When OpenMetadata runs ingestion, automation, or application pipelines as Kubernetes Jobs via K8sPipelineClient, the generated pods are rejected by the admission controller in any namespace enforcing the restricted Pod Security Standard.
Two causes:
- No seccomp profile support. The restricted standard requires every pod/container to set a seccompProfile (e.g. RuntimeDefault), but the K8s client has no way to configure one.
- Automation and application Jobs skip the security context entirely. buildAutomationJob() and buildApplicationJob() never apply a pod/container securityContext (unlike ingestion Jobs), so even with runAsUser/runAsNonRoot configured, those pods are non-compliant.
Expected: Pipelines launched by the K8s client should be deployable into restricted/hardened namespaces.
Proposed fix:
Add a configurable seccompProfileType (RuntimeDefault / Localhost / Unconfined) plus a seccompLocalhostProfile path (valid only when type is Localhost).
Route automation and application Jobs through the same buildPodSecurityContext() / buildContainerSecurityContext() helpers used by ingestion Jobs.
Expose the setting via openmetadata.yaml (K8S_SECCOMP_LOCALHOST_PROFILE).
When OpenMetadata runs ingestion, automation, or application pipelines as Kubernetes Jobs via K8sPipelineClient, the generated pods are rejected by the admission controller in any namespace enforcing the restricted Pod Security Standard.
Two causes:
Expected: Pipelines launched by the K8s client should be deployable into restricted/hardened namespaces.
Proposed fix:
Add a configurable seccompProfileType (RuntimeDefault / Localhost / Unconfined) plus a seccompLocalhostProfile path (valid only when type is Localhost).
Route automation and application Jobs through the same buildPodSecurityContext() / buildContainerSecurityContext() helpers used by ingestion Jobs.
Expose the setting via openmetadata.yaml (K8S_SECCOMP_LOCALHOST_PROFILE).