Kiterepo · pull · May 11, 2026 · May 11, 2026 · May 11, 2026 · May 11, 2026
diff --git a/docs/deployment/launchd.md b/docs/deployment/launchd.md
@@ -82,6 +82,40 @@ Both `SockType` and `SockFamily` must be defined for each socket. If the
 family is omitted, launchd opens two sockets (IPv4 and IPv6) for each key,
 which Ghostunnel does not currently support.
 
+## UNIX Socket Activation
+
+To restrict access to a specific local user (see
+[Security]({{< ref "general.md#restricting-to-specific-local-users" >}})),
+have launchd create a UNIX domain socket with the desired ownership and mode
+instead of binding to TCP:
+
+```xml
+<key>Sockets</key>
+<dict>
+  <key>Listener</key>
+  <dict>
+    <key>SockPathName</key>
+    <string>/var/run/ghostunnel.sock</string>
+    <key>SockPathMode</key>
+    <integer>384</integer>
+    <key>SockPathOwner</key>
+    <integer>0</integer>
+    <key>SockPathGroup</key>
+    <integer>0</integer>
+    <key>SockType</key>
+    <string>stream</string>
+  </dict>
+</dict>
+```
+
+`SockPathMode` is a **decimal** integer in plist XML, not octal. `384` is
+`0600` (owner read/write only); `416` is `0640`; `432` is `0660`. Combined
+with `SockPathOwner`/`SockPathGroup`, this lets launchd enforce per-user
+access at socket creation time, without any firewall rules.
+
+The full list of `Sockets` keys is documented in `launchd.plist(5)`
+(`man launchd.plist`).
+
 ## Installing
 
 ```bash

diff --git a/docs/deployment/systemd.md b/docs/deployment/systemd.md
@@ -140,6 +140,27 @@ The `FileDescriptorName` in `ghostunnel.socket` must match the name passed to
 `--listen`. If multiple sockets are needed (e.g. for a status port), use the
 name to distinguish them.
 
+### UNIX Socket Variant
+
+To restrict access to a specific local user (see
+[Security]({{< ref "general.md#restricting-to-specific-local-users" >}})),
+have systemd create a UNIX domain socket with the desired ownership and mode
+instead of binding to TCP:
+
+```ini
+[Socket]
+FileDescriptorName=ghostunnel
+ListenStream=/run/ghostunnel.sock
+SocketUser=root
+SocketGroup=root
+SocketMode=0600
+```
+
+systemd applies `SocketUser`/`SocketGroup`/`SocketMode` at socket creation
+time, so only the intended user can `connect(2)` to it; no firewall rules
+required. See [systemd.socket(5)][systemd-socket] for the full list of
+options.
+
 ### Installing
 
 ```bash
@@ -162,10 +183,15 @@ the privileges it needs:
 
 ```ini
 [Service]
-# Run as a dedicated unprivileged user
+# Dedicated unprivileged user. Use User=ghostunnel if you need persistent
+# state or specific file ownership instead.
 DynamicUser=yes
 
-# Filesystem restrictions
+# Filesystem: most of the system becomes read-only outside /dev, /proc, /sys.
+# Ghostunnel only needs read access to certs, which still works from standard
+# readable locations such as /etc. Note that ProtectHome=yes makes /home and
+# /root inaccessible, so certs should not be stored there unless you relax
+# ProtectHome or add an explicit exception with ReadOnlyPaths=.
 ProtectSystem=strict
 ProtectHome=yes
 PrivateTmp=yes
@@ -176,11 +202,11 @@ ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectControlGroups=yes
 ProtectProc=invisible
 
-# Network: only allow AF_INET/AF_INET6 (and AF_UNIX for syslog/notify)
+# Network: only allow AF_INET/AF_INET6/AF_UNIX
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
 
-# Capabilities: drop everything, Ghostunnel doesn't need any
-# (use socket activation or listen on ports > 1024)
+# Capabilities: drop everything. Add CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE if binding to a
+# privileged port (< 1024) without socket activation.
 CapabilityBoundingSet=
 NoNewPrivileges=yes
 
@@ -196,23 +222,8 @@ RemoveIPC=yes
 UMask=0077
 ```
 
-### Notes
-
-* **`DynamicUser=yes`** allocates a transient user at runtime. If you need
-  persistent state or specific file ownership, use a static `User=ghostunnel`
-  instead.
-* **`CapabilityBoundingSet=`** (empty) drops all capabilities. If you need to
-  bind to a privileged port (< 1024) without socket activation, add
-  `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` instead.
-* **`ProtectSystem=strict`** makes the entire filesystem read-only except
-  `/dev`, `/proc`, and `/sys`. Ghostunnel only needs to read certificate
-  files, so this is safe. If your certificates live outside the default
-  paths, no extra configuration is needed — they are already readable.
-* These settings work alongside Ghostunnel's own Landlock sandboxing
-  (enabled by default on Linux). The two layers are complementary — systemd
-  restricts at the process level, Landlock restricts within the process.
-* Run `systemd-analyze security ghostunnel.service` to audit the effective
-  security posture of your unit file.
+Run `systemd-analyze security ghostunnel.service` to audit the effective
+security posture of your unit file.
 
