Ymir (internally also referred to by its former name "Jötnar" in some
identifiers — service accounts, Kerberos principals, the quay.io/jotnar
registry namespace) is a set of LLM-driven agents, built on the BeeAI
framework, that automate RHEL/CentOS Stream package maintenance, running as
a fleet of OpenShift Deployments and CronJobs in the jotnar-ymir namespace
on Red Hat's internal GPC cluster (bot identity redhat-ymir-agent). For
the full architecture — agent roles, queues, and data flows — see
README.md, README-agents.md,
the *_data_flow.md docs; this section intentionally does not restate that architecture, to
avoid the two going out of sync.
Security-relevant assumptions this system makes about its environment:
- The OpenShift
TenantEgressdefault-deny network policy is the primary boundary preventing arbitrary outbound connections from agent pods. Several tool capabilities (e.g. fetching an attacker-influenced URL) are SSRF-shaped and are mitigated at the network layer, not by in-application URL validation. - Build validation can trigger a Konflux build directly. With
BUILD_BACKEND=konflux, agents callbuild_packagethrough the privileged MCP gateway, which creates and polls a scratch PipelineRun from a pushed fork commit. Local Compose and production OpenShift deployments select Konflux by default; Copr remains an explicit option. The human-applied MR labelfeature::draft-builds::enabledgates the separate GitLab CI draft/release build path, not agent build validation. Agents can automatically apply build-target labels (target::zstream, added bymr_consolidation_agent.pyandbackport_agent.py) that steer CI once that path is triggered. - AI-authored changes are expected to go through human review before merge. This is enforced by assigning humans as reviewers in the Gitlab MR. Gitlab projects are also configured to require all threads resolved and at least a single approval.
- The
ymir_todolabel path is maintainer-gated; the fetcher's main CVE batch sweep is not. Addingymir_todoonly enqueues work if the fetcher verifies (via a Jira changelog walk, not JQL) that the label-adder is a member of the "Red Hat Employee" Jira group. This is not the only enqueue path, however: a separatejira-issue-fetcherCronJob runs against a saved Jira filter ("Ymir early adopters + CVE work to do") and independently pushes every matching issue into the triage queue with no employee check. The filter's query and component-scope exclusions are version-controlled outside this repo, incve-scope— anyone able to get an issue into that filter's scope triggers processing. - Tool credentials never reach the LLM-hosting process. Privileged
tools (
ymir/tools/privileged/) run inside a dedicatedmcp-gatewaypod that alone mounts the GitLab PAT, Jira token, Kerberos keytabs, and Konflux service-account token; agent pods hold no credentials and reach privileged tools only over the network via the MCP protocol. Each agent additionally hardcodes a small, task-specific whitelist of privileged tool names exposed to the model (e.g. the rebase agent only exposesupload_sourcesandget_maintainer_rules) — the model never sees the full privileged set. Within that whitelist, though, the model has genuine autonomous authority to trigger real credentialed actions, so injected content can still steer those specific calls (see T2). - Internal TLS uses the OpenShift service-ca operator as the sole
trust anchor. All intra-namespace TLS connections (Valkey, PostgreSQL,
trace-server) validate certificates against the service-ca-injected CA
bundle. Agent, API, and CronJob pods mount this bundle at
/etc/pki/service-ca/from aservice-ca-bundleConfigMap annotated withservice.beta.openshift.io/inject-cabundle: "true". A compromise or misconfiguration of the service-ca operator would break all internal TLS trust.
