fix(node): say what the startup check skipped in operator terms

The warning named our own mechanism and left the operator to work out
which of their chains went unchecked; it now lists them.

The docs claimed a `ton` section exists, and that chains without an
inspector report a status name an operator never sees.

Author: haiyuechen-nearone

crates/e2e-tests/tests/foreign_chain_probe.rs

@@ -42,8 +42,9 @@ async fn foreign_chain_probe__should_publish_provider_health_on_startup() {
     setup_evm_mock(&server, MockAuthExpectation::None);
     let url = server.url("/");
 
-    let (cluster, _running) =
-        common::must_setup_cluster(common::FOREIGN_CHAIN_PROBE_PORT_SEED, |c| {
+    let (cluster, _running) = common::must_setup_cluster(
+        common::FOREIGN_CHAIN_PROBE_PORT_SEED,
+        |c: &mut e2e_tests::MpcClusterConfig| {
             c.num_nodes = 2;
             c.threshold = 2;
             c.foreign_chains.node_configs = vec![
@@ -56,8 +57,9 @@ async fn foreign_chain_probe__should_publish_provider_health_on_startup() {
                     ..Default::default()
                 },
             ];
-        })
-        .await;
+        },
+    )
+    .await;
 
     // when — the probe runs detached at startup, so both gauges settle on their own.
     common::wait_metric_on_nodes(

crates/node-config/src/foreign_chains.rs

@@ -702,8 +702,6 @@ ckd:
         assert!(error.contains("support only header auth"), "{error}");
     }
 
-    /// `ForeignChain::label` promises the key an operator writes, and only this crate knows those
-    /// keys.
     #[test]
     fn foreign_chains_config__should_key_every_chain_by_its_label() {
         // Given — every chain set, so a chain added later has to be listed here too.

crates/node/src/foreign_chain_probe.rs

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 
 use crate::metrics;
 
-/// Asks every configured provider which network it serves and logs a line per provider plus an
-/// `x/y providers healthy` summary. Diagnostic only: a provider on the wrong network keeps
-/// serving, because a boot time blip should not take a chain out of signing.
+/// Asks every configured RPC provider which network it serves and logs a line per provider plus an
+/// `x/y providers healthy` summary. Diagnostic only.
 pub async fn run_startup_probe(foreign_chains: ForeignChainsConfig) {
     if foreign_chains.is_empty() {
         warn!("no foreign chain is configured: this node cannot verify foreign-chain transactions");
@@ -27,8 +26,6 @@ pub async fn run_startup_probe(foreign_chains: ForeignChainsConfig) {
     log_report(&report);
 }
 
-/// Whether any probe covers this provider. What none covers stays out of both the summary and the
-/// gauges: it would otherwise read as an unhealthy provider for as long as the chain has no probe.
 fn is_probed(row: &ProviderHealth) -> bool {
     row.status != ProviderStatus::ProbeNotImplemented
 }
@@ -45,8 +42,6 @@ fn summarize(rows: &[ProviderHealth]) -> Summary {
     }
 }
 
-/// A [`ProviderStatus`] carries no auth material and no rendered error text, and its one
-/// provider written field is length capped, so it is logged whole.
 fn log_report(report: &ProbeReport) {
     let rows = report.rows();
     for row in rows {
@@ -72,8 +67,10 @@ fn log_report(report: &ProbeReport) {
 
     let Summary { probed, healthy } = summarize(rows);
     if probed == 0 {
+        let chains: BTreeSet<&str> = rows.iter().map(|row| row.chain.label()).collect();
         warn!(
-            "foreign-chain RPC provider probe found nothing to probe: no configured chain supports it"
+            ?chains,
+            "no RPC provider was checked at startup: the foreign chains configured cannot be checked by the node"
         );
         return;
     }

docs/foreign-chain-transactions.md

@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ Voting uses the protocol's existing signing threshold (`self.threshold()?.value(
 
 The per-chain map key prevents *lookup* confusion: when the node resolves the operator's `ethereum:` section, only `entries[Ethereum]` is consulted, never `entries[Sepolia]`. What it doesn't prevent is a `ChainVote { chain: Ethereum, providers: [ProviderEntry { provider_id: "ankr", chain_routing: PathSegment { segment: "eth_sepolia" }, … }, …], threshold: _ }` getting voted in — the contract just stores what threshold consensus produces; it can't tell whether `"eth_sepolia"` actually corresponds to Ethereum mainnet. Threshold voter review is the first line of defense; the fan-out across a chain's providers is the structural one. The network fingerprint probe is a per-node diagnostic on top of both.
 
-At startup, each configured provider gets its self-identifying RPC called and the response is compared against that chain's `expected_network_fingerprint` from the operator's config. The probe is report-only: a provider serving the wrong network is logged, but is not dropped, because a boot-time network blip should not take a chain out of signing. It runs detached, so it never delays startup.
+At startup, every provider of a chain the node can identify gets its self-identifying RPC called and the response is compared against that chain's `expected_network_fingerprint` from the operator's config. The probe is report-only: a provider serving the wrong network is logged, but is not dropped, because a boot-time network blip should not take a chain out of signing. It runs detached, so it never delays startup. A node that configures no foreign chain at all is warned about instead: the chains the code supports are the chains an operator is expected to configure.
 
 The result is a line per provider, an `x/y providers healthy` summary counting only the providers a probe covers, and two gauges labelled by chain: `mpc_foreign_chain_rpc_providers_configured` and `mpc_foreign_chain_rpc_providers_healthy`. The gauges are per chain rather than per provider, because a provider name is operator chosen and would put an unbounded label on a time series. A chain whose providers cannot be identified, such as Solana or Ethereum, is left out of both the summary and the gauges: reporting `0` healthy against its configured count would read as every provider failing.
 
@@ -720,9 +720,10 @@ each value must match the network of the `rpc_url` beside it. The value is alway
 including the fingerprints that look numeric.
 
 Every chain with an inspector is probed, and for those, leaving the field unset is not a silent
-skip: every provider of the chain is reported as `MissingExpectedFingerprint`, because silence reads
-as healthy on a dashboard. `solana` and `ethereum` report `ProbeNotImplemented` whether the field is
-set or not.
+skip: every provider of the chain is reported as `MissingExpectedFingerprint` and counts against the
+chain's healthy total, because silence reads as healthy on a dashboard. `solana` and `ethereum` have
+no inspector, so their providers are never asked and no health is reported for them, whether the
+field is set or not.
 
 ## Risks