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| 1 | +## MIP-B52: Bad Debt Remediation |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +### **Summary** |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +This proposal implements Anthias Labs' recommended actions to remediate the |
| 6 | +outstanding bad debt within select markets on Moonwell's Base implementation |
| 7 | +resulting from events which took place on October 10th, 2025 and November |
| 8 | +4th, 2025. This proposal also formalizes an allocation strategy for distributing |
| 9 | +excess reserves between cbXRP and VIRTUAL, based on both proportional debt share |
| 10 | +and contributor feedback on interest-rate dynamics. |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | +### **Background** |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +Anthias has conducted a reserve and risk assessment on Moonwell Base following |
| 15 | +the two major incidents that produced bad debt in multiple markets. Their |
| 16 | +analysis included a review on current protocol reserve balances, updated minimum |
| 17 | +reserve targets, outstanding bad debt, and the proper distribution of excess |
| 18 | +reserves available for repayment among the highest interest markets. |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +Moonwell holds approximately 1.89M USD in reserves, distributed across assets |
| 21 | +like WETH, USDC, cbBTC, AERO, etc. Significant idle reserves exist in WETH, |
| 22 | +USDC, and cbBTC. These reserves can partially or fully cover existing bad debt |
| 23 | +without external funding. |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +Anthias has identified 5.25M USD in required reserves to fully remediate all bad |
| 26 | +debt, with the largest deficits concentrated in cbXRP (2.57M USD), VIRTUAL |
| 27 | +(1.96M USD), AERO (248K USD), and other markets like MORPHO, EURC, and cbETH. No |
| 28 | +single market's bad debt can be resolved using only its own reserves, |
| 29 | +necessitating a coordinated proposal. |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | +### **Proposal** |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +This proposal enacts the following changes on Moonwell Base only: |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +1. Limit Reserve Auctions During Bad-Debt Remediation |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | + - Reserve auctions on Base (and OP Mainnet, where applicable) will be limited |
| 38 | + and minimized while bad debt is being repaid. |
| 39 | + - Auctions will not be fully halted; contributors may still conduct small or |
| 40 | + periodic auctions when necessary or when the opportunity arises. |
| 41 | + - The intention is to conserve reserves during the remediation period while |
| 42 | + maintaining flexibility for contributors. |
| 43 | + |
| 44 | +2. Redirect 100% of Reserve Accruals Toward Bad-Debt Repayment |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | + - All future reserve income (interest margin, liquidation fees, protocol |
| 47 | + revenue) will go directly to paying down outstanding bad debt. |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +3. Utilize Excess Reserves in WETH, USDC, and cbBTC |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | + - Anthias identifies significant excess reserves in these markets. |
| 52 | + - Authorise their use to cover bad debt, starting with: |
| 53 | + 1. cbXRP |
| 54 | + 2. VIRTUAL |
| 55 | + 3. AERO, MORPHO, EURC, cbETH (in order of deficit) |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +4. Adopt Minimum Reserve Targets |
| 58 | + |
| 59 | + - Reserve auctions remain limited until each asset’s reserves reach or exceed |
| 60 | + Anthias’ recommended minimum level. |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +5. Adopt an Allocation Strategy for cbXRP and VIRTUAL |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | + - These two assets are of high interest and with a significant portion of |
| 65 | + shortfall being centered between these two assets. As such, there may be a |
| 66 | + preference to pay off VIRTUAL first due its historically high interest |
| 67 | + rate. |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +6. Transparently Communicate Progress |
| 70 | + - The Foundation or designated contributors will report ongoing metrics |
| 71 | + including: |
| 72 | + - Remaining bad debt |
| 73 | + - Reserves used |
| 74 | + - Reserve accrual rate |
| 75 | + - Progress toward minimum reserve targets |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +### **Rationale** |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +Bad debt weakens protocol solvency, user confidence, and long-term |
| 80 | +sustainability. The Anthias analysis demonstrates both: |
| 81 | + |
| 82 | +1. The scale of the problem — multiple markets are underwater, with an aggregate |
| 83 | + shortfall of ~$5.25 M. |
| 84 | +2. A clear, conservative path to remediation — using existing reserves, limiting |
| 85 | + auctions, and redirecting future accrual allows Moonwell to address the issue |
| 86 | + without external capital or token dilution. |
| 87 | + |
| 88 | +PLimiting reserve auctions ensures the protocol does not drain capital too |
| 89 | +quickly while still allowing contributors flexibility to conduct small or |
| 90 | +periodic auctions when needed. Redirecting reserve accrual speeds up repayment |
| 91 | +using organic protocol revenue. Drawing from excess reserves in the most solvent |
| 92 | +markets allows immediate remediation of the largest deficits without sacrificing |
| 93 | +safety. |
| 94 | + |
| 95 | +In short: this plan protects the protocol, its users, and its long-term |
| 96 | +viability. |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +### **Voting Options** |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +- **Yes** — Adopt the Anthias bad-debt remediation plan: limit auctions, |
| 101 | + redirect reserves, and use excess WETH/USDC/cbBTC to repay bad debt. |
| 102 | +- **No** — Reject the plan; continue current reserve operations. |
| 103 | +- **Abstain** — No preference. |
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