Feature/issue 1161 encryption review

.github/SECURITY_REVIEW_CHECKLIST.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Security Review Checklist — Secrets, PII & Transport
+
+**Use for:** any PR that adds/changes a data store, secret, credential, external integration, or network-facing endpoint.
+**Companion doc:** [`docs/security/encryption-review.md`](../docs/security/encryption-review.md) — full current-state review this checklist enforces going forward.
+**Not this checklist:** smart-contract vulnerability classes (reentrancy, access control, gas/DoS) are covered by [`docs/SECURITY_CHECKLIST.md`](../docs/SECURITY_CHECKLIST.md).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Secrets & Credentials
+
+- [ ] No secret, API key, private key, or credential is hardcoded or committed (checked by `gitleaks` in CI, but review the diff yourself too)
+- [ ] New secrets are read from `process.env` / GitHub Actions `secrets.*`, never from a config file checked into the repo
+- [ ] Any new required secret is documented in [`docs/ENV_VARIABLE_MATRIX.md`](../docs/ENV_VARIABLE_MATRIX.md)
+- [ ] Secrets that must exist in production fail startup loudly if missing or weak (follow the pattern in `backend/src/auth.ts`'s `assertJwtSecretValid()`) rather than silently falling back to a dev default
+- [ ] Tokens/keys are persisted as one-way hashes (SHA-256/HMAC or stronger), never in plaintext
+
+## 2. Data at Rest
+
+- [ ] New sensitive fields (PII, tokens, wallet-linked identifiers) are added to the correct model with the retention category noted in [`docs/DATA_RETENTION_DELETION_POLICY.md`](../docs/DATA_RETENTION_DELETION_POLICY.md)
+- [ ] Any new database, cache, or file-based store this PR introduces is confirmed to write to the *intended* backing store — verify the Prisma datasource / connection string actually points where you think it does (see `docs/security/encryption-review.md` §4 F1 for a real example of this silently going wrong)
+- [ ] No secret or PII value is written to logs, error messages, or audit trails in plaintext — check against `backend/src/auditRedaction.ts`'s redaction patterns
+
+## 3. Data in Transit
+
+- [ ] All new outbound calls (webhooks, RPC, third-party APIs) use `https://` / `wss://`, never plaintext `http://`
+- [ ] New database or cache connection strings enforce TLS (`sslmode=require` for Postgres, `rediss://` for Redis) where the backing service supports it
+- [ ] New cookies (if any) set `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, and an explicit `SameSite` — this repo's auth model currently uses Bearer tokens, not cookies, so introducing a cookie is a deliberate change worth flagging in the PR description
+- [ ] CORS changes stay within an explicit origin allowlist — no `*` or broad regex in `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`
+
+## 4. PII & Sensitive Data Handling
+
+- [ ] User-identifying data (wallet address, email, IP) is only collected/stored where there's a documented purpose in [`docs/DATA_RETENTION_DELETION_POLICY.md`](../docs/DATA_RETENTION_DELETION_POLICY.md)
+- [ ] Frontend `localStorage`/`sessionStorage` usage stores no private keys, JWTs, or API keys — only public/non-sensitive values (wallet address, UI prefs, session timestamps)
+- [ ] New admin or export endpoints that expose PII/financial data are gated by the correct RBAC role and rate-limited
+
+## 5. If This PR Touches Any of the Findings in `docs/security/encryption-review.md`
+
+- [ ] Confirm which finding (F1–F6) this PR addresses, if any
+- [ ] Update the finding's status in `docs/security/encryption-review.md` in the same PR
+- [ ] If this PR resolves a finding, note it in the PR description so reviewers can verify against the documented evidence
+
+---
+
+**If any box above cannot be checked**, explain why in the PR description rather than leaving it silently unchecked — a documented exception is reviewable; a missing explanation is not.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Repository Guidelines
+
+## Git & PR Rules
+- NEVER add co-author tags, AI signatures, or attribution footers to git commit messages or PR descriptions.
+- Keep commits concise and strictly attributed to the git user identity.

