Spell check typos.

Author: mmaker

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 ### Background
 
-This crate was originally created as part of [`dalek-cyptography`](https://github.com/dalek-cryptography).
+This crate was originally created as part of [`dalek-cryptography`](https://github.com/dalek-cryptography).
 It has been forked:
 1. To bring the `zkp` crate up to date with `dalek-cryptography` dependencies.
 2. To resolve bugs and incorporate changes to the fiat-shamir transform.

src/errors.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ pub enum ProofError {
     /// Something is wrong with the proof, causing a verification failure.
     #[error("Verification failed.")]
     VerificationFailure,
-    /// Occurs during batch verification if the batch parameters are mis-sized.
+    /// Occurs during batch verification if the batch parameters do not have the right size.
     #[error("Mismatched parameter sizes for batch verification.")]
     BatchSizeMismatch,
 }

src/toolbox/sigma/group_morphism.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ pub struct LinearCombination {
 }
 
 pub struct Morphism<G: Group> {
-    pub linear_combinaison: Vec<LinearCombination>,
+    pub linear_combination: Vec<LinearCombination>,
     pub group_elements: Vec<G>,
     pub num_scalars: usize,
     pub num_elements: usize,
@@ -23,23 +23,23 @@ fn msm_pr<G: Group>(scalars: &[G::Scalar], bases: &[G]) -> G {
 impl<G: Group> Morphism<G> {
     pub fn new() -> Self {
         Self {
-            linear_combinaison: Vec::new(),
+            linear_combination: Vec::new(),
             group_elements: Vec::new(),
             num_scalars: 0,
             num_elements: 0,
         }
     }
 
     pub fn append(&mut self, lc: LinearCombination) {
-        self.linear_combinaison.push(lc);
+        self.linear_combination.push(lc);
     }
 
     pub fn num_statements(&self) -> usize {
-        self.linear_combinaison.len()
+        self.linear_combination.len()
     }
 
     pub fn evaluate(&self, scalars: &[<G as Group>::Scalar]) -> Vec<G> {
-        self.linear_combinaison.iter().map(|lc| {
+        self.linear_combination.iter().map(|lc| {
             let coefficients: Vec<_> = lc.scalar_indices.iter().map(|&i| scalars[i].clone()).collect();
             let elements: Vec<_> = lc.element_indices.iter().map(|&i| self.group_elements[i].clone()).collect();
             msm_pr(&coefficients, &elements)

tests/non_interactive_protocol.rs

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ fn fiat_shamir_schnorr_proof_ristretto() {
     let mut witness = Vec::new();
     witness.push(w.clone());
 
-    // The H = z * G equeation where z is the unique scalar variable
+    // The H = z * G equation where z is the unique scalar variable
     morphismp.append_equation(1, &[(0, 0)]);
 
     // The SigmaProtocol induced by morphismp

tests/proof_composition_test.rs

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ use rand::{rngs::OsRng, CryptoRng, Rng};
 use sigma_rs::toolbox::sigma::{proof_composition::OrEnum, AndProtocol, OrProtocol, SigmaProtocol};
 use curve25519_dalek::{ristretto::RistrettoPoint, scalar::Scalar};
 
-pub struct LokZkpSchnorr {
+pub struct SchnorrZkp {
     pub generator: RistrettoPoint,
     pub target: RistrettoPoint
 }
 
 #[allow(non_snake_case)]
-impl SigmaProtocol for LokZkpSchnorr {
+impl SigmaProtocol for SchnorrZkp {
     type Witness = Scalar;
     type Commitment = RistrettoPoint;
     type ProverState = (Scalar, Scalar);
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ fn andproof_schnorr_correct() {
     let H1 = w1 * G1;
     let H2 = w2 * G2;
 
-    let p1 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G1, target: H1 };
-    let p2 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G2, target: H2 };
+    let p1 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G1, target: H1 };
+    let p2 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G2, target: H2 };
 
     let and_proof = AndProtocol::new(p1, p2);
 
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ fn andproof_schnorr_incorrect() {
     let H1 = w1 * G1;
     let H2 = w2 * G2;
 
-    let p1 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G1, target: H1 };
-    let p2 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G2, target: H2 };
+    let p1 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G1, target: H1 };
+    let p2 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G2, target: H2 };
 
     let and_proof = AndProtocol::new(p1, p2);
 
@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ fn orproof_schnorr_correct() {
     let H1 = w1 * G1;
     let H2 = RistrettoPoint::random(&mut rng); // The witness for this point is unknown
 
-    let p1 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G1, target: H1 };
-    let p2 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G2, target: H2 };
+    let p1 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G1, target: H1 };
+    let p2 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G2, target: H2 };
 
     let or_proof = OrProtocol::new(p1, p2);
 
@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@ fn orproof_schnorr_incorrect() {
     let H1 = RistrettoPoint::random(&mut rng); // The witness for this point is unknown
     let H2 = RistrettoPoint::random(&mut rng); // The witness for this point is unknown
 
-    let p1 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G1, target: H1 };
-    let p2 = LokZkpSchnorr { generator: G2, target: H2 };
+    let p1 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G1, target: H1 };
+    let p2 = SchnorrZkp { generator: G2, target: H2 };
 
     let or_proof = OrProtocol::new(p1, p2);