Bound input length in split_to_two_frs#966
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Reject inputs outside [33, 47] bytes. Previously a `len() - 16` could underflow on too-short input, and inputs ≥ 48 bytes could trigger silent modular reduction in the first half (enabling collisions). Also add a note in get_nonce about a related latent underflow that is unreachable in practice.
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Covered in #939. Closing |
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Reject inputs outside
[33, 47]bytes insplit_to_two_frs: shorter inputs would underflowlen() - 16, and≥ 48byte inputs let the first half exceed the BN254 modulus and silently reduce (enabling collisions).Also adds a note in
get_nonceabout a related latent underflow that is unreachable in practice.This has no impact on Sui which always builds
extended_pk_bytes = flag (1 byte) || public_key_bytes, producing 33 bytes for ed25519 and 34 bytes for compressed secp256k1 / secp256r1 both of which are inside the new bounds. Theverify_zk_loginpath insui-types::zk_login_authenticatorand the CLIkeytoolnonce-generation path are both unaffected.