When the Konflux backend is selected, build validation crosses these additional
service boundaries (configured in openshift/deployment-mcp-gateway.yml):
| dependency / identity | purpose and data handled | relationship to validation |
|---|---|---|
Konflux Kubernetes/Tekton API, https://api.kflux-rhel-p01.fc38.p1.openshiftapps.com:6443, namespace ymir-tenant; gateway authenticates as konflux-bot-0 |
Receives the bearer token, a temporary Kubernetes Secret containing GITLAB_TOKEN for cloning the fork, and a PipelineRun with package name, fork Git URL, commit SHA, target branch, optional spec file, pipeline reference, and scratch image destination. Returns PipelineRun/TaskRun status and pod logs. |
The gateway creates the Secret and scratch PipelineRun, polls its status, collects failure-log URLs, and attempts Secret cleanup after submission/polling. Pipeline status determines the agent's validation result; this is separate from MR-triggered CI builds. |
KubeArchive API, https://kubearchive-api-server-product-kubearchive.apps.kflux-rhel-p01.fc38.p1.openshiftapps.com |
Receives the same bearer token on authenticated reads of archived PipelineRuns, TaskRuns, and pod logs. Returns archived status and logs; no build or Secret writes are sent here. | Optional fallback when the live Konflux API returns 404 after garbage collection. Failure logs can be passed to the build-failure analyst for diagnosis; its text cannot change the build success flag. |
RPM pipeline repository, https://gitlab.cee.redhat.com/rhel-on-konflux/rpmbuild-pipeline.git |
The gateway resolves refs/heads/main to a commit SHA; Konflux fetches pipeline/build-rpm-package.yaml and the pipeline's referenced code from that repository. |
The SHA is pinned within each PipelineRun, but each new build resolves main again. This repository supplies the executable build procedure used to validate the agent's pushed commit. |
The artifact downloader sends the bearer token only to HTTPS pod-log URLs in the configured namespace on the exact Konflux or KubeArchive origin. It rejects redirects and other caller-supplied URLs before making a request.
| asset | description | sensitivity |
|---|---|---|
Dist-git / GitLab write access (bot identity redhat-ymir-agent) |
Ability to fork, push, and open MRs against internal and gitlab.com/redhat RHEL & CentOS Stream package repos |
critical |
Kerberos keytabs (personal + redhat-ymir-agent.keytab prod) |
Enable passwordless authentication and user impersonation against internal Red Hat systems (Brew/Koji, dist-git SSH) | critical |
GitLab PAT (redhat-ymir-agent.gitlab.token) |
OAuth2 token with write access to gitlab.com dist-git repos and MRs |
critical |
Konflux konflux-bot-0 service-account token |
Short-lived token mounted in the MCP gateway, allowing PipelineRun and Secret operations and authenticated build-result reads in ymir-tenant |
critical |
Konflux git-auth Secret (GITLAB_TOKEN) |
Temporary copy of the gateway's GitLab token, used by the PipelineRun to clone the pushed fork commit | critical |
| Source, patches, and spec-file changes produced by agents | Content that flows directly into RHEL/CentOS Stream builds if merged | critical |
| Build-validation result and RPM pipeline definition | Integrity of the build status and executable pipeline code used to accept or diagnose an agent's change | high |
Local .secrets/ credential bundle (dev machines, CI runners) |
Co-located keytabs, GitLab PAT, Jira token, GCP keys | critical |
| Jira API token | Read/write access to RHEL/PACKIT Jira issues, including status transitions that trigger errata creation and compose inclusion | high |
| GCP Vertex AI service-account keys (dev/prod) | Access to hosted LLM inference; misuse enables cost abuse or model manipulation | high |
Redis/Valkey task queues (triage_queue, merge_consolidation_queue) |
Integrity of in-flight automation state; controls which package/branch/issue is processed next | high |
Container images (quay.io/jotnar/*) |
Build supply-chain integrity for all deployed agent/service images | high |
| Testing Farm API token | Ability to trigger test runs against package builds | medium |
| Sumo Logic logs, OTEL traces (Phoenix), Sentry logs | May contain tool inputs/outputs; sensitive if credential redaction fails | medium |