backend/package.json

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "dev": "tsx watch src/index.ts",
     "build": "tsc",
     "start": "node dist/index.js",
-    "test": "jest",
+    "test": "jest --runInBand",
     "test:smoke": "npm run build && npm run start &",
     "lint": "eslint src",
     "format": "prettier --write src",

contracts/share-price-math/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //! Vault share conversion math with deterministic rounding policy.
 //!
-//! Host-buildable library used by the Soroban vault contract, proptest suite,
-//! and `cargo fuzz` targets.
+//! `no_std` so it links cleanly into the Soroban vault's `wasm32-unknown-unknown`
+//! build; also used host-side by the proptest suite and `cargo fuzz` targets.
 //!
 //! ## Numeric Boundaries and Constraints
 //! - Maximum `i128` (3.4e38) represents the theoretical absolute upper limit for assets or shares.
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 //!   should generally be kept significantly below `i128::MAX / expected_deposit_size`.
 //! - Specifically, if `total_shares` and `total_assets` are bounded by `2^64`, then any operation with
 //!   values up to `2^63` will never overflow an `i128`.
+#![no_std]
 
 pub mod fuzz_invariants;
 pub mod rounding;

contracts/vault/proptest-regressions/deposit_withdraw_props.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Seeds for failure cases proptest has generated in the past. It is
+# automatically read and these particular cases re-run before any
+# novel cases are generated.
+#
+# It is recommended to check this file in to source control so that
+# everyone who runs the test benefits from these saved cases.
+cc 9500b952ba76ddc8412c8075347f03164d293671f7119543f0c58b98caa97ad2 # shrinks to deposit_amount = 1000, cooldown_secs = 1

contracts/vault/src/admin.rs

@@ -45,14 +45,18 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_admin_proposal_nonce_is_monotonic() {
         let env = Env::default();
-        assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 1);
-        assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 2);
-        assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 3);
+        let contract_id = env.register(crate::YieldVault, ());
+        env.as_contract(&contract_id, || {
+            assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 1);
+            assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 2);
+            assert_eq!(next_proposal_id(&env), 3);
+        });
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_admin_proposal_round_trip() {
         let env = Env::default();
+        let contract_id = env.register(crate::YieldVault, ());
         let proposer = Address::generate(&env);
         let new_admin = Address::generate(&env);
         let proposal = AdminProposal {
@@ -62,8 +66,10 @@ mod tests {
             cancelled: false,
             created_at: 42,
         };
-        write_proposal(&env, 1, &proposal);
-        let loaded = read_proposal(&env, 1).expect("proposal stored");
-        assert_eq!(loaded, proposal);
+        env.as_contract(&contract_id, || {
+            write_proposal(&env, 1, &proposal);
+            let loaded = read_proposal(&env, 1).expect("proposal stored");
+            assert_eq!(loaded, proposal);
+        });
     }
 }

contracts/vault/src/errors.rs

@@ -93,7 +93,13 @@ pub enum VaultError {
     ProposalRejected = 36,
 
     // ── Oracle / treasury / strategy health (27–29, 37) ──────────────────────
-    /// Oracle validation failed (stale or manipulated price).
+    /// Oracle validation failed: expired heartbeat, invalid price data (zero,
+    /// negative, future timestamp, unsafe decimals/overflow), excessive
+    /// deviation from the last validated price, or an out-of-range
+    /// `set_oracle_heartbeat` configuration. See [`crate::oracle`] for the
+    /// full stale-data policy. Reused across all of `oracle::OracleError`'s
+    /// variants rather than spending a dedicated code per variant under the
+    /// 50-case cap.
     OracleValidationFailed = 27,
     /// Treasury claim quota exceeded for the current epoch.
     ClaimQuotaExceeded = 28,

contracts/vault/src/feature_tests.rs

@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ fn test_role_restricted_pausability_controls() {
     vault.initialize(&admin, &usdc);
 
     let pauser = Address::generate(&env);
-    let unauthorized = Address::generate(&env);
+    let _unauthorized = Address::generate(&env);
 
     // Initial pauser is None
     assert_eq!(vault.pauser(), None);
@@ -337,9 +337,6 @@ fn test_role_restricted_pausability_controls() {
 
     // Designated pauser can pause with role
     vault.pause_with_role(&pauser, &PauseReason::SecurityIncident);
-    vault
-        .pause_with_role(&pauser, &PauseReason::SecurityIncident)
-        .unwrap();
     assert!(vault.is_paused());
     assert_eq!(vault.pause_reason(), Some(PauseReason::SecurityIncident));
 
@@ -350,9 +347,6 @@ fn test_role_restricted_pausability_controls() {
 
     // Admin can also pause and unpause with role
     vault.pause_with_role(&admin, &PauseReason::Maintenance);
-    vault
-        .pause_with_role(&admin, &PauseReason::Maintenance)
-        .unwrap();
     assert!(vault.is_paused());
 
     vault.unpause_with_role(&admin);

contracts/vault/src/formal_verification_tests.rs

@@ -8,8 +8,11 @@
 
 #![cfg(test)]
 
+extern crate std;
+
 use soroban_sdk::testutils::Address as _;
 use soroban_sdk::{token, Address, Env};
+use std::vec::Vec;
 
 use crate::{YieldVault, YieldVaultClient};