fix(ci): mitigate template injection in GitHub Actions workflows#351
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Move all ${{ github.* }} and ${{ needs.* }} expressions out of run: blocks into env: variables to prevent script injection via untrusted inputs (branch names, PR numbers, workflow dispatch params).
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)
Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
Yolley
approved these changes
Apr 24, 2026
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Summary
Fixes template injection vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows identified by Aikido security scan.
GitHub Actions
run:blocks that directly embed${{ }}template expressions referencing untrusted inputs (branch names, PR numbers, workflow dispatch params) are vulnerable to script injection. An attacker can craft a malicious branch name or PR body containing shell metacharacters that get evaluated by bash when the workflow runs.Vulnerabilities Fixed
.github/workflows/gh-alpha-release.yml(6 injection points):${{ github.event_name }}— used inifcomparisons in shell${{ github.head_ref }}— attacker-controlled branch name injected directly${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}— injected into shell variable${{ github.event.inputs.pr_number }}— user-supplied workflow dispatch input${{ needs.resolve-alpha.outputs.alpha_version }}— injected intopnpm version-allarg andgit commit -m.github/workflows/gh-publish.yml(1 injection point):${{ github.repository }}— injected intogithub-scripttemplate literalFix
All
${{ }}expressions insiderun:andscript:blocks are moved toenv:mappings, then referenced as shell environment variables ($VAR). Environment variable assignment treats values as literal strings, preventing shell metacharacter evaluation.Test plan
ruby -ryaml)${{ }}expressions remain in anyrun:blocks across both filesalpha/*and verify it resolves the version correctlymasterand verify the publish workflow creates the release and comment as expected