I reported this some months ago to customer support when I tried to get support for my ongoing system lockups with the CPU fan pinned at full when closing the lid, resolved only by a power cycle. These are still occurring but I've decided to just shut down my laptop when not in use, hoping it's resolved some point in the future. There may be additional context for this issue in my ticket history if you wish to look it up.
Issue/Bug Description:
The system76 drivers bug reporting collects the log output of all the users system services and full syslog output.
|
SubProcess.check_call(['journalctl', '--since', 'yesterday'], stdout=fp) |
- These are generated without user consent, but only uploaded after confirmation based on what I see in:
|
tgz = create_logs(self.args.home) |
My issues with this practice are:
-
Security - It appears the files are copied to the home directory using default permissions that would make them world readable, based on that gtk message. This means that low privileged users (not in the systemd-journal) for journal, users without (syslog or adm) membership for syslog can get full journal & syslog access leaking potential configuration details. I understand on a workstation this is less of a concern than a server environment, but they should still be taken into consideration and be violated only with necessity.
-
Privacy - While they are not automatically uploaded, not all users may understand how wide reaching the report may be. If they are frustrated or in a rush to get their system working they may not bother trying to audit the contents. These files may contain very personal information, PII data, it's impossible to assert with absolute certainty that PKI, PCI, or any other strictly regulated data may not end up in these files on a developers machine.
Steps to reproduce (if you know):
Look at source control.
Expected behavior:
System76 does not collect all system information by default, instead maintains a whitelist of very granular rules constrained by [systemd unit, pattern] known to be useful for diagnosis. This negates both security and privacy concerns. I don't think there is any other option.
I reported this some months ago to customer support when I tried to get support for my ongoing system lockups with the CPU fan pinned at full when closing the lid, resolved only by a power cycle. These are still occurring but I've decided to just shut down my laptop when not in use, hoping it's resolved some point in the future. There may be additional context for this issue in my ticket history if you wish to look it up.
Issue/Bug Description:
The system76 drivers bug reporting collects the log output of all the users system services and full syslog output.
system76-driver/system76driver/util.py
Line 53 in 34c87f2
system76-driver/system76driver/gtk.py
Line 162 in 34c87f2
My issues with this practice are:
Security - It appears the files are copied to the home directory using default permissions that would make them world readable, based on that gtk message. This means that low privileged users (not in the
systemd-journal) for journal, users without (syslogoradm) membership for syslog can get full journal & syslog access leaking potential configuration details. I understand on a workstation this is less of a concern than a server environment, but they should still be taken into consideration and be violated only with necessity.Privacy - While they are not automatically uploaded, not all users may understand how wide reaching the report may be. If they are frustrated or in a rush to get their system working they may not bother trying to audit the contents. These files may contain very personal information, PII data, it's impossible to assert with absolute certainty that PKI, PCI, or any other strictly regulated data may not end up in these files on a developers machine.
Steps to reproduce (if you know):
Look at source control.
Expected behavior:
System76 does not collect all system information by default, instead maintains a whitelist of very granular rules constrained by [systemd unit, pattern] known to be useful for diagnosis. This negates both security and privacy concerns. I don't think there is any other option.