fix(security): verify Ed25519 signatures on inbound PUT and chat (SOC-59)#10
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chongkan wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix(security): verify Ed25519 signatures on inbound PUT and chat (SOC-59)#10chongkan wants to merge 2 commits into
chongkan wants to merge 2 commits into
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…-59) The mesh is public — any peer can dial and publish. Inbound handlers verified only hashBlob(blob) === contentHash (integrity), never that the writer controls the claimed didOwner/from DID. verifySignature() existed but was called on no inbound path, allowing namespace squatting, version-overwrite shadowing of a victim's identity state, and forged chat messages. - verify.ts (new): pluggable DidResolver, offline did:key resolver, version- tagged canonical serialization (guards cross-type/replay signature reuse), verify/sign helpers. - crypto.ts: add synchronous verifySignatureSync for the gossip hot path; verifySignature kept as an async wrapper. - protocol.ts: handlePut + handleChat/Ack/Delete verify the signature against the claimed DID's key BEFORE storing/propagating, and reject on failure. In handlePut the check runs BEFORE version-conflict resolution, so a forged higher version cannot force-win. Constructor gains an optional didResolver (defaults to did:key; fail-closed for methods it cannot resolve). - index.ts: export the new surface. - tests: put-chat-signature.test.ts (14 adversarial cases incl. namespace squat, forged-version overwrite, forged chat/delete, resolver round-trip); existing chat/security tests updated to sign legitimately and to assert unsigned messages are now rejected. Suite: 152 passed / 1 skipped. Fail-closed consequence: the anchor daemon uses the default did:key resolver, so did:sns writes are rejected until a did:sns resolver is injected (SOC-69) — SOC-69 is a deploy-blocking dependency.
Pre-existing type-check failure: the /chat/channels handler fetched
getChatMessages('__list__') into a channels var it never used (the endpoint
returns an empty list until a getChannels API exists). Dropped the dead call so
'pnpm type-check' passes; behavior unchanged.
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Summary
Closes SOC-59 (CRITICAL) from the 2026-07-19 workspace audit. The mesh is public — any peer can dial and publish. Inbound handlers verified only
hashBlob(blob) === contentHash(integrity), never that the writer controls the claimeddidOwner/fromDID.verifySignature()existed but was called on no inbound path, allowing namespace squatting, version-overwrite shadowing of a victim's identity state, and forged chat messages.Base branch note
This PR targets
fix/better-sqlite3-electron39, notmain. The fix layers on the chat protocol, RPC layer, and chat types that live only on that branch and are not yet inmain(handleChat/GossipChatMessage/chat-storedon't exist onmain). It must merge with or after that feature stack — it cannot be cherry-picked tomainalone.Changes
verify.ts(new): pluggableDidResolver, offlinedid:keyresolver, version-tagged canonical serialization (guards cross-type/replay signature reuse), verify/sign helpers.crypto.ts: synchronousverifySignatureSyncfor the gossip hot path;verifySignaturekept as an async wrapper.protocol.ts:handlePut+handleChat/Ack/Deleteverify the signature against the resolved DID key before storing/propagating. InhandlePutthe check runs before version-conflict resolution, so a forged higherversioncannot force-win. Constructor gains an optionaldidResolver(defaults todid:key; fail-closed for methods it cannot resolve).index.ts: export the new surface.put-chat-signature.test.ts(14 adversarial cases: namespace squat, forged-version overwrite, forged chat/delete, resolver round-trip); existing chat/security tests updated to sign legitimately and to assert unsigned messages are now rejected.Verification
tsupbuild (ESM + CJS + d.ts) succeedsTS6133in the untouchedsrc/rpc.tsremains (not caused by this change)Deploy-blocking dependency: SOC-69
daemon.tsbuildsMeshProtocolwith the defaultdid:keyresolver, so once deployed this rejects alldid:snswrites until SOC-69 injects adid:snsresolver. Correct fail-closed posture, butdid:snspropagation on the anchor node is dark until SOC-69 lands. Also confirm publishers (CORTEX / wallet) attach signatures via the exportedsignPutMetadata/signChatMessagehelpers before rollout.