Parent
Part of #79 (app distribution).
Summary
The Android preview workflow builds assembleRelease but the job summary states signing is the Expo template debug / non-production key. That is fine for internal smoke tests; it is not acceptable as a public “release” users should trust long-term.
Why it matters
- Users cannot meaningfully pin trust to a known signing key
- Updates / sideload upgrades break or look suspicious across key changes
- Checksums alone do not replace a stable publisher identity
Evidence
.github/workflows/android-preview.yml — “Signing: Expo template debug key (non-production)”
- Threat model / site trust copy assume users pick a source they trust; that source needs a real key
Proposed direction
- Decide key custody (maintainer-held keystore, hardware token, or Play App Signing if Play is ever in scope — see distribution policy child)
- Wire CI (or a documented manual step) to sign with that key
- Publish the signing certificate fingerprint next to Releases / download page
Done when
Related
Pairs with GitHub Releases child of #79. Store policy may affect Play App Signing.
Parent
Part of #79 (app distribution).
Summary
The Android preview workflow builds
assembleReleasebut the job summary states signing is the Expo template debug / non-production key. That is fine for internal smoke tests; it is not acceptable as a public “release” users should trust long-term.Why it matters
Evidence
.github/workflows/android-preview.yml— “Signing: Expo template debug key (non-production)”Proposed direction
Done when
Related
Pairs with GitHub Releases child of #79. Store policy may affect Play App Signing.