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Description
CVE-2018-20847
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters in src/lib/openjp2/pi.c once led to integer overflow and was fixed in Commit 5d00b71.
Similar Code Snippet
opj_j2k_update_rates in src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c contains a similar logic
/* 4 borders of the tile rescale on the image if necessary */
l_x0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(l_cp->tx0 + j * l_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)l_image->x0);
l_y0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(l_cp->ty0 + i * l_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)l_image->y0);
l_x1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(l_cp->tx0 + (j + 1) * l_cp->tdx),
(OPJ_INT32)l_image->x1);
l_y1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(l_cp->ty0 + (i + 1) * l_cp->tdy),
(OPJ_INT32)l_image->y1);Would it make sense to replace opj_int_* with opj_uint_* as the patch did for defending programming?
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