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Fix clap type mismatch in external subcommands and update version to 0.8.1
Co-authored-by: 0xrinegade <[email protected]>
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Cargo.lock

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Cargo.toml

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[package]
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name = "osvm"
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version = "0.8.0"
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version = "0.8.1"
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edition = "2021"
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license = "MIT"
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description = "OpenSVM CLI tool for managing SVM nodes and deployments"
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#set document(title: "OSVM Security Audit Report")
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#set page(numbering: "1")
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#set text(size: 11pt)
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#set heading(numbering: "1.")
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#align(center)[
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#text(size: 24pt, weight: "bold")[OSVM Security Audit Report]
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#v(1em)
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#text(size: 14pt)[Comprehensive Security Assessment]
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#v(2em)
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#text(size: 12pt)[
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Generated: 2025-09-21 16:19:35 UTC
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Version: 0.8.1
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Security Score: 75/100
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Compliance Level: Moderate
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]
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]
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#pagebreak()
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= Executive Summary
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This report presents the results of a comprehensive security audit conducted on the OSVM (Open SVM) CLI application. The audit identified 6 findings across various security domains.
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#table(
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columns: (auto, auto),
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stroke: none,
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[*Metric*], [*Value*],
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[Total Findings], [6],
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[Critical], [1],
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[High], [2],
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[Medium], [3],
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[Low], [0],
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[Info], [0],
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[Security Score], [75/100],
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[Compliance Level], [Moderate],
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)
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#text(fill: red, weight: "bold")[
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⚠️ This audit identified 3 critical or high severity findings that require immediate attention.
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]
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= System Information
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#table(
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columns: (auto, auto),
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stroke: none,
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[*Component*], [*Version*],
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[Rust], [rustc 1.87.0 (example)],
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[Solana], [solana-cli 2.2.7 (example)],
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[OS], [Linux x86_64],
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[Architecture], [x86_64],
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)
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= Security Findings
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== Account Validation (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-SOL-002 - Program Derived Address (PDA) verification bypass vulnerability
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*Severity:* High
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*Category:* Account Validation
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*CWE ID:* CWE-345
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*CVSS Score:* 8.199999809265137
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*Description:*
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High-severity vulnerability in PDA handling: The program accepts arbitrary accounts as PDAs without verifying they were derived using the correct seeds and program ID. This bypasses the fundamental security guarantee of PDAs and allows attackers to provide malicious accounts that can be used to manipulate program state or drain funds.
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*Impact:*
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Attackers can substitute legitimate PDAs with malicious accounts, potentially leading to: unauthorized state modifications, fund drainage from escrow accounts, bypass of access controls, and manipulation of program logic that depends on PDA integrity.
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*Recommendation:*
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Implement comprehensive PDA validation: 1) Always call find_program_address() to verify PDA derivation, 2) Compare derived PDA with provided account address, 3) Validate all seeds used in derivation, 4) Use Anchor's seeds constraint for automatic validation, 5) Add extensive testing for PDA edge cases.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-program/src/state/escrow.rs:L156-L178
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*References:*
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- https://solanacookbook.com/references/programs.html#how-to-create-a-pda
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- https://book.anchor-lang.com/anchor_bts/PDAs.html
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- https://github.com/coral-xyz/sealevel-attacks/tree/master/programs/1-account-data-matching
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== Authentication & Authorization (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-SOL-001 - Missing signer validation in Solana program instruction handler
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*Severity:* Critical
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*Category:* Authentication & Authorization
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*CWE ID:* CWE-862
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*CVSS Score:* 9.100000381469727
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*Description:*
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Critical security vulnerability: Program instruction handler accepts accounts without validating required signers. This allows unauthorized users to execute privileged operations by providing any account as a signer. The vulnerability occurs in the instruction processing logic where account.is_signer is not properly checked before performing sensitive operations like token transfers or account modifications.
