Summary
The SiYuan kernel WebSocket server accepts unauthenticated connections when a specific “auth keepalive” query parameter is present. After connection, incoming messages are parsed using unchecked type assertions on attacker-controlled JSON.
A remote attacker can send malformed messages that trigger a runtime panic, potentially crashing the kernel process and causing denial of service.
Details
1. Authentication Bypass via Keepalive Query
Unauthenticated connections are accepted if the request URI matches a specific pattern intended for an authentication page keepalive.
File: kernel/server/serve.go
if !authOk {
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
}
2. Unsafe Type Assertions on Untrusted Input
Incoming JSON messages are parsed into a generic map and fields are accessed without validation.
File: kernel/server/serve.go
cmdStr := request["cmd"].(string)
cmdId := request["reqId"].(float64)
param := request["param"].(map[string]interface{})
Malformed or missing fields trigger a runtime panic.
The handler does not implement local panic recovery, allowing crashes to propagate.
PoC
Step 1 — Prepare workspace directory
Step 2 — Run SiYuan container
docker run -d \
-p 6806:6806 \
-e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE_BYPASS=true \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan \
--workspace=/siyuan/workspace
Service becomes reachable at http://127.0.0.1:6806
Step 3 — Confirm service availability
Open in browser:
Step 4 — Connect to unauthenticated WebSocket endpoint
ws://127.0.0.1:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth
This connection is accepted without credentials.
Step 5 — Send malformed payload
Payload:
Step 6 — Observe behavior
Monitor container logs:
docker logs -f <container_id>
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can repeatedly crash the kernel, causing persistent denial of service.
Impact is highest when the service is exposed beyond localhost (e.g., Docker deployments, reverse proxies, LAN access, or public hosting).
Summary
The SiYuan kernel WebSocket server accepts unauthenticated connections when a specific “auth keepalive” query parameter is present. After connection, incoming messages are parsed using unchecked type assertions on attacker-controlled JSON.
A remote attacker can send malformed messages that trigger a runtime panic, potentially crashing the kernel process and causing denial of service.
Details
1. Authentication Bypass via Keepalive Query
Unauthenticated connections are accepted if the request URI matches a specific pattern intended for an authentication page keepalive.
File: kernel/server/serve.go
2. Unsafe Type Assertions on Untrusted Input
Incoming JSON messages are parsed into a generic map and fields are accessed without validation.
File: kernel/server/serve.go
Malformed or missing fields trigger a runtime panic.
The handler does not implement local panic recovery, allowing crashes to propagate.
PoC
Step 1 — Prepare workspace directory
Step 2 — Run SiYuan container
Service becomes reachable at http://127.0.0.1:6806
Step 3 — Confirm service availability
Open in browser:
Step 4 — Connect to unauthenticated WebSocket endpoint
This connection is accepted without credentials.
Step 5 — Send malformed payload
Payload:
{}Step 6 — Observe behavior
Monitor container logs:
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can repeatedly crash the kernel, causing persistent denial of service.
Impact is highest when the service is exposed beyond localhost (e.g., Docker deployments, reverse proxies, LAN access, or public hosting).