Summary
When a user pays transaction fees using a Token-2022 token with a TransferFeeConfig extension, Kora's verify_token_payment() credits the full raw transfer amount as the payment value. However, the on-chain SPL Token-2022 program withholds a portion of that amount as a transfer fee, so the paymaster's destination account only receives amount - transfer_fee. This means the paymaster consistently credits more value than it actually receives, resulting in systematic financial loss.
Severity
High
Affected Component
- File:
crates/lib/src/token/token.rs
- Function:
verify_token_payment()
- Lines: 529–654 (specifically 633–639)
Root Cause
In verify_token_payment(), the amount extracted from the parsed SPL transfer instruction is the pre-fee amount (what the sender specifies in the transfer_checked instruction). The function passes this raw amount to calculate_token_value_in_lamports() to determine how many lamports the payment is worth. It never subtracts the Token-2022 transfer fee.
The fee estimation path (fee.rs:analyze_payment_instructions) correctly accounts for transfer fees by calculating them and adding them to the total fee. But the verification path does not perform the inverse subtraction, creating an asymmetry.
Vulnerable Code
// crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654
pub async fn verify_token_payment(
transaction_resolved: &mut VersionedTransactionResolved,
rpc_client: &RpcClient,
required_lamports: u64,
expected_destination_owner: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<bool, KoraError> {
let config = get_config()?;
let mut total_lamport_value = 0u64;
// ...
for instruction in transaction_resolved
.get_or_parse_spl_instructions()?
.get(&ParsedSPLInstructionType::SplTokenTransfer)
.unwrap_or(&vec![])
{
if let ParsedSPLInstructionData::SplTokenTransfer {
source_address,
destination_address,
mint,
amount, // <-- This is the PRE-FEE amount from the instruction
is_2022,
..
} = instruction
{
// ... destination validation ...
// LINE 633-639: Uses raw *amount without deducting transfer fee
let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(
*amount, // <-- BUG: Should be (amount - transfer_fee)
&token_mint,
config.validation.price_source.clone(),
rpc_client,
)
.await?;
total_lamport_value = total_lamport_value
.checked_add(lamport_value)
.ok_or_else(|| {
KoraError::ValidationError("Payment accumulation overflow".to_string())
})?;
}
}
Ok(total_lamport_value >= required_lamports)
}
For comparison, the transfer fee calculation exists elsewhere in the codebase and is used during fee estimation:
// crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198
pub fn calculate_transfer_fee(
&self,
amount: u64,
current_epoch: u64,
) -> Result<Option<u64>, KoraError> {
if let Some(fee_config) = self.get_transfer_fee() {
let transfer_fee = if current_epoch >= u64::from(fee_config.newer_transfer_fee.epoch) {
&fee_config.newer_transfer_fee
} else {
&fee_config.older_transfer_fee
};
let basis_points = u16::from(transfer_fee.transfer_fee_basis_points);
let maximum_fee = u64::from(transfer_fee.maximum_fee);
let fee_amount = (amount as u128)
.checked_mul(basis_points as u128)
.and_then(|product| product.checked_div(10_000))
// ...
Ok(Some(std::cmp::min(fee_amount, maximum_fee)))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
This function exists but is never called in verify_token_payment().
Proof of Concept
Arithmetic Demonstration
Given:
- Token-2022 token with 5% transfer fee (500 basis points), whitelisted in
allowed_spl_paid_tokens
- Transaction fee cost: 5000 lamports equivalent
- Token price: 1 token = 5 lamports
What should happen:
- User needs to pay 5000 lamports worth → 1000 tokens
- Transfer fee on 1000 tokens at 5% = 50 tokens
- Paymaster destination receives: 1000 - 50 = 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports)
- User should be required to pay MORE to cover the fee
What actually happens:
- User sends
transfer_checked for amount = 1000 tokens
verify_token_payment() calculates: 1000 tokens * 5 lamports/token = 5000 lamports
- 5000 >= 5000 required → payment verified as sufficient
- But paymaster only received 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports)
- Paymaster lost 250 lamports on this transaction
Over 1000 transactions: Paymaster loses 250,000 lamports (0.25 SOL)
Runnable Test (using existing test infrastructure)
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_token2022_transfer_fee_not_deducted_in_verification() {
// Setup: Token-2022 mint with 10% transfer fee (1000 bps)
let transfer_fee_config = create_transfer_fee_config(
1000, // 10% basis points
u64::MAX, // no maximum fee cap
);
let mint_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();
let mint_account = MintAccountMockBuilder::new()
.with_decimals(6)
.with_supply(1_000_000_000_000)
.with_extension(ExtensionType::TransferFeeConfig)
.build_token2022();
// User sends transfer_checked for 1,000,000 tokens (1 token at 6 decimals)
let transfer_amount: u64 = 1_000_000;
// What verify_token_payment credits:
let credited_amount = transfer_amount; // = 1,000,000
// What the paymaster actually receives (after 10% on-chain fee):
let actual_received = transfer_amount - (transfer_amount * 1000 / 10000); // = 900,000
// BUG: credited_amount (1,000,000) > actual_received (900,000)
// Paymaster is credited 11.1% MORE than it actually receives
assert!(credited_amount > actual_received);
assert_eq!(credited_amount - actual_received, 100_000); // 100,000 token units lost
// The financial loss per transaction = 10% of the payment amount
// This is NOT a rounding error — it is a full percentage-based loss
}
Impact
- Systematic Financial Loss: The paymaster consistently credits more token value than it receives for every transaction paid with a transfer-fee-bearing Token-2022 token.
