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fix: secure temp file handling in diff.bash to prevent symlink attacks #1956
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fix: secure temp file handling in diff.bash to prevent symlink attacks #1956
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Thanks for your pull request! It looks like this may be your first contribution to a Google open source project. Before we can look at your pull request, you'll need to sign a Contributor License Agreement (CLA). View this failed invocation of the CLA check for more information. For the most up to date status, view the checks section at the bottom of the pull request. |
Summary of ChangesHello @anandppatil, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request significantly enhances the security of the Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request effectively addresses a security vulnerability (CWE-59) by replacing insecure temporary file handling with the use of a secure, temporary directory created via mktemp -d. The changes are well-implemented, including the addition of a trap for cleanup and restricting directory permissions. Furthermore, the pull request includes several valuable improvements to the script's robustness, such as better variable quoting, safer conditional checks, and improved readability. The fix is comprehensive and significantly improves the security posture of the script. I have one minor suggestion to further enhance the robustness of the cleanup mechanism.
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The cla/google check is now passing, and I have addressed the automated feedback by adding a robustness guard to the cleanup mechanism in commit 47ffb18. This PR is now ready for a final human review and for the CI workflows to be triggered. Thank you for your patience! |
Title: fix: use secure temporary directory in diff.bash to prevent symlink attacks
Description:
This PR addresses a CWE-59 / CWE-377 vulnerability in private/tools/diff.bash. The script was writing to a predictable, world-writable path (/tmp/cfg.json), which allows a local attacker to perform an arbitrary file overwrite via a symlink.
Changes:
Replaced hardcoded /tmp paths with a secure, randomized temporary directory using mktemp -d.
Added a trap mechanism to ensure all temporary artifacts (config, certificates, storage) are automatically cleaned up on exit.
Restricted permissions on the temporary directory to 0700 to prevent unauthorized local access.
Impact: Prevents a local privilege escalation (LPE) primitive where an attacker could hijack the script to overwrite sensitive system files or another user's configuration.
This issue was previously reported to the Google OSS VRP (Issue 471071574), where the Bug Hunter Team suggested public disclosure and a public fix.