.coderabbit.yaml

language: en-US
early_access: false
enable_free_tier: false
reviews:
  profile: chill
  request_changes_workflow: false
  high_level_summary: true
  poem: false
  in_progress_fortune: false
  review_status: true
  collapse_walkthrough: false
  path_filters:
    - "!**/vendor/**"
    - "!vendor/**"
    - "!**/zz_generated*"
    - "!boilerplate/**"
    # Taken from prodsec suggested configuration: https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills/blob/main/.coderabbit.yaml
    - "!node_modules/**"
    - "!dist/**"
    - "!*.min.js"
    # yarn.lock excluded: high churn, low signal — package.json changes are
    # reviewed by the supply-chain block. Other dependency locks (go.sum,
    # package-lock.json, Cargo.lock) are deliberately kept so the supply-chain
    # path_instructions block fires on them.
    - "!yarn.lock"
  auto_review:
    enabled: true
    drafts: true
  pre_merge_checks:
    custom_checks:
      - name: "no-weak-crypto"
        instructions: |
          Flag MD5, SHA1, DES, RC4, 3DES, Blowfish, ECB mode usage.
          Flag custom crypto implementations. Flag non-constant-time
          comparison of secrets or tokens.
        mode: "error"

      - name: "container-privileges"
        instructions: |
          Flag privileged: true, hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC,
          SYS_ADMIN capability, running as root without justification,
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: true in container/K8s manifests.
        mode: "error"

      - name: "no-sensitive-data-in-logs"
        instructions: |
          Flag logging that may expose passwords, tokens, API keys,
          PII (email, SSN, credit card), session IDs, internal
          hostnames, or customer data.
        mode: "error"

      # Taken from prodsec suggested configuration: https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills/blob/main/.coderabbit.yaml
      - name: "no-hardcoded-secrets"
        instructions: |
          Flag hardcoded secrets: API keys, tokens, passwords, private
          keys, credentials. Also flag base64 strings >32 chars in config,
          URLs with embedded credentials, variables named api_key/secret/
          token/password assigned string literals.
        mode: "error"

      - name: "no-injection-vectors"
        instructions: |
          Flag SQL string concatenation, shell=True with user input,
          eval/exec on untrusted data, pickle.loads on untrusted input,
          yaml.load without SafeLoader, os.system with variables,
          dangerouslySetInnerHTML with user data.
        mode: "error"

      - name: "ai-attribution"
        instructions: |
          If AI tools were used (mentioned in PR or commits), verify
          Red Hat attribution: Assisted-by or Generated-by trailers.
          Flag use of Co-Authored-By for AI tools.
        mode: "warning"

  # Taken from prodsec suggested configuration: https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills/blob/main/.coderabbit.yaml
  path_instructions:

    # ── Injection & input validation ─────────────────────────────
    # Skills: input-validation-injection, web-application-security
    - path: "**/*.{py,js,ts,go,rs,java,rb,php,kt,swift,cs}"
      instructions: |
        Injection prevention (prodsec-skills):
        - SQL: parameterized queries only; no string concatenation
        - Command: no shell=True, os.system, or backtick exec with user input
        - LDAP/XPath: escape special characters in filters
        - Path traversal: canonicalize paths, reject ../
        - Deserialization: no pickle/yaml.load()/eval on untrusted data
        - Prototype pollution: no recursive merge of untrusted objects
        - Validate at trust boundaries with allow-lists, not deny-lists
        - Normalize Unicode and anchor regexes (^$); watch for ReDoS

    # ── Web & frontend security ──────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: react-security, client-side-security, http-security-headers,
    #         graphql-security, session-management-cookies, file-handling-uploads,
    #         xml-serialization-security
    - path: "**/*.{html,jsx,tsx,vue,svelte}"
      instructions: |
        Web security (prodsec-skills):
        - No dangerouslySetInnerHTML or v-html with user data
        - CSP: no unsafe-inline, no unsafe-eval
        - CSRF tokens on state-changing requests
        - Cookies: Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict
        - No document.write, eval, new Function with user input
        - GraphQL: depth/complexity limits, disable introspection in prod
        - File uploads: validate by content magic, cap size, server-generate names
        - XML: disable external entities (XXE), reject DTDs from untrusted sources

    # ── Cryptography ─────────────────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: algorithm-selection, constant-time-analysis, zeroize-audit,
    #         wycheproof, crypto-protocol-diagram, mermaid-to-proverif,
    #         constant-time-testing
    - path: "**/*{crypt,cipher,sign,hash,tls,ssl,cert,key,token}*"
      instructions: |
        Cryptographic security (prodsec-skills):
        - Banned: MD5, SHA1, DES, RC4, 3DES, Blowfish, ECB mode
        - Symmetric: AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305
        - Passwords: Argon2id (not bcrypt/scrypt for new code)
        - Signing: Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256+
        - Key exchange: X25519 or ECDH P-256+
        - Constant-time comparison for all secret/token data
        - Zeroize key material after use (no garbage-collector reliance)
        - No custom crypto; use vetted libraries only
        - Post-quantum: flag if protecting long-lived secrets

    # ── Container & image hardening ──────────────────────────────
    # Skills: container-hardening, isolation-sandboxing
    - path: "**/{Dockerfile,Containerfile}*"
      instructions: |
        Container security (prodsec-skills):
        - Base image: UBI minimal or distroless from catalog.redhat.com
        - Red Hat images: use floating tags (Red Hat manages updates);
          non-RH images: pin by digest
        - Multi-stage builds; no build tools in final image
        - USER non-root; never run as root
        - COPY specific files, not entire context
        - No secrets in ENV, ARG, or COPY
        - Read-only rootfs where possible
        - No package manager cache in final layer
        - HEALTHCHECK defined