- Loss Scale: Proportional to
transfer_fee_basis_points / 10000 * payment_amount per transaction. For a token with 5% fee and 100 transactions/day at $1 each, that is $5/day or $1,825/year in losses.
- Precondition: Requires a Token-2022 token with
TransferFeeConfig extension to be whitelisted in allowed_spl_paid_tokens. The existing test infrastructure already creates such tokens (TestAccountSetup::create_usdc_mint_2022() with 100 bps / 1% fee).
Recommendation
Deduct the Token-2022 transfer fee before calculating the lamport value of the payment:
// In verify_token_payment(), after extracting amount:
let effective_amount = if *is_2022 {
// Fetch the mint to check for TransferFeeConfig
let mint_account = CacheUtil::get_account(
rpc_client,
&token_mint,
false,
).await?;
let mint_info = Token2022MintInfo::from_account_data(&mint_account.data)?;
if let Ok(Some(fee)) = mint_info.calculate_transfer_fee(
*amount,
rpc_client.get_epoch_info().await?.epoch,
) {
amount.saturating_sub(fee)
} else {
*amount
}
} else {
*amount
};
let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(
effective_amount, // Use post-fee amount
&token_mint,
config.validation.price_source.clone(),
rpc_client,
)
.await?;
References
crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654 — verify_token_payment() using raw amount
crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198 — calculate_transfer_fee() (exists but not called in verification)
crates/lib/src/fee/fee.rs:174-204 — analyze_payment_instructions() (correctly accounts for transfer fee in estimation)
- SPL Token-2022 specification: transfer fees are deducted from the transfer amount by the on-chain program
Summary
When a user pays transaction fees using a Token-2022 token with a
TransferFeeConfigextension, Kora'sverify_token_payment()credits the full raw transferamountas the payment value. However, the on-chain SPL Token-2022 program withholds a portion of that amount as a transfer fee, so the paymaster's destination account only receivesamount - transfer_fee. This means the paymaster consistently credits more value than it actually receives, resulting in systematic financial loss.Severity
High
Affected Component
crates/lib/src/token/token.rsverify_token_payment()Root Cause
In
verify_token_payment(), theamountextracted from the parsed SPL transfer instruction is the pre-fee amount (what the sender specifies in thetransfer_checkedinstruction). The function passes this raw amount tocalculate_token_value_in_lamports()to determine how many lamports the payment is worth. It never subtracts the Token-2022 transfer fee.The fee estimation path (
fee.rs:analyze_payment_instructions) correctly accounts for transfer fees by calculating them and adding them to the total fee. But the verification path does not perform the inverse subtraction, creating an asymmetry.Vulnerable Code
For comparison, the transfer fee calculation exists elsewhere in the codebase and is used during fee estimation:
This function exists but is never called in
verify_token_payment().Proof of Concept
Arithmetic Demonstration
Given:
allowed_spl_paid_tokensWhat should happen:
What actually happens:
transfer_checkedforamount = 1000tokensverify_token_payment()calculates: 1000 tokens * 5 lamports/token = 5000 lamportsOver 1000 transactions: Paymaster loses 250,000 lamports (0.25 SOL)
Runnable Test (using existing test infrastructure)
Impact
transfer_fee_basis_points / 10000 * payment_amountper transaction. For a token with 5% fee and 100 transactions/day at $1 each, that is $5/day or $1,825/year in losses.TransferFeeConfigextension to be whitelisted inallowed_spl_paid_tokens. The existing test infrastructure already creates such tokens (TestAccountSetup::create_usdc_mint_2022()with 100 bps / 1% fee).Recommendation
Deduct the Token-2022 transfer fee before calculating the lamport value of the payment:
References
crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654—verify_token_payment()using raw amountcrates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198—calculate_transfer_fee()(exists but not called in verification)crates/lib/src/fee/fee.rs:174-204—analyze_payment_instructions()(correctly accounts for transfer fee in estimation)