fix additional issues with filter macros

Author: nasbench

detections/deprecated/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2025-01-13'
 author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
 status: deprecated
 type: Hunting
-description: This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "Domain Group Discovery With Net". The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
+description: This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44". The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688

detections/deprecated/net_localgroup_discovery.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2025-01-13'
 author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 status: deprecated
 type: Hunting
-description: This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "Domain Group Discovery With Net". The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
+description: This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44". The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
 data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688

…oint/windows_group_discovery_via_net.yml …ndows_domain_group_discovery_via_net.ymldetections/endpoint/windows_group_discovery_via_net.yml renamed to detections/endpoint/windows_domain_group_discovery_via_net.yml detections/endpoint/windows_group_discovery_via_net.yml renamed to detections/endpoint/windows_domain_group_discovery_via_net.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: Domain Group Discovery With Net
+name: Windows Domain Group Discovery Via Net
 id: c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44
 version: 1
 date: '2025-01-13'
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ data_source:
 - Sysmon EventID 1
 - Windows Event Log Security 4688
 - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) AND NOT (Processes.process="*/add" OR Processes.process="*/delete") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) AND NOT (Processes.process="*/add" OR Processes.process="*/delete") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_domain_group_discovery_via_net_filter`'
 how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
 known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 references: