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// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
pub(crate) mod compat;
use self::compat::Evidence;
use super::{TeeClass, TeeEvidence, TeeEvidenceParsedClaim, Verifier};
use crate::snp::{
get_common_name, get_oid_int, get_oid_octets, get_processor_generation, CERT_CHAINS, HW_ID_OID,
LOADER_SPL_OID, SNP_SPL_OID, TEE_SPL_OID, UCODE_SPL_OID,
};
use crate::{InitDataHash, ReportData};
use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use az_snp_vtpm::certs::{AmdChain, Vcek};
use az_snp_vtpm::hcl::HclReport;
use az_snp_vtpm::report::AttestationReport;
use az_snp_vtpm::vtpm::QuoteError;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
use base64::Engine;
pub(crate) use compat::TpmQuote;
use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
use openssl::pkey::PKey;
use openssl::sign::Verifier as OsslVerifier;
use openssl::x509::X509;
use openssl::{ec::EcKey, ecdsa, sha::sha384};
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sev::parser::ByteParser;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::{debug, instrument};
use tss_esapi::structures::{Attest, AttestInfo};
use tss_esapi::traits::UnMarshall;
use x509_parser::prelude::*;
const HCL_VMPL_VALUE: u32 = 0;
const INITDATA_PCR: usize = 8;
const SNP_REPORT_SIGNATURE_OFFSET: usize = 0x2a0; // 672 bytes
const SHA256_LEN: usize = 32;
pub struct AzSnpVtpm;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum CertError {
#[error("Vendor certs not found for processor type: {0}")]
VcekValidationFailed(String),
#[error("TPM quote nonce doesn't match expected report_data")]
NonceMismatch,
#[error("SNP report report_data mismatch")]
SnpReportMismatch,
#[error("VMPL of SNP report is not {0}")]
VmplIncorrect(u32),
#[error(transparent)]
Quote(#[from] QuoteError),
#[error(transparent)]
JsonWebkey(#[from] jsonwebkey::ConversionError),
#[error(transparent)]
Anyhow(#[from] anyhow::Error),
}
pub(crate) fn extend_claim(claim: &mut TeeEvidenceParsedClaim, tpm_quote: &TpmQuote) -> Result<()> {
let Value::Object(ref mut map) = claim else {
bail!("failed to extend the claim, not an object");
};
let mut tpm_values = serde_json::Map::new();
for (i, pcr) in tpm_quote.pcrs.iter().enumerate() {
tpm_values.insert(format!("pcr{:02}", i), Value::String(hex::encode(pcr)));
}
map.insert("tpm".to_string(), Value::Object(tpm_values));
if tpm_quote.pcrs.len() > INITDATA_PCR {
map.insert(
"init_data".into(),
Value::String(hex::encode(&tpm_quote.pcrs[INITDATA_PCR])),
);
}
let nonce = extract_nonce(&tpm_quote.message)?;
map.insert("report_data".into(), Value::String(hex::encode(nonce)));
Ok(())
}
fn extract_nonce(message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let attest = Attest::unmarshall(message).context("Failed to parse TPM quote message")?;
Ok(attest.extra_data().to_vec())
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
struct VarDataUserData {
#[serde(rename = "user-data")]
user_data: String,
}
fn get_user_data(var_data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let var_data_json: VarDataUserData =
serde_json::from_slice(var_data).context("Failed to parse var data as JSON")?;
let user_data = hex::decode(var_data_json.user_data)
.context("Failed to decode user_data from hex string")?;
Ok(user_data)
}
fn verify_report_data(hcl_report: &HclReport) -> Result<()> {
let var_data_hash = hcl_report.var_data_sha256();
let snp_report: AttestationReport = hcl_report.try_into()?;
if var_data_hash != snp_report.report_data[..SHA256_LEN] {
bail!("HCL variable data digest doesn't match SNP report data");
}
debug!("SNP report_data verification completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn verify_user_data(hcl_report: &HclReport, report_data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let var_data = hcl_report.var_data();