| entry_point | description | trust_boundary | reachable_assets |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jira issue content (title/description/comments) | Ingested by jira-issue-fetcher cronjobs and the triage agent via JQL search |
untrusted Jira reporter content → LLM agent context / privileged tool arguments | Dist-git write access, GitLab PAT, Kerberos keytabs, source/patch integrity |
ymir_todo / ymir_todo_triage Jira label |
Maintainer-facing trigger to enqueue processing of a specific issue (ymir_todo_triage requests a run that stops after triage) |
Jira user → triage queue enqueue (gated by Red Hat-employee group check) | Redis/Valkey task queues, Jira API token |
| Jira webhook bot-mention commands | POST /api/jira/webhook accepts Jira Cloud comment webhooks; a bot-mention in the comment body triggers command dispatch (e.g. consolidate) |
Jira commenter → Redis merge-consolidation queue enqueue (gated by HMAC signature + Red Hat-employee group check on comment author) | Redis/Valkey task queues |
| GitLab MR comments / CI pipeline logs | Read by agents during iterate/fix loops on open MRs | untrusted GitLab.com commenter / CI log content → LLM agent context | Dist-git write access, GitLab PAT |
GetPatchFromUrlTool patch_url parameter |
Tool argument that can originate from Jira issue text | attacker-influenceable input → outbound HTTP fetch (SSRF-shaped) | Internal network reachability within egress allow-list |
AGENTS.md / ymir.yaml content (get_maintainer_rules, get_shared_rules) |
Free-text guidance fetched from gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rules/<package> and, as of the shared-rules registry, rules/shared-rules/<rule_set>/AGENTS.md — one shared rule set can apply to every package listed in the registry, not just one. The same repo's machine-parsed rules/<package>/ymir.yaml (branch creation, reproducer, consolidation, release bumping, auto_processing.mode) steers agent control flow rather than LLM context |
maintainer-authored content → LLM agent context / agent control flow | Source, patches, and spec-file changes produced by agents; pipeline dispatch |
| Konflux Kubernetes/Tekton API | mcp-gateway submits scratch PipelineRuns and a temporary git-auth Secret; status and task logs are read back |
privileged gateway → external build cluster; build status → agent validation decision | Konflux token, GitLab token, build-validation result |
| KubeArchive API | Archived PipelineRun/TaskRun status and pod-log reads after a live API 404 | external archive data → gateway and, for failed logs, build-failure analyst context | Build-validation result, agent diagnosis |
| RPM pipeline repository | main is resolved at build time and its pinned SHA is used by the Tekton Git resolver |
remote repository code → executable pipeline in Konflux | GitLab token in git-auth Secret, build-validation result |
redis-commander OpenShift Route |
Public HTTPS route to the Valkey queue admin UI, no application-level auth configured | remote unauth peer → Redis/Valkey read/write | Redis/Valkey task queues |
phoenix OpenShift Route |
Public HTTPS route to the tracing/observability UI | remote peer → trace data | Sumo Logic logs / OTEL traces |
trace-server OpenShift Route |
Public HTTPS OTEL ingestion/query endpoint | remote peer → trace data | Sumo Logic logs / OTEL traces |
oc exec / oc rsh into the valkey pod |
Documented operational practice for queue inspection (valkey-cli --tls KEYS/LPUSH/LRANGE) |
OpenShift-RBAC-authorized operator → direct queue read/write, bypassing application logic | Redis/Valkey task queues |
Github actions container image builds → quay.io/jotnar |
CI builds and pushes all agent/service container images using a robot account | Github CI service account → container registry write | Container images |
| PyPI dependency resolution during container build | pip/uv install of Python packages (e.g. litellm) into every agent image |
third-party package maintainer → code executing with full pod privileges | Container images, all credentials mounted into that pod |
