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allowedSchemes includes data, so data:text/html links survive sanitization (stored/preview XSS) #1176

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Description

@godownio

Summary

Artalk’s frontend HTML sanitizer allowlists the data: URL scheme. Comment HTML such as <a href="data:text/html;base64,…"> therefore survives sanitization and is injected via innerHTML. Clicking the link executes arbitrary JavaScript in a data: browsing context.

This is present in v2.9.1 (insane) and still present in v2.10.0 after the sanitizer was switched to DOMPurify. v2.10.0’s release notes say the previous URL-scheme allowlist was intentionally retained, so upgrading to 2.10.0 does not close this issue.

Source (v2.9.1 ui/artalk/src/lib/sanitizer.ts):

allowedSchemes: [
  'http',
  'https',
  'mailto',
  'data', // for support base64 encoded image (安全性有待考虑)
],

v2.10.0 still has:

const allowedSchemes = new Set(['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'data'])
// …
ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS: ['a'],

The comment already notes that allowing data is a security concern. The intended use appears to be base64 images, but the allowlist does not restrict MIME type, so data:text/html on <a href> is accepted.

<script> tags are stripped (allowlist does not include script). The bypass is the allowed data: scheme on a[href].

Affected versions

  • Confirmed in source: v2.9.1 (ui/artalk/src/lib/sanitizer.ts + insane@2.6.2)
  • Confirmed in source: v2.10.0 (DOMPurify, same data scheme + ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS: ['a'])
  • v2.10.0 tests still expect <a href="data:text/plain,hello"> to be kept

Reproduction (local, sanitizer only)

Using the v2.9.1 insane options copied from sanitizer.ts:

import insane from 'insane'

const insaneOptions = {
  allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'data'],
  allowedTags: ['a', 'p', 'img' /* …same as Artalk… */],
  allowedAttributes: {
    a: ['href', 'name', 'target', 'aria-label', 'rel'],
    img: ['src', 'alt', 'title'],
  },
}

const payload =
  '<p><a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==" target="_blank">click</a></p>'

console.log(insane(payload, insaneOptions))
// → <p><a href="data:text/html;base64,…" target="_blank">click</a></p>
// data: survives

console.log(insane(payload, { ...insaneOptions, allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto'] }))
// → <p><a target="_blank">click</a></p>
// href stripped

Base64 payload decodes to <script>alert(1)</script>.

In the live UI: put that HTML in the comment editor and open Preview. Artalk runs marked then sanitize() / getContentMarked() into innerHTML. A data:text/html link appears; clicking it (often target="_blank") executes the script.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated comment content (or preview of unsaved content) can carry a data:text/html link.
  • Clicking the link runs attacker JavaScript. That document’s origin is "null" (data: URLs), so this is not classic same-origin cookie theft from the host site (document.cookie on data: pages is blocked).
  • Practical impact: phishing / fake “support” pages, arbitrary JS in the data: document, social-engineering of moderators who click links while reviewing comments.
  • <img src="https://…"> in comments can also fire automatically when HTML is rendered (OOB ping), which is a separate issue from JS execution.

Suggested fix

  1. Remove 'data' from allowedSchemes, or only allow data: on <img src> with an image MIME (">x</a>') must not keep that href.
  5. Server-side: do not trust client HTML; sanitize content the same way so pending/moderator views cannot render raw data:text/html.

v2.10.0 replacing insane with DOMPurify is a good hardening step for ReDoS / unmaintained parser issues; it does not by itself fix this allowlist bug.

Activity

  1. qwqcode commented on Oct 11, 2026

    @qwqcode
    Member

    Thanks for the detailed report. We confirmed that the frontend sanitizer retains data:text/html links. PR #1196 removes all data: links and permits inline data only for explicitly allowlisted raster images, including lazy-loaded images. It adds frontend rendering tests and regression coverage for the backend sanitizer, which already rejects the reported links.

    In Chromium 149, clicking the original payload with either _self or _blank did not execute JavaScript: navigation was blocked. We have therefore confirmed an overly broad URL allowlist, but have not reproduced same-origin XSS. The fix removes the unsafe links without relying on browser navigation restrictions.

    The PR is awaiting review and has not been released. We will keep this issue open until the fix is merged.

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