Script updating gh-pages from 2e8e0a4. [ci skip]

Author: ID Bot

PieterKas-patch-873896/draft-ietf-oauth-cross-device-security.html

@@ -2614,7 +2614,7 @@ <h4 id="name-short-lived-tokens">
           <h4 id="name-rate-limits">
 <a href="#section-6.1.11" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.11. </a><a href="#name-rate-limits" class="section-name selfRef">Rate Limits</a>
           </h4>
-<p id="section-6.1.11-1">An attacker that engages in a scaled attack may need to request a large number of user codes (see exploit <a href="#example-b1" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.1</a>) or initiate a large number of authorization requests (see exploit <a href="#example-b4-1" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.4.1</a> and <a href="#example-b9" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.9</a>) in a short period of time. An authorization server MAY apply rate limits to minimize the number of requests it would accept from a client or send to a user in a limited time period.<a href="#section-6.1.11-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
+<p id="section-6.1.11-1">An attacker that engages in a scaled attack may need to request a large number of user codes (see exploit described in <a href="#example-b1" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.1</a>) or initiate a large number of authorization requests (see exploits described in <a href="#example-b4-1" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.4.1</a> and <a href="#example-b9" class="auto internal xref">Section 4.3.9</a>) in a short period of time. An authorization server MAY apply rate limits to minimize the number of requests it would accept from a client or send to a user in a limited time period.<a href="#section-6.1.11-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-6.1.11-2"><strong>Limitations:</strong> Rate limits are effective at slowing an attacker down and help to degrade scaled attacks, but do not prevent more targeted attacks that are executed with lower volumes and velocity. Therefore, it should be used along with other techniques to provide a defence-in-depth defence against cross-device attacks.<a href="#section-6.1.11-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 </section>
 </div>

PieterKas-patch-873896/draft-ietf-oauth-cross-device-security.txt

@@ -1942,12 +1942,12 @@ Table of Contents
 6.1.11.  Rate Limits
 
    An attacker that engages in a scaled attack may need to request a
-   large number of user codes (see exploit Section 4.3.1) or initiate a
-   large number of authorization requests (see exploit Section 4.3.4.1
-   and Section 4.3.9) in a short period of time.  An authorization
-   server MAY apply rate limits to minimize the number of requests it
-   would accept from a client or send to a user in a limited time
-   period.
+   large number of user codes (see exploit described in Section 4.3.1)
+   or initiate a large number of authorization requests (see exploits
+   described in Section 4.3.4.1 and Section 4.3.9) in a short period of
+   time.  An authorization server MAY apply rate limits to minimize the
+   number of requests it would accept from a client or send to a user in
+   a limited time period.
 
    *Limitations:* Rate limits are effective at slowing an attacker down
    and help to degrade scaled attacks, but do not prevent more targeted