| id | threat | actor | surface | asset | impact | likelihood | status | controls | evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T2 | Indirect prompt injection via untrusted Jira issue or GitLab MR comment content causes an agent to misuse privileged tools (unauthorized push, credential exfiltration, SSRF via patch_url, resource exhaustion — see T12) |
remote_auth | Jira issue content; GitLab MR comments; GetPatchFromUrlTool |
Dist-git write access, GitLab PAT, Kerberos keytabs, source/patch integrity | critical | possible | partially_mitigated | credential redaction (redact_credentials()/_REDACT_PATTERNS in gateway_utils.py, shared by both privileged and unprivileged gateways); credentials never mounted into agent pods (isolated to mcp-gateway); per-agent hardcoded privileged-tool whitelists (model never sees the full privileged set); network egress allow-list bounds SSRF blast radius; human review expected before merge (not code-enforced — see open questions) |
ymir/tools/gateway_utils.py (redact_credentials), commit 8b181341 (path traversal fix) |
| T15 | A compromised RPM pipeline repository changes the pipeline run for a later validation build, potentially exposing the temporary GitLab clone token or producing misleading build results | insider | refs/heads/main in rhel-on-konflux/rpmbuild-pipeline; Tekton Git resolver |
GitLab token, build-validation result, source/patch integrity | critical | rare | partially_mitigated | Each run resolves main to a SHA and pins that SHA in the PipelineRun; this prevents a branch move during one run, but does not vet the code selected for the next run. Secret cleanup is attempted after submission/polling. |
ymir/tools/privileged/konflux.py (_resolve_pipeline_revision, _pipelinerun_body, KonfluxBuildTool._run) |
| T3 | CreateZstreamBranchTool parses spec-file content pulled from arbitrary historical dist-git commits using the macro/shell-expanding specfile library, inside the privileged mcp-gateway pod that alone holds the Kerberos keytab and GitLab PAT — a spec macro (e.g. %(shell command)) surviving in dist-git history achieves code execution with access to those credentials |
remote_auth | Specfile(content=...) in ymir/tools/privileged/distgit.py (CreateZstreamBranchTool._find_latest_same_nvr_ref) |
Kerberos keytabs, GitLab PAT, Dist-git write access | critical | rare | unmitigated | none — spec parsing runs with the same container privileges as every other tool in mcp-gateway (runAsNonRoot + default RuntimeDefault seccomp only); no sandboxing of macro/shell expansion; this is the one pod holding all credentials, so code execution here is a full compromise |
ymir/tools/privileged/distgit.py:156-157; tracked upstream as PACKIT-4796 |
| T4 | Credential material leaks into LLM agent context or centralized logs via tool error/stderr output | insider | privileged GitLab/dist-git tool error handling; centrally collected stdout/stderr | GitLab PAT, Kerberos keytabs | critical | rare | mitigated | redact_credentials()/_REDACT_PATTERNS (ymir/tools/gateway_utils.py), used by both the privileged and unprivileged gateways, strips credential-shaped strings before they reach agent context or logs; sanitize_url() (ymir/tools/privileged/utils.py) redacts credentials embedded in URLs |
ymir/tools/gateway_utils.py, ymir/tools/privileged/utils.py |
| T13 | Compromised or malformed Brew source metadata redirects Y-stream inheritance to an unrelated repository or commit, or embeds instructions that influence the inheritance adaptation LLM | remote_auth | Brew build source; source commit/spec diff; resolve_brew_source; privileged FetchCommitTool |
Source/patch integrity, GitLab PAT | high | rare | mitigated | require an existing build for the expected package; derive Epoch:Version from Brew fields; accept only HTTPS gitlab.com/redhat/rhel/rpms/<package> and a full hexadecimal SHA; fetch into a namespaced ref; require one exact single-Jira Resolves: commit; reject unsupported, binary, renamed, deleted, source, and unrelated packaging files; give the adaptation LLM only spec text tools; verify inherited patch Git blob IDs; audit changed files plus protected Epoch, Version, Release, Source, and changelog metadata; require prep, SRPM, and Copr validation before push |
ymir/agents/ystream_inherit.py, ymir/agents/prompts/backport/instructions_inherit.j2, ymir/tools/privileged/gitlab.py (FetchCommitTool) |