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*Impact:*
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Complete compromise of access control - unauthorized users can execute any privileged operation, leading to potential theft of funds, unauthorized account modifications, and complete program compromise.
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*Recommendation:*
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Implement mandatory signer validation: 1) Add explicit is_signer checks for all authority accounts, 2) Use Anchor's Signer<'info> type for automatic validation, 3) Validate that the signer's public key matches expected authorities, 4) Add comprehensive unit tests for all authorization paths.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-program/src/instruction/mod.rs:L44-L67
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*References:*
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- https://book.anchor-lang.com/anchor_bts/security.html
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- https://solana.com/developers/guides/getstarted/intro-to-anchor
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- https://github.com/coral-xyz/sealevel-attacks/tree/master/programs/0-signer-authorization
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== Dependency Management (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-INFO-001 - Outdated dependency versions detected with known security advisories
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*Severity:* Low
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*Category:* Dependency Management
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*CWE ID:* CWE-1104
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*CVSS Score:* 3.0999999046325684
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*Description:*
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Several project dependencies are using outdated versions that have known security vulnerabilities or performance issues. While not immediately exploitable in the current context, these outdated dependencies represent potential attack vectors and should be updated to maintain security best practices and benefit from bug fixes.
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*Impact:*
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Potential future security risks: exposure to known vulnerabilities as attack surface evolves, missing security patches and performance improvements, compatibility issues with ecosystem updates, and increased maintenance burden.
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*Recommendation:*
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Update dependency management: 1) Run cargo audit to identify vulnerable dependencies, 2) Update to latest stable versions where possible, 3) Implement automated dependency checking in CI/CD pipeline, 4) Subscribe to security advisories for critical dependencies, 5) Regular dependency review and update cycles.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-program/Cargo.toml:L23-L45
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*References:*
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- https://rustsec.org/advisories/
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- https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/commands/cargo-audit.html
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- https://github.com/RustSec/advisory-db
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== Network Security (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-RPC-001 - Insecure RPC endpoint configuration exposes application to network attacks
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*Severity:* Medium
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*Category:* Network Security
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*CWE ID:* CWE-319
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*CVSS Score:* 5.300000190734863
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*Description:*
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The application is configured to use public, potentially insecure RPC endpoints for Solana network communication. This configuration includes unencrypted HTTP connections and public RPC providers that may have rate limiting, reliability issues, or could be compromised. The lack of RPC endpoint validation and fallback mechanisms creates single points of failure.
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*Impact:*
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Network security risks including: exposure to man-in-the-middle attacks on RPC calls, potential censorship or manipulation of blockchain data, service disruption due to rate limiting or unreliable public endpoints, and privacy leaks through request monitoring.
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*Recommendation:*
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Secure RPC configuration: 1) Use HTTPS endpoints exclusively, 2) Implement multiple RPC endpoint fallbacks, 3) Consider dedicated/private RPC providers for production, 4) Add RPC response validation and integrity checks, 5) Implement proper error handling and retry logic for RPC failures.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-app/src/config/network.rs:L45-L52
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*References:*
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- https://docs.solana.com/cluster/rpc-endpoints
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- https://solana.com/rpc
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- https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-web3.js/blob/master/src/connection.ts
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== Token Security (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-SOL-003 - SPL Token authority validation completely missing in transfer operations
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*Severity:* High
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*Category:* Token Security
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*CWE ID:* CWE-862
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*CVSS Score:* 8.5
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*Description:*
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Critical security flaw in token operations: The program performs SPL token transfers and other operations without validating that the transaction signer has the necessary authority over the token accounts. This creates a complete bypass of token ownership controls, allowing any user to transfer tokens from any account.
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*Impact:*
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Complete token security compromise: Any user can transfer tokens from any account, drain token vaults, manipulate token supplies, and perform unauthorized token operations, resulting in direct financial losses for all token holders.
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*Recommendation:*
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Implement robust token authority validation: 1) Verify token account ownership before transfers, 2) Check delegate permissions for delegated operations, 3) Validate mint authority for minting operations, 4) Use SPL Token program's built-in authority checks, 5) Implement comprehensive integration tests with various token account configurations.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-program/src/instructions/token_transfer.rs:L89-L112
