Fix Open Redirect in Google Auth Callback#78
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Description:
This change addresses a High-Severity Open Redirect vulnerability in the Google OAuth callback endpoint (`/auth/google/callback`).
Vulnerability:
The `success_url` parameter was previously taken directly from the query string and used in a `RedirectResponse` without validation. This allowed attackers to construct URLs that could redirect authenticated users to malicious sites (e.g., phishing pages).
Fix:
1. Implemented `validate_redirect_url` in `src/security_utils.py`.
- Enforces relative URLs (starting with `/` but not `//`).
- Allows `localhost` and `127.0.0.1` for local development.
- Respects `settings.allowed_origins` for cross-domain redirects if explicitly configured.
- Falls back to `/` for invalid or suspicious URLs.
2. Updated `src/api/routes.py` to sanitize `success_url` using `validate_redirect_url` before redirection.
3. Added regression tests in `tests/test_open_redirect.py` to verify the fix and prevent future regressions.
Verification:
- `tests/test_open_redirect.py` passes, confirming that malicious URLs are sanitized to `/` and valid relative URLs are preserved.
- Linting checks passed.
Co-authored-by: MRiabov <108194191+MRiabov@users.noreply.github.com>
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Fixes an Open Redirect vulnerability in the Google Auth callback.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 4811872788570662064 started by @MRiabov