Security: Arbitrary File Read via read_trace Tauri Command#1615
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The `read_trace` Tauri command in `read_trace.rs` accepts a file path string and directly reads it using `std::fs::read`. There is no path validation, sanitization, or restriction to prevent reading files outside of intended directories. This allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the system by passing paths like `../../../etc/passwd` or `C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM`. Since this is exposed as a Tauri command, it can be invoked from the frontend JavaScript. Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Security: Arbitrary File Read via read_trace Tauri Command
Problem
Severity:
High| File:pdl-live-react/src-tauri/src/commands/read_trace.rs:L1The
read_traceTauri command inread_trace.rsaccepts a file path string and directly reads it usingstd::fs::read. There is no path validation, sanitization, or restriction to prevent reading files outside of intended directories. This allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the system by passing paths like../../../etc/passwdorC:\Windows\System32\config\SAM. Since this is exposed as a Tauri command, it can be invoked from the frontend JavaScript.Solution
Validate and restrict the file path to a specific allowed directory. Use
std::path::Path::canonicalizeand ensure the resolved path is within an allowed base directory. Consider using a whitelist or sandbox approach. Also validate that the file extension is.jsonor.pdlas expected.Changes
pdl-live-react/src-tauri/src/commands/read_trace.rs(modified)