| T5 | Operator (or anyone with oc exec/oc rsh RBAC into the valkey pod) directly injects or tampers with queue entries, controlling which package/branch/issue privileged agents act on |
local_admin | oc exec/oc rsh into valkey pod |
Redis/Valkey task queues | high | possible | partially_mitigated | OpenShift namespace RBAC restricts who can oc exec; no application-level audit trail for direct queue mutation |
openshift/README.md documents the operational queue commands |
| T6 | SSRF-shaped fetch of an attacker-supplied patch_url reaches internal network endpoints reachable from the agent pod |
remote_auth | GetPatchFromUrlTool patch_url parameter |
Internal network reachability, GCP Vertex AI endpoints, other RH internal services within the egress allow-list | high | possible | partially_mitigated | OpenShift TenantEgress default-deny egress allow-list (network-level only; no in-app URL validation) |
none |
| T10 | RPM spec files are parsed with the macro/shell-expanding specfile library and executed via rpmbuild -bp/-bs (not naive text parsing) while an agent rebases/backports a package; a spec crafted with %(shell command) macro syntax (e.g. via a malicious patch or a compromised upstream tarball) achieves arbitrary code execution during parsing/prep, independent of and in addition to the LLM's own tool-call surface (T2) |
remote_auth | Specfile() calls in ymir/tools/unprivileged/specfile.py (GetPackageInfoTool, AddChangelogEntryTool, UpdateReleaseTool); rpmbuild -bp/-bs in ymir/tools/unprivileged/wicked_git.py (RunPackagePrepTool, BuildSrpmTool) |
Pod filesystem/process (backport/rebase agent pods), source/patch integrity | high | possible | unmitigated | none — rpmbuild and the full RPM build toolchain run with standard container privileges only (runAsNonRoot + default RuntimeDefault seccomp, no restricted profile, no sandboxed macro evaluation) |
ymir/tools/unprivileged/specfile.py, ymir/tools/unprivileged/wicked_git.py; tracked upstream as PACKIT-4796 |
| T12 | Prompt-injected instructions in Jira issue or MR comment content drive an agent to repeatedly invoke costly privileged tools (ReproduceTestingFarmRequestTool, build_package) with varying arguments, exhausting the Testing Farm API quota or spamming Copr or Konflux validation builds under the automation's real identity |
remote_auth | ReproduceTestingFarmRequestTool, build_package |
Testing Farm API token, Copr/Konflux build capacity, Kerberos-authenticated build identity, Konflux token | high | possible | unmitigated | ToolCallChecker only blocks exact-duplicate calls (identical tool name + args) within a window of 10, so varying one argument bypasses it; max_iterations (default 20-255) caps total agent steps but not per-tool invocation count |
ymir/tools/privileged/gateway.py (_select_build_tools) |
| T7 | Attacker-influenced or malformed jira_issue string reaches a privileged filesystem operation (shutil.rmtree) without validation, deleting arbitrary directories on the shared clone volume |
remote_auth | clone_and_prep_sources, fork_and_prepare_dist_git |
Shared PVC mcp-server-git-repos (RWX, mounted by 6+ agent pods) |
high | rare | mitigated | input validation rejects empty, absolute, or ..-containing jira_issue values |
commit 8b181341 (validate jira_issue), commit 3dad71ea (don't ignore shutil.rmtree errors) |
| T8 | Non-employee or compromised Jira account forces automated processing of an arbitrary issue via the ymir_todo label or a webhook bot-mention command (see T12 for what a legitimately-triggered issue's content can still drive an agent to do) |
remote_auth | ymir_todo Jira label; Jira webhook bot-mention commands |
Dist-git write access, Jira write access, compute/API budget | high | rare | mitigated | fetcher verifies label-adder is a Red Hat Employee Jira-group member via changelog walk (not JQL); atomic label flip before enqueue (fail-closed); webhook handler verifies comment author is a Red Hat Employee Jira-group member via GET /rest/api/3/user?expand=groups before dispatching any command (fail-closed on missing accountId or API error) |
none |