let user_data = get_user_data(var_data)?;
let report_data_len = report_data.len();
if &user_data[0..report_data_len] != report_data {
bail!("User-data in HCL variable data doesn't match report_data");
}
debug!("HCL user-data verification completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
#[async_trait]
impl Verifier for AzSnpVtpm {
/// The following verification steps are performed:
/// 1. TPM Quote has been signed by AK included in the HCL variable data
/// 2. Attestation report_data matches TPM Quote nonce
/// 3. TPM PCRs' digest matches the digest in the Quote
/// 4. SNP report's report_data field matches hashed HCL variable data
/// 5. User-data field in HCL variable data matches report_data
/// 6. SNP Report is genuine
/// 7. SNP Report has been issued in VMPL 0
/// 8. Init data hash matches TPM PCR[INITDATA_PCR]
#[instrument(skip_all, name = "Azure vTPM SEV-SNP")]
async fn evaluate(
&self,
evidence: TeeEvidence,
expected_report_data: &ReportData,
expected_init_data_hash: &InitDataHash,
) -> Result<Vec<(TeeEvidenceParsedClaim, TeeClass)>> {
let ReportData::Value(expected_report_data) = expected_report_data else {
bail!("unexpected empty report data");
};
let evidence = serde_json::from_value::<Evidence>(evidence)
.context("Failed to deserialize Azure vTPM SEV-SNP evidence")?;
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(evidence.hcl_report().into())?;
let tpm_quote = &evidence.tpm_quote();
verify_tpm_signature(tpm_quote, &hcl_report)?;
verify_tpm_nonce(tpm_quote, expected_report_data)?;
verify_tpm_pcrs(tpm_quote)?;
verify_report_data(&hcl_report)?;
if evidence.version() >= 2 {
verify_user_data(&hcl_report, expected_report_data)?;
}
let vcek_x509: X509 = match evidence.vcek()? {
compat::Vcek::Pem(pem) => pem,
compat::Vcek::Der(der) => X509::from_der(&der).context("Invalid VCEK DER")?,
};
let vcek = Vcek(vcek_x509);
let snp_report = hcl_report.try_into()?;
let proc_gen =
get_processor_generation(&snp_report).context("Failed to get CPU Generation")?;
let Some(vendor_certs) = CERT_CHAINS.get(&proc_gen) else {
return Err(CertError::VcekValidationFailed(format!("{:?}", proc_gen)).into());
};
let amd_chain = AmdChain {
ask: vendor_certs.ask.clone().into(),
ark: vendor_certs.ark.clone().into(),
};
amd_chain
.validate()
.context("Failed to validate CA chain")?;
vcek.validate(&amd_chain)
.context("Failed to validate VCEK")?;
debug!("VCEK validated against {:?} certificate chain", proc_gen);
verify_snp_report(&snp_report, &vcek)?;
let pcrs = get_pcrs(tpm_quote)?;
let pcr_refs: Vec<&[u8; 32]> = pcrs.iter().collect();
verify_init_data(expected_init_data_hash, &pcr_refs)?;
let mut claim = parse_tee_evidence_az(&snp_report);
extend_claim(&mut claim, tpm_quote)?;
Ok(vec![(claim, "cpu".to_string())])
}
}
fn get_pcrs(tpm_quote: &TpmQuote) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>> {
tpm_quote
.pcrs
.iter()
.map(|p| {
p.as_slice()
.try_into()
.context("Invalid PCR length, expected 32 bytes")
})
.collect()
}
pub(crate) fn verify_tpm_nonce(tpm_quote: &TpmQuote, report_data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let nonce = extract_nonce(&tpm_quote.message)?;
if nonce != report_data[..] {
bail!("TPM quote nonce doesn't match expected report_data");
}
debug!("TPM report_data verification completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn verify_tpm_signature(tpm_quote: &TpmQuote, hcl_report: &HclReport) -> Result<()> {
let ak_pub = hcl_report.ak_pub().context("Failed to get AKpub")?;
let der = ak_pub.key.try_to_der()?;
let ak_pub = PKey::public_key_from_der(&der).context("Failed to parse AKpub")?;
