warn` rather than flagging our own crates on every run.
wildcards = "warn"

[sources]
# Only crates.io. A git or registry source appearing here would be a supply-chain
# change worth failing on.
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"

# NOTE on licenses: `cargo deny check licenses` currently rejects all 236
# dependencies because no allow-list is configured. Choosing that list is a
# licensing-policy decision for the project (which SPDX identifiers are
# acceptable for an Apache-2.0 product), not something to settle in a CI plumbing
# change. Until then CI runs `check advisories bans sources` explicitly rather
# than bare `cargo deny check`, so the license gate is off rather than silently
# passing. Enabling it is tracked separately.