| T9 | Unbounded retention of Redis/Valkey queue data and Phoenix traces stores workflow state and tool inputs/outputs indefinitely | insider | Valkey queue storage; Phoenix trace PVC | Redis/Valkey task queues, Sumo Logic logs / OTEL traces | medium | likely | unmitigated | none — data_retention_policy.md explicitly flags this as unresolved; the 7-day cleanup job only covers git clones, not queues or traces |
data_retention_policy.md self-identifies the gap |
| T1 | Unauthenticated public route grants direct read/write access to live automation task queues | remote_unauth | redis-commander OpenShift Route |
Redis/Valkey task queues | medium | rare | unmitigated | no HTTP_USER/HTTP_PASSWORD configured; only Red Hat employees can tamper with it |
none |
| T11 | Long-running Deployments (agents, mcp-gateway, phoenix) do not set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false or capabilities: drop: [ALL], unlike CronJob pods which do |
local_user | openshift/deployment-*.yml |
Pod isolation guarantees | medium | rare | partially_mitigated | OpenShift's restrictive SCC already blocks privilege escalation and most capabilities cluster-wide regardless of pod spec, which is why this hasn't been prioritized; explicit allowPrivilegeEscalation: false/capabilities: drop: [ALL] would still be defense-in-depth against a future SCC relaxation |
none |
| T14 | A single MR to the shared-rules registry can plant misleading or contradictory guidance in AGENTS.md content followed by agents across every package the rule set lists, multiplying the blast radius of one instruction relative to a per-package AGENTS.md (which only affects one package); a compromised or careless contributor could steer fix strategy, patch conventions, or spec BuildRequires/Requires additions for many packages at once |
insider | get_maintainer_rules, get_shared_rules; rules/shared-rules/registry.yaml, rules/shared-rules/<rule_set>/AGENTS.md, rules/<package>/AGENTS.md |
Source, patches, and spec-file changes produced by agents | high | possible | partially_mitigated | CI validates registry structure only (valid YAML, referenced AGENTS.md exists, no orphaned entries), not content; MR review does not guarantee a reviewer catches subtly wrong or malicious guidance across every listed package; the non-overridable behaviors list (target branch, CVE eligibility, Jira transitions, build triggering, MR creation) bounds what any rules content can influence regardless of source; human review still expected before the resulting dist-git MR merges (not code-enforced — see T2) |
ymir/tools/privileged/shared_rules.py, ymir/tools/privileged/maintainer_rules.py |
Sorted by (impact desc, likelihood desc).
| threat | reason |
|---|---|
| Compromise of GitLab CI draft/release build triggering | The GitLab CI draft/release path depends on a human-applied MR label. Agent-triggered Konflux scratch validation is in scope above (T12, T15). |
| Processing of embargoed CVEs by agents | Explicitly out of scope by policy — agents do not handle embargoed issues (monitoring.md) and cannot access any such information. |
Compromise of GitLab CI build infrastructure (gitlab.cee.redhat.com) or the quay.io robot account |
Owned and secured by central Red Hat CI/PSI infrastructure teams, outside this project's control. |
| OpenShift platform/cluster-level compromise (node escape, cluster-admin compromise, storage-class or admission-webhook bugs) | Platform-team responsibility; this project treats the OpenShift control plane as trusted infrastructure. |
Supply-chain compromise of a third-party Python dependency (e.g. litellm) executing arbitrary code inside agent/build containers |
Threat to any software with third-party dependencies, not specific to this AI/agent system — tracked here as a generic-engineering concern rather than alongside the AI-specific threats above. Mitigated in practice: version pins excluding known-compromised litellm releases, build-time litellm_init.pth malicious-file detection, enforced Log Detective MCP version (commit e7422175 and related litellm version pins, following the real PyPI supply-chain compromise of litellm 1.82.7/1.82.8). |
Runtime users in the highest-privilege images (beeai, mcp) being members of the wheel group, in case the base image ships a sudoers rule |
wheel membership / a possible sudoers rule has no effect under OpenShift's restrictive SCC (runAsNonRoot: true, no sudo capability path to root inside the container regardless of group membership); not a real escalation path in this deployment environment. |
