Summary
Two model implementation files hardcode trust_remote_code=True when loading sub-components, bypassing the user's explicit --trust-remote-code=False security opt-out. This enables remote code execution via malicious model
repositories even when the user has explicitly disabled remote code trust.
Details
Affected files (latest main branch):
vllm/model_executor/models/nemotron_vl.py:430
vision_model = AutoModel.from_config(config.vision_config, trust_remote_code=True)
- vllm/model_executor/models/kimi_k25.py:177
cached_get_image_processor(self.ctx.model_config.model, trust_remote_code=True)
Both pass a hardcoded trust_remote_code=True to HuggingFace API calls, overriding the user's global --trust-remote-code=False setting.
Relation to prior CVEs:
- CVE-2025-66448 fixed auto_map resolution in vllm/transformers_utils/config.py (config loading path)
- CVE-2026-22807 fixed broader auto_map at startup
- Both fixes are present in the current code. These hardcoded instances in model files survived both patches — different code paths.
Impact
Remote code execution. An attacker can craft a malicious model repository that executes arbitrary Python code when loaded by vLLM, even when the user has explicitly set --trust-remote-code=False. This undermines the security guarantee
that trust_remote_code=False is intended to provide.
Remediation: Replace hardcoded trust_remote_code=True with self.config.model_config.trust_remote_code in both files. Raise a clear error if the model component requires remote code but the user hasn't opted in.
Fixes
Summary
Two model implementation files hardcode
trust_remote_code=Truewhen loading sub-components, bypassing the user's explicit--trust-remote-code=Falsesecurity opt-out. This enables remote code execution via malicious modelrepositories even when the user has explicitly disabled remote code trust.
Details
Affected files (latest main branch):
vllm/model_executor/models/nemotron_vl.py:430Both pass a hardcoded trust_remote_code=True to HuggingFace API calls, overriding the user's global --trust-remote-code=False setting.
Relation to prior CVEs:
Impact
Remote code execution. An attacker can craft a malicious model repository that executes arbitrary Python code when loaded by vLLM, even when the user has explicitly set --trust-remote-code=False. This undermines the security guarantee
that trust_remote_code=False is intended to provide.
Remediation: Replace hardcoded trust_remote_code=True with self.config.model_config.trust_remote_code in both files. Raise a clear error if the model component requires remote code but the user hasn't opted in.
Fixes