let mut verifier = OsslVerifier::new(MessageDigest::sha256(), &ak_pub)?;
verifier.update(&tpm_quote.message)?;
let is_verified = verifier.verify(&tpm_quote.signature)?;
if !is_verified {
bail!("vTPM quote is not signed by AKpub");
}
debug!("Signature verification completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn verify_tpm_pcrs(tpm_quote: &TpmQuote) -> Result<()> {
let attest = Attest::unmarshall(&tpm_quote.message).context("Failed to parse TPM message")?;
let AttestInfo::Quote { info } = attest.attested() else {
bail!("TPM attestation is not a quote");
};
let expected_digest = info.pcr_digest();
let mut hasher = openssl::sha::Sha256::new();
for pcr in &tpm_quote.pcrs {
hasher.update(pcr);
}
let actual_digest = hasher.finish();
if actual_digest[..] != expected_digest[..] {
bail!("Digest of PCRs does not match digest in Quote");
}
debug!("PCR verification completed successfully");
Ok(())
}
fn verify_snp_report(snp_report: &AttestationReport, vcek: &Vcek) -> Result<(), CertError> {
verify_report_signature(snp_report, vcek)?;
if snp_report.vmpl != HCL_VMPL_VALUE {
return Err(CertError::VmplIncorrect(HCL_VMPL_VALUE));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verifies the signature of the attestation report using the provided certificate chain and vendor certificates.
fn verify_report_signature(report: &AttestationReport, vcek: &Vcek) -> Result<()> {
// OpenSSL bindings do not expose custom extensions
// Parse the key using x509_parser
let endorsement_key_der = &vcek.0.to_der()?;
let parsed_endorsement_key = X509Certificate::from_der(endorsement_key_der)?
.1
.tbs_certificate;
let common_name = get_common_name(&vcek.0).context("No common name found in certificate")?;
// if the common name is "VCEK", then the key is a VCEK
// so lets check the chip id
if common_name == "VCEK"
&& get_oid_octets::<64>(&parsed_endorsement_key, HW_ID_OID)? != report.chip_id
{
bail!("Chip ID mismatch");
}
// tcb version
// these integer extensions are 3 bytes with the last byte as the data
if get_oid_int(&parsed_endorsement_key, UCODE_SPL_OID)? != report.reported_tcb.microcode {
bail!("Microcode version mismatch");
}
if get_oid_int(&parsed_endorsement_key, SNP_SPL_OID)? != report.reported_tcb.snp {
bail!("SNP version mismatch");
}
if get_oid_int(&parsed_endorsement_key, TEE_SPL_OID)? != report.reported_tcb.tee {
bail!("TEE version mismatch");
}
if get_oid_int(&parsed_endorsement_key, LOADER_SPL_OID)? != report.reported_tcb.bootloader {
bail!("Boot loader version mismatch");
}
// verify report signature
let sig = ecdsa::EcdsaSig::try_from(&report.signature)?;
// Get the offset of the signature field in the report struct
let raw_report_bytes = report.to_bytes().context("Failed to write report bytes")?;
let data = &raw_report_bytes[..SNP_REPORT_SIGNATURE_OFFSET];
let pub_key = EcKey::try_from(vcek.0.public_key()?)?;
let signed = sig.verify(&sha384(data), &pub_key)?;
if !signed {
bail!("Signature validation failed.");
}
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn verify_init_data(expected: &InitDataHash, pcrs: &[&[u8; 32]]) -> Result<()> {
let InitDataHash::Value(expected_init_data_hash) = expected else {
debug!("No expected value, skipping init_data verification");
return Ok(());
};
debug!("Check the binding of PCR{INITDATA_PCR}");
// sha256(0x00 * 32 || expected_init_data_hash)
let mut input = [0u8; 64];
input[32..].copy_from_slice(expected_init_data_hash);
let digest = openssl::sha::sha256(&input);
let init_data_pcr = pcrs[INITDATA_PCR];
if &digest != init_data_pcr {
bail!("Expected init_data digest is different from the content of PCR{INITDATA_PCR}");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Parses the attestation report and extracts the TEE evidence claims.