Self-inflicted availability incidents (RollingUpdate/PVC deadlock, resource-quota deadlock, stale AWS nodeSelectors from cluster migration) |
Operational reliability bugs, not adversarial threats — tracked as ops incidents. The original PVC-deadlock fix (switching all Deployments to Recreate) has since been partially reverted: once per-issue Redis locking (T5) and a memory-quota increase landed, 8 agent Deployments moved back to RollingUpdate (commits 9cd8c25b and 88597ddd) to avoid downtime on redeploy; mcp-gateway, phoenix, valkey, and the mr-consolidation-agent Deployments still use Recreate. |
- Who can file Jira issues or post GitLab MR comments that reach agent context — can non-Red-Hat-employee partners or customers do so? This determines whether T2's actor should be
remote_unauthrather thanremote_auth. - Phoenix trace retention is described inconsistently:
monitoring.mdsays 2 weeks,data_retention_policy.mdsays unconfigured/infinite, and the current manifests use2Giforphoenix-dataand150Gifortrace-server-data. Needs reconciliation and an enforced retention job. - Is
SKIP_GATEWAY_CHECK=1(the bypass forcheck-unprivileged-gateway.py's privileged/unprivileged tool separation check) ever used in CI or production, and if so, is its use audited? - Does the external
access_control.md(referenced fromSECURITY.md, not present in this repo) cover credential rotation for the long-lived keytabs, GitLab PAT, and GCP keys? Should be cross-referenced from this document once confirmed. - No maintainer interview has been conducted for this document yet — the impact/likelihood scores above are a bootstrap author's best estimate from code and docs, not a maintainer-agreed baseline.
- mode: bootstrap
- date: 2026-08-18
- target: github.com/packit/ai-workflows @ dc10a6c1
- inputs: SECURITY.md, README.md, README-agents.md, AGENTS.md,
CONTRIBUTING.md, ai_providers_data_flow.md, brew_konflux_data_flow.md,
gitlab_distgit_data_flow.md, jira_data_flow.md, jira_label_workflow_routing.md,
docs/mr_consolidation_architecture.md, monitoring.md, data_retention_policy.md,
openshift/ manifests, ymir/tools/privileged and ymir/tools/unprivileged source,
git commit history
- owner: @packit/the-packit-teamThe Konflux validation boundary update (2026-10-14) was checked against
ymir/tools/privileged/konflux.py, ymir/tools/privileged/gateway.py,
ymir/agents/build_agent.py, openshift/deployment-mcp-gateway.yml, and
openshift/README.md.
| mitigation | threat_ids | closes_class | effort |
|---|---|---|---|
Require authentication (proxy or HTTP_USER/HTTP_PASSWORD) on the redis-commander route, or remove the public Route and access it only via oc port-forward |
T1 | yes | S |
Add TTL/eviction for Redis/Valkey queue entries and an enforced Phoenix trace retention job; reconcile the retention numbers across monitoring.md, data_retention_policy.md, and the PVC manifests |
T9 | yes | M |
Create a heuristic for validation of patch URLs coming from GetPatchFromUrlTool to make sure the patches are coming from the official upstream repositories |
T6 | partial | M |
Restrict OpenShift RBAC so oc exec/oc rsh into valkey (and other stateful pods) is limited to a small break-glass group, and add audit logging for direct queue mutation |
T5 | partial | M |
Add per-tool invocation rate limiting / cooldown for costly privileged tools (BuildPackageTool, ReproduceTestingFarmRequestTool), independent of the existing exact-duplicate-call ToolCallChecker |
T12 | yes | M |
| Treat all Jira-issue- and MR-comment-derived text as untrusted at the prompt level; add a confirmation/second-check step before high-impact privileged actions (push, Jira status change) whose triggering content originated from unverified external sources | T2 | partial | L |
Sandbox spec-file macro/shell expansion (restrict or strip %(...) shell macros, run specfile/rpmbuild parsing in a locked-down subprocess with no credential/network access) before processing untrusted patches, upstream tarballs, or dist-git history; see PACKIT-4796 |
T10, T3 | partial | M |
| Make sure we are logging the content of SKIP_GATEWAY_CHECK environment variable | T2 | partial | S |