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Missing authorization on Flowise chat message routes allows low-privileged API keys to read and delete chat history

High
igor-magun-wd published GHSA-ppmg-4cx6-95hh Sep 10, 2026

Package

npm flowise (npm)

Affected versions

<= 3.1.4

Patched versions

None

Description

Title

Missing RBAC checks on Flowise chat message routes allow low-privileged API keys to read and delete chat history

Description

Flowise flowise@3.1.2 appears to have missing route-level RBAC checks on chat message read/delete routes.

The global /api/v1 middleware validates API keys and assigns req.user.permissions = apiKey.permissions, but the affected chat message routes call their controllers directly without checkAnyPermission(...).

Affected files:

  • packages/server/src/routes/chat-messages/index.ts
  • packages/server/src/routes/internal-chat-messages/index.ts

Affected routes:

  • GET /api/v1/chatmessage/:id
  • GET /api/v1/internal-chatmessage/:id
  • DELETE /api/v1/chatmessage/:id

Confirmed affected release:

  • flowise@3.1.2
  • tag commit 4114b3b506e7bbee155141175a2ba48e426919dd

Impact

A valid but low-privileged API key for a workspace can reach chat message read/delete handlers without having the expected flow permissions.

Potential impact:

  • Read chat histories and internal test chat messages for known flow IDs.
  • Access prompts, model responses, source documents, used tools, feedback, and uploaded file metadata serialized in chat messages.
  • Delete chat messages and related uploaded files without flow delete permission.

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Estimated severity: High, 8.3.

Affected versions

Confirmed:

  • flowise@3.1.2

Broader affected range:

  • Unknown; maintainers should confirm whether earlier RBAC-enabled releases are also affected.

Reproduction steps

  1. Add the test file from the patch package to:
packages/server/src/routes/chat-messages/authorization.test.ts
  1. Before applying the route patch, run:
pnpm --dir packages/server exec jest src/routes/chat-messages/authorization.test.ts --runInBand

  1. Observe insufficient-permission requests return 200 instead of 403.

  2. Apply the route patch.

  3. Run the same test again.

  4. Observe insufficient-permission requests return 403, while requests with chatflows:view, agentflows:view, or agentflows:delete continue to succeed.

Safe PoC

The PoC is a Jest/supertest test with mocked controllers. It uses dummy data only and does not touch real users, credentials, or a database.

Pre-patch observed output:

FAIL src/routes/chat-messages/authorization.test.ts
Tests: 3 failed, 3 passed, 6 total
Expected: 403
Received: 200

Post-patch observed output:

PASS src/routes/chat-messages/authorization.test.ts
Tests: 6 passed, 6 total

I also reproduced the issue against a real local Flowise server with a dummy SQLite database:

Vulnerable local server:
GET /api/v1/chatmessage/:id              -> 200, returned LOCAL_E2E_SECRET_CHAT_CONTENT
GET /api/v1/internal-chatmessage/:id     -> 200, returned LOCAL_E2E_SECRET_CHAT_CONTENT
DELETE /api/v1/chatmessage/:id           -> 200, {"raw":[],"affected":1}

Patched local server:
GET /api/v1/chatmessage/:id              -> 403
GET /api/v1/internal-chatmessage/:id     -> 403
DELETE /api/v1/chatmessage/:id           -> 403
GET /api/v1/chatmessage/:id with allowed key -> 200

The local server E2E used only dummy data and localhost requests.

Patch proposal

Add route-level permission checks:

  • GET /chatmessage/:id: checkAnyPermission('chatflows:view,agentflows:view')
  • GET /internal-chatmessage/:id: checkAnyPermission('chatflows:view,agentflows:view')
  • DELETE /chatmessage/:id: checkAnyPermission('chatflows:delete,agentflows:delete')

Credit request

If this is accepted as a valid vulnerability, please credit GGBoo as the reporter/researcher.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required Low
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits