Import fix from Alma openssh-9.9p1-30

Version 9.9p1-30 does not yet have an src rpm to my knowledge,
so I retrieved the fixes from their git, and I also integrated
the fixes for CVE-2026-60000 and CVE-2026-60001.

But as a result they correct the following CVE:
- CVE-2026-59995
- CVE-2026-59999
- CVE-2026-73281
- CVE-2026-73282
- CVE-2026-73283

Knowing that CVE-2026-5996 and CVE-2026-60002 have already been
corrected in the previous import. CVE-2026-59998 appears to be
a documentation mistake.
Only CVE-2026-59997 is not yet corrected, it is deferred on major
distros, and as a result it requires highly improbable actions.

Signed-off-by: Lucas RAVAGNIER <lucas.ravagnier@vates.tech>

Author: Lucas RAVAGNIER

SOURCES/openssh-10.4p1-CVE-2026-59995.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index 0ab9206c2..0b57e0833 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -2289,13 +2289,8 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 				return (-1);
+ 			}
+ 		} else {
+-			/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
+-			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
+-			    global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
+-			    file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
+-			    file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
+-			err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+-			    &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
++			err = process_get(conn, dir, file2, remote_path, 0, 0,
++			    global_aflag, 0);
+ 			free(dir);
+ 			free(startdir);
+ 			free(remote_path);

SOURCES/openssh-10.4p1-CVE-2026-59999.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
+index e15f600ab..c5fc4e59c 100644
+--- a/auth-options.c
++++ b/auth-options.c
+@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void)
+ 	ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ 	ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
+ 	ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
++	ret->permit_tun_flag = 1;
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -345,6 +346,7 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
+ 			ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ 			ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
+ 			ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
++			ret->permit_tun_flag = 0;
+ 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
+ 			ret->cert_authority = r;
+ 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+@@ -601,6 +603,7 @@ sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
+ 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+ 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
+ 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
++	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_tun_flag);
+ 	OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+ 	/* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+ 	OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
+@@ -669,6 +672,7 @@ sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
+ 	OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+ 	OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag);
+ 	OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc);
++	OPTSCALAR(permit_tun_flag);
+ 	OPTSCALAR(restricted);
+ 	OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
+ 	OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
+@@ -804,6 +808,7 @@ sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_tun_flag)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0 ||
+@@ -867,6 +872,7 @@ sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
+ 	OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+ 	OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag);
+ 	OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
++	OPT_FLAG(permit_tun_flag);
+ 	OPT_FLAG(restricted);
+ 	OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
+ 	OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
+diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
+index 6e29b727c..191b9b249 100644
+--- a/auth-options.h
++++ b/auth-options.h
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct sshauthopt {
+ 	int permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
+ 	int permit_pty_flag;
+ 	int permit_user_rc;
++	int permit_tun_flag;
+
+ 	/* "restrict" keyword was invoked */
+ 	int restricted;
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 8a6e3db80..cf5243f80 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,8 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
++	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding ||
++	    !auth_opts->permit_tun_flag) {
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ 		    "forwarding");
+ 		return NULL;

SOURCES/openssh-10.4p1-XCPNG-CVE-2026-60000.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192
+Backport notes:
+- Only the "version identifier/RCS ID" in the header has been updated
+  to reflect our current base file.
+
+From 5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:53:30 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix multiple RFC 4462 (GSSAPIAuthentication)
+ compliance
+
+problems
+
+1) Remove an early failure return for GSSAPI authentication attempts
+made for invalid accounts that yielded different behaviour for
+valid vs invalid accounts.
+
+2) Fix a situation where some GSSAPI requestes were not correctly
+subjected to MaxAuthTries.
+
+3) Fix a moderate pre-authentication resource DoS related to #2.
+
+Add missing logging for error cases.
+
+Report and fixes from Manfred Kaiser, milCERT AT
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca0acdd64eea435d6f89534538a9eb404a5629d3
+Backported-by: Lucas Ravagnier <lucas.ravagnier@vates.tech>
+---
+ auth2-gss.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 901ba52..9c25ab2 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -154,12 +154,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+-		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+-		free(doid);
+-		return (0);
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid))) {
+ 		if (ctxt != NULL)
+ 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+@@ -221,8 +215,14 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
+ 		}
++		logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s "
++		    "from %.200s port %d ssh2",
++		    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
++		    authctxt->user,
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ 		authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ 		userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+@@ -234,14 +234,18 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
+ 		}
+ 		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+-			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+-			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+-				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
++			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
++			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
++			/* note: keep ERRTOK handler as per RFC 4462 s3.4 */
++			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) {
++				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
++				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_mic);
+-			else
++			} else {
+ 				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
+ 				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -253,10 +257,6 @@ static int
+ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+-	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+-	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+-	OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ 	int r;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+@@ -264,26 +264,21 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+ 
+-	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
++	/* Minimal error handling - just cancel auth and return FAILURE */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+-	recv_tok.value = p;
+-	recv_tok.length = len;
+-
+-	/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+-	maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+-	    &send_tok, NULL);
+-
+-	free(recv_tok.value);
+ 
+-	/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
++	logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
++	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
++	    authctxt->user,
++	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
++	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+-
+-	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+-
+-	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.54.0
+

SOURCES/openssh-10.4p1-XCPNG-CVE-2026-60001.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+Origin: upstream, https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454
+Backport notes:
+- Only the "version identifier/RCS ID" in the header has been updated
+  to reflect our current base file.
+
+From d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:44:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix cases in GSSAPI and keyboard-interactive
+
+authentication where the minimum per-attempt delay was not being enforced.
+
+Reported by Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c40bd35cc2428fcaccad7a141703c28baa6da01e
+Backported-by: Lucas Ravagnier <lucas.ravagnier@vates.tech>
+---
+ auth.h        |  1 +
+ auth2-chall.c |  4 ++++
+ auth2-gss.c   |  7 +++++++
+ auth2.c       | 10 ++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 6be52d7..d6f2083 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ void	auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
+ void	auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn));
+ void	userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *);
+ int	auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *);
++void	auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *, double);
+ 
+ char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
+index 021df82..20e70d2 100644
+--- a/auth2-chall.c
++++ b/auth2-chall.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	u_int i, nresp;
+ 	const char *devicename = NULL;
+ 	char **response = NULL;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("no authctxt");
+@@ -354,6 +355,9 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+ 	    devicename);
+ 	return 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 5b1b9cd..901ba52 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+@@ -311,6 +312,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ 
+  	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -332,6 +335,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+@@ -367,6 +371,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
++
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index d81887d..5c98097 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
+ 	nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++void
++auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *authctxt, double tstart)
++{
++	ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
++}
++
+ static int
+ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -359,8 +365,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh, method);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+-		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
+-		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
++
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
+ 	r = 0;
+  out:
+-- 
+2.54.0
+