/// Returns a JSON-formatted map of parsed claims.
pub(crate) fn parse_tee_evidence_az(report: &AttestationReport) -> TeeEvidenceParsedClaim {
let claims_map = json!({
// policy fields
"policy_abi_major": format!("{}",report.policy.abi_major()),
"policy_abi_minor": format!("{}", report.policy.abi_minor()),
"policy_smt_allowed": format!("{}", report.policy.smt_allowed()),
"policy_migrate_ma": format!("{}", report.policy.migrate_ma_allowed()),
"policy_debug_allowed": format!("{}", report.policy.debug_allowed()),
"policy_single_socket": format!("{}", report.policy.single_socket_required()),
// versioning info
"reported_tcb_bootloader": format!("{}", report.reported_tcb.bootloader),
"reported_tcb_tee": format!("{}", report.reported_tcb.tee),
"reported_tcb_snp": format!("{}", report.reported_tcb.snp),
"reported_tcb_microcode": format!("{}", report.reported_tcb.microcode),
// platform info
"platform_tsme_enabled": format!("{}", report.plat_info.tsme_enabled()),
"platform_smt_enabled": format!("{}", report.plat_info.smt_enabled()),
// measurements
"measurement": format!("{}", STANDARD.encode(report.measurement)),
"report_data": format!("{}", STANDARD.encode(report.report_data)),
"init_data": format!("{}", STANDARD.encode(report.host_data)),
});
claims_map as TeeEvidenceParsedClaim
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use rstest::rstest;
use serde_json::json;
const REPORT: &[u8; 2600] = include_bytes!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/hcl-report.bin");
const TPM_QUOTE_V1_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/tpm-quote-v1.json");
const REPORT_DATA: &[u8] = "challenge".as_bytes();
const EVIDENCE_V0_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/evidence-v0.json");
const EVIDENCE_V1_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/evidence-v1.json");
const EVIDENCE_V2_JSON: &str = include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/evidence-v2.json");
const EVIDENCE_GENOA_JSON: &str =
include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/evidence-genoa.json");
const EVIDENCE_V2_PCR0: &str =
"84275b2f4312cd4fc6cbe6b152ad3c3683e513d9f1e23c34fca160c8cca7a6a7";
const EVIDENCE_V2_REPORT_DATA: &str = "982f5c6e45df0ed3f10b6f60b02f0c8390e281300f3805e2279c16168cd6ae9aa398f647caa2338748cd0fd9f5f819ef";
fn load_tpm_quote() -> TpmQuote {
serde_json::from_str(TPM_QUOTE_V1_JSON).unwrap()
}
#[rstest]
#[case::v0(EVIDENCE_V0_JSON)]
#[case::v1(EVIDENCE_V1_JSON)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_evaluate(#[case] evidence_json: &str) {
let tee_evidence: TeeEvidence = serde_json::from_str(evidence_json).unwrap();
let verifier = AzSnpVtpm;
let result = verifier
.evaluate(
tee_evidence,
&ReportData::Value(REPORT_DATA),
&InitDataHash::NotProvided,
)
.await;
let claims = result.unwrap();
let claims_values = claims[0].0.clone();
assert!(claims_values["report_data"] == "6368616c6c656e6765");
assert!(
claims_values["tpm"]["pcr00"]
== "e15c44796beabf46abcec7c57e590942041e47497e4ec27571c8b7664f48dced"
);
}
#[rstest]
#[case::v2(EVIDENCE_V2_JSON)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_evaluate_v2(#[case] evidence_json: &str) {
let report_data_hex = EVIDENCE_V2_REPORT_DATA;
let tee_evidence: TeeEvidence = serde_json::from_str(evidence_json).unwrap();
let verifier = AzSnpVtpm;
let result = verifier
.evaluate(
tee_evidence,
&ReportData::Value(&hex::decode(report_data_hex).unwrap()),
&InitDataHash::NotProvided,
)
.await;
let claims = result.unwrap();
let claims_values = claims[0].0.clone();
assert!(claims_values["report_data"] == report_data_hex);
assert!(claims_values["tpm"]["pcr00"] == EVIDENCE_V2_PCR0);
}
#[rstest]
#[case::v2(EVIDENCE_V2_JSON)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_verify_user_data(#[case] tampered_evidence_json: &str) {
