| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 3.1.x (GrokLink Native) | Yes — current |
| 3.0.x | Best-effort |
| 2.x overlay (GrokLink-Firmware) | Via that repo only |
| < 2.0 | No |
If you discover a safety bypass, audit-log integrity flaw, confirm-token forgery path, blacklist fail-open bug, or privilege escalation in GrokLink OS:
- Do not open a public issue with exploit detail.
- Use the private GitHub security advisory channel for this repository.
- Include: version string, platform (host sim / STM32WB55), reproduction steps, and impact assessment (especially if TX/GPIO can fire without confirm).
We aim to acknowledge within 7 days and ship a fix or mitigation for confirmed critical safety defects as soon as practical.
- Default-deny for TX, GPIO output, contact, and system actions.
- Confirm tokens: short-lived, single-use, action-scoped.
- Physical confirm required for system-class actions on device.
- Blacklists offline-editable only; corrupt blacklist fails closed for TX.
- Audit log: append-only with cryptographic chaining (exportable).
- Skills: risk-classified; elevated skills need human approval before deploy.
- ML outputs never auto-actuate hardware — always filtered by policy.
- Secure boot / signed skills: hooks present; enable for release images.
- Requests to remove safety gates, blacklists, or audit for convenience.
- Weaponization of radio / access-control capabilities.
- Bypassing regional RF regulations.