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Limitations

Honest constraints for operators evaluating 0.1.0.

Authentication

  • Kerberos authentication: implemented via embedded Apache Kerby (not Android OS Kerberos). Requires reachable KDC (TCP/UDP 88), correct realm/SPN, and compatible enctypes (AES preferred).
  • GSSAPI / SASL GSS-SPNEGO bind: implemented using app-built tokens + UnboundID GenericSASLBindRequest. Mutual-auth multi-round continuation is still limited.
  • Only anonymous and simple bind are available

Object provisioning UI

  • Create user / create group / create OU screens are limited message placeholders
  • LDAP add exists in the engine, but there is no production-ready provisioning UI

Custom CA UX

  • TLS CUSTOM_CA mode and Room CA storage exist
  • Profile editor only exposes a Custom CA ID field — no certificate file picker / PEM import UI yet

Directory coverage

  • Not a full replacement for RSAT / ADUC / enterprise consoles
  • Nested group expansion and large memberships may be truncated in UI (engine supports range retrieval / nested search)
  • Schema screen lists names; it is not a full schema browser/editor
  • Multi-forest / complex trust graphs are summarized from LDAP trust attributes, not a full trust path analyzer

Diagnostics

  • Kerberos checks are locator/port oriented, not ticket/auth success
  • Concurrency and timeouts are configurable but not a continuous monitoring product
  • Score is a simple weighted heuristic over SUCCESS/WARNING/ERROR tests

Platform / packaging

  • Early development; not intended for production AD environments without careful review
  • compileSdk / targetSdk 37 locally (SDK 36 unavailable on the documented build machine)
  • Cleartext traffic permitted at the app level to allow intentional LDAP:389 use
  • No WorkManager background diagnostic scheduling in the current dependency set

Privacy / sharing risk

  • Unsanitized report export can include hostnames, DNs, and other directory evidence — use sanitization for external sharing
  • Device compromise can still expose Keystore-protected material under advanced attack scenarios

See implementation-status.md for the full feature matrix.