Status: Draft
Author: Anna Popivanova
Created: 2025-10-01
Tags: fingerprinting, identity, verification, attestation
In a network of autonomous agents, verifying identity is critical. Traditional identifiers (e.g., UUIDs, public keys) are insufficient when agents are mutable, composable, or cloned. This RFC defines a fingerprinting mechanism that captures both static and behavioral traits of an agent — enabling cryptographic and contextual identity assurance.
- Generate reproducible fingerprints for agents
- Support both static (code, weights) and dynamic (behavioral) traits
- Enable attestation and verification across sessions
- Resist spoofing, replay, and impersonation
{
"agent_id": "airlock:agent:sha256:abc123...",
"version": "2025.10",
"fingerprint": {
"static": {
"model_hash": "sha256:...",
"weights_hash": "sha256:...",
"config_hash": "sha256:..."
},
"dynamic": {
"emoprint_hash": "sha256:...",
"response_profile": {
"hedging": 0.72,
"provocation_reflex": 0.91,
"humor_signature": "dry-sarcastic",
"tone_volatility": 0.18
}
},
"environment": {
"runtime_hash": "sha256:...",
"platform": "linux-x86_64",
"dependencies": ["torch==2.1.0", "numpy==1.26.0"]
}
},
"timestamp": "2025-10-14T15:00:00Z",
"signature": "ed25519:..."
}- Static hashes must match known agent builds
- Dynamic profile must fall within expected bounds
- Signature must be verifiable against registry public key
- Environment hash must match attested runtime (see RFC 0003)
Agents may include an emoprint, capturing affective telemetry from affective tone, sentiment patterns, and challenge-response patterns. See RFC 0008.
- Hash collision spoofing — mitigated via SHA-256 and signed payloads
- Behavioral mimicry — mitigated via emoprint drift detection
- Environment forgery — mitigated via attestation (RFC 0003)
See /examples/fingerprint/agent-v1.json for a full payload.