 [sd-notify]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/sd_notify.html
 [systemd-service]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd.service.html

diff --git a/docs/security/general.md b/docs/security/general.md
@@ -1,64 +1,29 @@
 ---
-title: Landlock & TLS
+title: General Security
 description: Landlock sandboxing, TLS protocol settings, cipher suites, address restrictions.
 weight: 10
 ---
 
-Ghostunnel's TLS settings and Landlock sandboxing.
+Ghostunnel's TLS settings, address restrictions, and Landlock sandboxing.
 
-## TLS Configuration
+## TLS Settings
 
-Ghostunnel enforces a minimum TLS version of **TLS 1.2**. Earlier versions are
-not supported. TLS 1.3 is supported and will be negotiated when both sides
-support it.
+Ghostunnel enforces a minimum TLS version of TLS 1.2, and TLS 1.3 is supported
+and will be negotiated when both sides support it. Earlier versions of TLS are
+not supported.
 
 ### Cipher Suites
 
-The following cipher suites are enabled by default, in order of preference:
-
-**AES-GCM:**
-- `TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` (TLS 1.3)
-- `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`
-- `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`
-- `TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384` (TLS 1.3)
-- `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`
-- `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`
-
-**ChaCha20-Poly1305:**
-- `TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256` (TLS 1.3)
-- `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305`
-- `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305`
-
-All suites use authenticated encryption (AEAD). CBC-mode ciphers are not
-enabled. ECDSA suites are listed before RSA to prefer ECDSA when both
-certificate types are available.
-
-To check which cipher suite and protocol version were negotiated for a
-connection:
-
-```bash
-openssl s_client -connect localhost:8443 \
-    -cert client-cert.pem -key client-key.pem -CAfile cacert.pem \
-    </dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'Protocol|Cipher'
-```
-
 In TLS 1.3, cipher suite selection is handled by Go's [`crypto/tls`][crypto-tls]
-and cannot be configured by the application. The TLS 1.3 suites listed above are always
-available when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. The configurable cipher suite list only
-affects TLS 1.2 connections.
-
-### Curve Preferences
-
-In server mode, key exchange prefers the following elliptic curves:
-
-1. **X25519**: fast, constant-time, widely supported
-2. **P-256 (secp256r1)**: hardware-accelerated on most platforms
+and cannot be configured by the application. For TLS 1.2, the configured cipher
+suites all use authenticated encryption (AEAD). Older CBC-mode ciphers are not
+enabled.
 
 ### Client Authentication
 
 In server mode, Ghostunnel requires and verifies client certificates by
-default (`RequireAndVerifyClientCert`). This can be disabled with
-`--disable-authentication`, in which case no client certificate is requested.
+default. This can be disabled with `--disable-authentication`, in which case no
+client certificate is requested.
 
 The status port (`--status`) is optional and does not require client
 certificates. It is typically consumed by monitoring systems that may not
@@ -96,6 +61,34 @@ To accept connections from remote hosts, pass `--unsafe-listen`. The listen
 side of client mode accepts plaintext connections, so exposing it beyond
 localhost risks unauthorized access to the proxied service.
 
+### Restricting to specific local users
+
+Binding to `localhost` (or `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`) blocks the network, but on a
+shared host any local user can still connect to the port. If you need to
+restrict access to a specific UID (for example, only `root` may reach the
+plaintext side of a tunnel), bind to a UNIX domain socket and use
+filesystem permissions:
+
+```bash
+ghostunnel client \
+    --listen=unix:/var/run/ghostunnel/client.sock \
+    --target=backend.example.com:8443 \
+    ...
+```
+
+Set the socket's owner and mode so only the intended user can `connect(2)` to
+it. With socket activation, the service manager creates the socket and applies
+the permissions for you; see [Systemd]({{< ref "systemd.md" >}}) and
+[Launchd]({{< ref "launchd.md" >}}). Otherwise, ensure the socket's parent
+directory is `chmod 0700` and `chown` it to the intended user, since the path
+must be traversable to connect.
+
+Firewall-based UID filtering exists but is fragile. On Linux, `iptables`
+supports `-m owner --uid-owner` and `nftables` supports `skuid`. On macOS, `pf`
+accepts `user =` rules, but Apple has formally stated that `pf` is not a stable
+API; see [TN3165: Packet Filter is not API][tn3165]. Prefer UNIX socket
+permissions, which are kernel-enforced via VFS and survive OS upgrades.
+
 ## Landlock sandboxing
 
 *Available since v1.8.0. Enabled by default since v1.9.0.*
@@ -133,3 +126,4 @@ libraries that may require access to arbitrary files and sockets.
 
 [crypto-tls]: https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/tls
 [landlock]: https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html
+[tn3165]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technotes/tn3165-packet-filter-is-not-api