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proposals/mips/mip-b52/b52.md

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## MIP-B52: Bad Debt Remediation
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### **Summary**
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This proposal implements Anthias Labs' recommended actions to remediate the
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outstanding bad debt within select markets on Moonwell's Base implementation
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resulting from events which took place on October 10th, 2025 and November
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4th, 2025. This proposal also formalizes an allocation strategy for distributing
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excess reserves between cbXRP and VIRTUAL, based on both proportional debt share
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and contributor feedback on interest-rate dynamics.
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### **Background**
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Anthias has conducted a reserve and risk assessment on Moonwell Base following
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the two major incidents that produced bad debt in multiple markets. Their
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analysis included a review on current protocol reserve balances, updated minimum
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reserve targets, outstanding bad debt, and the proper distribution of excess
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reserves available for repayment among the highest interest markets.
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Moonwell holds approximately 1.89M USD in reserves, distributed across assets
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like WETH, USDC, cbBTC, AERO, etc. Significant idle reserves exist in WETH,
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USDC, and cbBTC. These reserves can partially or fully cover existing bad debt
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without external funding.
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Anthias has identified 5.25M USD in required reserves to fully remediate all bad
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debt, with the largest deficits concentrated in cbXRP (2.57M USD), VIRTUAL
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(1.96M USD), AERO (248K USD), and other markets like MORPHO, EURC, and cbETH. No
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single market's bad debt can be resolved using only its own reserves,
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necessitating a coordinated proposal.
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### **Proposal**
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This proposal enacts the following changes on Moonwell Base only:
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1. Limit Reserve Auctions During Bad-Debt Remediation
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- Reserve auctions on Base (and OP Mainnet, where applicable) will be limited
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and minimized while bad debt is being repaid.
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- Auctions will not be fully halted; contributors may still conduct small or
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periodic auctions when necessary or when the opportunity arises.
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- The intention is to conserve reserves during the remediation period while
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maintaining flexibility for contributors.
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2. Redirect 100% of Reserve Accruals Toward Bad-Debt Repayment
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- All future reserve income (interest margin, liquidation fees, protocol
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revenue) will go directly to paying down outstanding bad debt.
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3. Utilize Excess Reserves in WETH, USDC, and cbBTC
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- Anthias identifies significant excess reserves in these markets.
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- Authorise their use to cover bad debt, starting with:
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1. cbXRP
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2. VIRTUAL
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3. AERO, MORPHO, EURC, cbETH (in order of deficit)
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4. Adopt Minimum Reserve Targets
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- Reserve auctions remain limited until each asset’s reserves reach or exceed
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Anthias’ recommended minimum level.
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5. Adopt an Allocation Strategy for cbXRP and VIRTUAL
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- These two assets are of high interest and with a significant portion of
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shortfall being centered between these two assets. As such, there may be a
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preference to pay off VIRTUAL first due its historically high interest
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rate.
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6. Transparently Communicate Progress
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- The Foundation or designated contributors will report ongoing metrics
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including:
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- Remaining bad debt
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- Reserves used
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- Reserve accrual rate
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- Progress toward minimum reserve targets
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### **Rationale**
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Bad debt weakens protocol solvency, user confidence, and long-term
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sustainability. The Anthias analysis demonstrates both:
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1. The scale of the problem — multiple markets are underwater, with an aggregate
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shortfall of ~$5.25 M.
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2. A clear, conservative path to remediation — using existing reserves, limiting
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auctions, and redirecting future accrual allows Moonwell to address the issue
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without external capital or token dilution.
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PLimiting reserve auctions ensures the protocol does not drain capital too
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quickly while still allowing contributors flexibility to conduct small or
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periodic auctions when needed. Redirecting reserve accrual speeds up repayment
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using organic protocol revenue. Drawing from excess reserves in the most solvent
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markets allows immediate remediation of the largest deficits without sacrificing
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safety.
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In short: this plan protects the protocol, its users, and its long-term
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viability.
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### **Voting Options**
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- **Yes** — Adopt the Anthias bad-debt remediation plan: limit auctions,
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redirect reserves, and use excess WETH/USDC/cbBTC to repay bad debt.
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- **No** — Reject the plan; continue current reserve operations.
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- **Abstain** — No preference.
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proposals/mips/mip-x37/x37.md

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proposals/mips/mips.json

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"envpath": "",
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"governor": "MultichainGovernor",
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"id": 0,
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"path": "mip-x37.sol/mipx37.json",
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"path": "mip-b52.sol/mipb52.json",
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"proposalType": "HybridProposal"
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},
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{

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