(Minor) Nits

docs/ManagingBitcoinCoreKeys.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ This is an example of `eclair-signer.conf` configuration file:
 
 Restart eclair, without changing `eclair.bitcoind.wallet` (so it uses the default wallet or the previously used bitcoin wallet for existing nodes).
 
-Create a new empty, decriptor-enabled wallet on your new Bitcoin Core node.
+Create a new empty, descriptor-enabled wallet on your new Bitcoin Core node.
 
 :warning: The name must match the one that you set in `eclair-signer.conf` (here we use "eclair")
 

eclair-core/src/main/scala/fr/acinq/eclair/channel/fsm/Channel.scala

@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ class Channel(val nodeParams: NodeParams, val channelKeys: ChannelKeys, val wall
                 // commitment format and will simply apply the previous commitment format.
                 val nextCommitmentFormat = msg.channelType_opt match {
                   case Some(ChannelTypes.SimpleTaprootChannelsPhoenix) if parentCommitment.commitmentFormat == UnsafeLegacyAnchorOutputsCommitmentFormat =>
-                    log.info("accepting upgrade to {} during splice from commitment format {}", ChannelTypes.SimpleTaprootChannelsPhoenix, parentCommitment.commitmentFormat)
+                    log.info("accepting upgrade to {} during splice from commitment format {}", PhoenixSimpleTaprootChannelCommitmentFormat, parentCommitment.commitmentFormat)
                     PhoenixSimpleTaprootChannelCommitmentFormat
                   case Some(channelType) =>
                     log.info("rejecting upgrade to {} during splice from commitment format {}", channelType, parentCommitment.commitmentFormat)

eclair-core/src/main/scala/fr/acinq/eclair/crypto/keymanager/LocalOnChainKeyManager.scala

@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class LocalOnChainKeyManager(override val walletName: String, seed: ByteVector,
     for {
       spent <- spentAmount(psbt, ourInputs)
       change <- changeAmount(psbt, ourOutputs)
-      _ = logger.debug(s"signing txid=${psbt.global.tx.txid} fees=${psbt.computeFees()} spent=$spent change=$change")
+      _ = logger.info(s"signing txid=${psbt.global.tx.txid} fees=${psbt.computeFees()} spent=$spent change=$change")
       _ <- Try {
         ourOutputs.foreach(i => require(isOurOutput(psbt, i), s"could not verify output $i: bitcoin core may be malicious"))
       }

eclair-core/src/main/scala/fr/acinq/eclair/io/PeerConnection.scala

@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@ class PeerConnection(keyPair: KeyPair, conf: PeerConnection.Conf, switchboard: A
   when(AUTHENTICATING) {
     case Event(TransportHandler.HandshakeCompleted(remoteNodeId), d: AuthenticatingData) =>
       cancelTimer(AUTH_TIMER)
-      log.info(s"connection authenticated (direction=${if (d.pendingAuth.outgoing) "outgoing" else "incoming"})")
+      Logs.withMdc(diagLog)(Logs.mdc(remoteNodeId_opt = Some(remoteNodeId))) {
+        log.info(s"connection authenticated (direction=${if (d.pendingAuth.outgoing) "outgoing" else "incoming"})")
+      }
       Metrics.PeerConnectionsConnecting.withTag(Tags.ConnectionState, Tags.ConnectionStates.Authenticated).increment()
       switchboard ! Authenticated(self, remoteNodeId, d.pendingAuth.outgoing)
       goto(BEFORE_INIT) using BeforeInitData(remoteNodeId, d.pendingAuth, d.transport, d.isPersistent)
@@ -133,7 +135,6 @@ class PeerConnection(keyPair: KeyPair, conf: PeerConnection.Conf, switchboard: A
       case Event(remoteInit: protocol.Init, d: InitializingData) =>
         cancelTimer(INIT_TIMER)
         d.transport ! TransportHandler.ReadAck(remoteInit)
-
         log.info(s"peer is using features=${remoteInit.features}, networks=${remoteInit.networks.mkString(",")}")
         remoteInit.remoteAddress_opt.foreach(address => log.info("peer reports that our IP address is {} (public={})", address.toString, NodeAddress.isPublicIPAddress(address)))
 

eclair-core/src/main/scala/fr/acinq/eclair/wire/protocol/FailureMessage.scala

@@ -192,9 +192,7 @@ object FailureMessageCodecs {
   )
 
   /**
-   * An onion-encrypted failure from an intermediate node:
-   *
-   * | HMAC(32 bytes) | failure message length (2 bytes) | failure message | pad length (2 bytes) | pad |
+   * An onion-encrypted failure from an intermediate node.
    *
    * Bolt 4: SHOULD set pad such that the failure_len plus pad_len is equal to 256: by always using the same size we
    * ensure error messages are indistinguishable.