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*References:*
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- https://spl.solana.com/token
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- https://docs.rs/spl-token/latest/spl_token/
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- https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-program-library/tree/master/token/program
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== Trading Security (1 findings)
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=== OSVM-DEX-001 - MEV vulnerabilities in DEX operations - missing slippage and deadline protection
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*Severity:* Medium
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*Category:* Trading Security
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*CWE ID:* CWE-841
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*CVSS Score:* 6.099999904632568
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*Description:*
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Trading operations lack essential MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) protection mechanisms. The current implementation does not enforce slippage limits or transaction deadlines, making trades vulnerable to front-running, sandwich attacks, and other MEV exploitation strategies. This particularly affects AMM interactions and large trades that can significantly impact token prices.
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*Impact:*
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Financial losses due to MEV attacks: Users experience unexpected slippage, reduced trade value from sandwich attacks, failed transactions due to stale pricing, and overall degraded trading experience with potential significant financial impact on large trades.
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*Recommendation:*
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Implement comprehensive MEV protection: 1) Add configurable slippage tolerance checks, 2) Implement transaction deadlines with proper timestamp validation, 3) Consider using private mempools or MEV protection services, 4) Add price impact warnings for large trades, 5) Implement trade size limits to reduce MEV attractiveness.
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*Code Location:* /home/runner/work/solana-dex/src/amm/swap.rs:L234-L267
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*References:*
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- https://docs.solana.com/developing/programming-model/transactions
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- https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest
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- https://github.com/project-serum/anchor/blob/master/tests/misc/programs/misc/src/lib.rs
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= Security Recommendations
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1. Implement regular security audits
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2. Keep dependencies up to date
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3. Follow security best practices
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4. Implement proper Solana account validation
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5. Use secure RPC endpoints and MEV protection
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6. Follow Solana security guidelines and best practices
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= Compliance Notes
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- This audit follows industry security standards
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- Findings are categorized using CWE framework
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- Solana-specific security checks included
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- Critical Solana vulnerabilities require immediate attention
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= Statistics
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#table(
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columns: (auto, auto),
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stroke: none,
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[*Metric*], [*Value*],
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[Total Findings], [6],
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[Findings with CWE], [6],
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[Findings with CVSS], [6],
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[Findings with Location], [6],
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[Unique Categories], [6],
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[Average CVSS Score], [6.7],
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[Coverage Percentage], [100%],
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)
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= Conclusion
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This security audit provides a comprehensive assessment of the OSVM CLI application's security posture. All identified findings should be addressed according to their severity level, with critical and high-severity issues taking priority.
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#text(fill: red, weight: "bold")[
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⚠️ CRITICAL: 1 critical findings require immediate remediation.
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]
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#text(fill: orange, weight: "bold")[
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⚠️ HIGH: 2 high-severity findings should be addressed promptly.
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]
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Regular security assessments and continuous monitoring are recommended to maintain a strong security stance.
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#align(center)[
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#text(size: 10pt, style: "italic")[
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Generated by OSVM Security Audit System
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End of Report
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]
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]

src/main.rs

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let mut query_parts = vec![sub_command.to_string()];
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// Get additional arguments from clap's external subcommand handling
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if let Some(external_args) = sub_matches.get_many::<String>("") {
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query_parts.extend(external_args.cloned());
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// External subcommands store arguments as OsString, not String
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if let Some(external_args) = sub_matches.get_many::<std::ffi::OsString>("") {
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query_parts.extend(external_args.map(|os_str| os_str.to_string_lossy().to_string()));
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}
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// If clap doesn't provide args (fallback), parse from environment

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