let report_data = hex::decode(EVIDENCE_V2_REPORT_DATA).unwrap();
let evidence: Evidence = serde_json::from_str(&tampered_evidence_json).unwrap();
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(evidence.hcl_report().into()).unwrap();
verify_user_data(&hcl_report, &report_data).unwrap();
let report_data = hex::decode("123abc").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
verify_user_data(&hcl_report, &report_data)
.unwrap_err()
.to_string(),
"User-data in HCL variable data doesn't match report_data"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_evaluate_genoa() {
let tee_evidence: TeeEvidence = serde_json::from_str(EVIDENCE_GENOA_JSON).unwrap();
let verifier = AzSnpVtpm;
let report_data = hex::decode(
"0218488bae25d2509232bf676f1a66a30d7372add909109b36016ef136f2938ca05475f8b46094de6b64270ea35d950f",
)
.unwrap();
let result = verifier
.evaluate(
tee_evidence,
&ReportData::Value(&report_data),
&InitDataHash::NotProvided,
)
.await;
let claims = result.unwrap();
let claims_values = claims[0].0.clone();
assert!(
claims_values["tpm"]["pcr00"]
== "afd689d0bb1c5f36f023fbaf574135f555a28a10c1f6b938d2a25e70c7783338"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_snp_report() {
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(REPORT.to_vec()).unwrap();
let snp_report = hcl_report.try_into().unwrap();
let vcek = Vcek::from_pem(include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/vcek.pem")).unwrap();
// Try to validate VCEK against all known certificate chains
let validated = CERT_CHAINS.iter().any(|(_proc_gen, vendor_certs)| {
let amd_chain = AmdChain {
ask: vendor_certs.ask.clone().into(),
ark: vendor_certs.ark.clone().into(),
};
amd_chain.validate().is_ok() && vcek.validate(&amd_chain).is_ok()
});
assert!(
validated,
"VCEK should validate against at least one certificate chain"
);
verify_snp_report(&snp_report, &vcek).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_genoa_certificate_chain_validation() {
use crate::snp::ProcessorGeneration;
let vendor_certs = CERT_CHAINS
.get(&ProcessorGeneration::Genoa)
.expect("Genoa certificate chain should be present");
let amd_chain = AmdChain {
ask: vendor_certs.ask.clone().into(),
ark: vendor_certs.ark.clone().into(),
};
amd_chain
.validate()
.expect("Genoa certificate chain should be valid");
}
#[test]
fn test_genoa_vcek_validation() {
use crate::snp::ProcessorGeneration;
let vcek_pem = include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/vcek-genoa.pem");
let vcek = Vcek::from_pem(vcek_pem).expect("Failed to parse Genoa VCEK");
let vendor_certs = CERT_CHAINS
.get(&ProcessorGeneration::Genoa)
.expect("Genoa certificate chain should be present");
let amd_chain = AmdChain {
ask: vendor_certs.ask.clone().into(),
ark: vendor_certs.ark.clone().into(),
};
amd_chain
.validate()
.expect("Genoa certificate chain should be valid");
vcek.validate(&amd_chain)
.expect("Genoa VCEK should validate against Genoa certificate chain");
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_snp_report_failure() {
let mut wrong_report = *REPORT;
// messing with snp report
wrong_report[0x01a6] = 0;
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(wrong_report.to_vec()).unwrap();
let snp_report = hcl_report.try_into().unwrap();
let vcek = Vcek::from_pem(include_str!("../../test_data/az-snp-vtpm/vcek.pem")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
verify_snp_report(&snp_report, &vcek)
.unwrap_err()
.to_string(),
"SNP version mismatch",
);
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_report_data() {
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(REPORT.to_vec()).unwrap();
verify_report_data(&hcl_report).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_report_data_failure() {
let mut wrong_report = *REPORT;
wrong_report[0x06e0] += 1;