    # ── Kubernetes & OpenShift ───────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: scc-security, operator-security, helm-chart-security,
    #         container-hardening, health-probes
    - path: "**/*.{yaml,yml}"
      instructions: |
        If this is a Kubernetes/OpenShift manifest or Helm template:
        - securityContext: runAsNonRoot, readOnlyRootFilesystem,
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        - Drop ALL capabilities, add only what is required
        - Resource limits (cpu, memory) on every container
        - No hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC, privileged: true
        - NetworkPolicy defined for the namespace
        - OpenShift: SCC must be restricted or custom-scoped
        - Liveness + readiness probes defined
        - automountServiceAccountToken: false unless needed
        - RBAC: least privilege; no cluster-admin for workloads
        - Helm: no .Values interpolation in shell commands

    # ── Supply chain & dependencies ──────────────────────────────
    # Skills: supply-chain-risk-auditor, sbom-provenance,
    #         software-signing, secure-pipeline, vulnerability-management
    - path: "**/{requirements*.txt,Pipfile*,pyproject.toml,package*.json,go.mod,go.sum,Cargo.toml,Gemfile*,pom.xml,build.gradle*}"
      instructions: |
        Supply chain security (prodsec-skills):
        - New deps: justify need, check license compatibility
        - Pin exact versions; verify hashes where supported
        - Flag known CVEs (cross-ref osv.dev)
        - No pre-release or yanked versions in production
        - SBOM: ensure build produces provenance attestations
        - Signing: artifacts signed with Sigstore/cosign

    # ── CI/CD & GitHub Actions ───────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: secure-pipeline, build-yaml-misconfiguration,
    #         agentic-actions-auditor
    - path: ".github/workflows/**/*"
      instructions: |
        CI/CD security (prodsec-skills):
        - Pin actions by full SHA, not tag
        - No secrets in logs; mask sensitive outputs
        - Least privilege: minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
        - No pull_request_target with checkout of PR head
        - SAST/SCA steps in pipeline
        - Sign artifacts with Sigstore/cosign
        - Agentic CI actions: audit for prompt injection via
          issue/PR title/body flowing into LLM prompts

    # ── IDE & AI tool configuration (supply chain risk) ─────────
    - path: "**/{.claude,.vscode}/**/*"
      instructions: |
        HIGH RISK — IDE and AI tool configuration (prodsec-skills):
        These directories can be supply chain attack vectors.
        Review every change with a security and malware lens.
        Flag the following for close scrutiny:
        - .claude: hook commands, MCP server definitions, or
          permissive tool-use policies in settings.json
        - .claude: any scripts or binaries (e.g., .mjs, .sh)
        - .vscode: tasks.json or launch.json entries that execute
          code on folder open, build, or save
        - .vscode: settings.json entries that auto-run formatters,
          linters, or extensions with broad permissions
        - Any change that grants broad filesystem or network access
        - Obfuscated content or suspiciously large files
        - Changes without a clear, legitimate purpose

    # ── Go ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: go-security
    - path: "**/*.go"
      instructions: |
        Go security (prodsec-skills):
        - Never ignore error returns
        - database/sql with placeholders; no fmt.Sprintf in queries
        - Use stdlib crypto/* and golang.org/x/crypto (Go team maintained);
          avoid third-party crypto libraries
        - Integer overflow: bounds-check user-supplied sizes
        - context.Context for cancellation and timeouts

    # ── C/C++ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: safe-c-functions, compiler-hardening
    - path: "**/*.{c,cpp,cc,h,hpp}"
      instructions: |
        C/C++ security (prodsec-skills):
        - Banned: gets, sprintf, strcpy, strcat, strtok
        - Use strlcpy, snprintf, bounded APIs
        - Compile: -fstack-protector-strong -fPIE -pie
          -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wformat-security
        - Nullify pointers after free; no use-after-free
        - Integer overflow: check arithmetic on untrusted sizes

    # ── Database & external data ─────────────────────────────────
    # Skills: database-security, authentication (external-data-source),
    #         encrypted-communication, redis-elasticache-security
    - path: "**/{db,database,redis,cache,storage}/**/*"
      instructions: |
        Data store security (prodsec-skills):
        - Auth: no default credentials; use IAM or IdP tokens
        - Encryption: TLS in transit, encryption at rest
        - Least privilege: app user has minimal grants
        - Redis/ElastiCache: AUTH required, no KEYS in prod,
          rename dangerous commands (FLUSHALL, CONFIG)
        - Connection strings: no embedded credentials

  # Taken from prodsec suggested configuration: https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills/blob/main/.coderabbit.yaml
  # ── Security scanners ────────────────────────────────────────
  tools:
    gitleaks:
      enabled: true
    semgrep:
      enabled: true
    checkov:
      enabled: true
    hadolint:
      enabled: true
    trivy:
      enabled: true
    osvScanner:
      enabled: true
    actionlint:
      enabled: true
    ast-grep:
      essential_rules: true

# Taken from prodsec suggested configuration: https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills/blob/main/.coderabbit.yaml
# ── Knowledge base ───────────────────────────────────────────
knowledge_base:
  code_guidelines:
    enabled: true
    filePatterns:
      - "**/AGENTS.md"
      - "**/REDHAT.md"
      - "**/CLAUDE.md"
      - "**/CONTRIBUTING.md"
  issues:
    scope: "auto"
  pull_requests:
    scope: "auto"

chat:
  auto_reply: true
  art: false