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(wrong_report.to_vec()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
verify_report_data(&hcl_report).unwrap_err().to_string(),
"HCL variable data digest doesn't match SNP report data"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_signature() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(REPORT.to_vec()).unwrap();
verify_tpm_signature(&tpm_quote, &hcl_report).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_quote_signature_failure() {
let mut tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
tpm_quote.signature[0] ^= 1;
let hcl_report = HclReport::new(REPORT.to_vec()).unwrap();
assert!(verify_tpm_signature(&tpm_quote, &hcl_report).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_akpub_failure() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
let mut wrong_report = *REPORT;
// messing with AKpub in var data
wrong_report[0x0540] = 0;
let wrong_hcl_report = HclReport::new(wrong_report.to_vec()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
verify_tpm_signature(&tpm_quote, &wrong_hcl_report)
.unwrap_err()
.to_string(),
"Failed to get AKpub",
);
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_quote_nonce() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
verify_tpm_nonce(&tpm_quote, REPORT_DATA).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_quote_nonce_failure() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
let mut wrong_report_data = REPORT_DATA.to_vec();
wrong_report_data.reverse();
verify_tpm_nonce(&tpm_quote, &wrong_report_data).unwrap_err();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_pcrs() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
verify_tpm_pcrs(&tpm_quote).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_pcrs_failure() {
let mut tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
tpm_quote.pcrs[0][0] ^= 1;
assert!(verify_tpm_pcrs(&tpm_quote).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_init_data() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
let pcrs = get_pcrs(&tpm_quote).unwrap();
let mut init_data_hash = [0u8; 32];
hex::decode_to_slice(
"8505e4e25e50a27c5dc8147af88efbece627fbea55291911eff832d9ee127781",
&mut init_data_hash,
)
.unwrap();
// sha256(0x00 * 32 || "8505...") == "bdda..."
let mut digest = [0u8; 32];
hex::decode_to_slice(
"bddaccb9c52249e97a31baea61b7d91be8221a16e703d92148d04fb8e9c1dfdd",
&mut digest,
)
.unwrap();
let mut pcr_refs: Vec<&[u8; 32]> = pcrs.iter().collect();
pcr_refs[INITDATA_PCR] = &digest;
verify_init_data(&InitDataHash::Value(&init_data_hash), &pcr_refs).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_init_data_failure() {
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
let pcrs = get_pcrs(&tpm_quote).unwrap();
let pcr_refs: Vec<&[u8; 32]> = pcrs.iter().collect();
let mut init_data = *pcr_refs[INITDATA_PCR];
init_data[0] ^= 1;
let init_data_hash = InitDataHash::Value(&init_data);
verify_init_data(&init_data_hash, &pcr_refs).unwrap_err();
}
#[test]
fn test_extend_claim() {
let mut claim = json!({"some": "thing"});
let tpm_quote = load_tpm_quote();
extend_claim(&mut claim, &tpm_quote).unwrap();
let map = claim.as_object().unwrap();
assert_eq!(map.len(), 4);
let tpm_map = map.get("tpm").unwrap().as_object().unwrap();
assert_eq!(tpm_map.len(), 24);
for (i, pcr) in tpm_quote.pcrs.iter().enumerate() {
let key = format!("pcr{:02}", i);
let value = tpm_map.get(&key).unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
assert_eq!(value, hex::encode(pcr));
}
let init_data = map.get("init_data").unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
assert_eq!(init_data, hex::encode(&tpm_quote.pcrs[INITDATA_PCR]));
let report_data = map.get("report_data").unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
assert_eq!(report_data, hex::encode(REPORT_DATA));
}
}