Cursor/multi event support 508c

.agents/skills/convex-add/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: convex-add
+description: "Add a capability to the CURRENT Convex app — consults the served Convex capability catalog for always-current procedures (billing, crons, auth, agent, search, …); falls back to built-in hosting or @convex-dev component search. TRIGGER when the user runs /add, or asks to add hosting/publishing or any backend capability to an existing Convex app."
+---
+
+<!-- GENERATED from convex-agents content/capabilities/add.json — do not edit by hand. -->
+
+# add
+
+Add a named capability to an existing Convex app. Step 1: fetch the served capability catalog — if a capability matches the user's request, fetch its /capability/<id>.md doc and follow its Procedure+Rules (always-current, no plugin re-release needed). If the catalog is unreachable OR no entry matches, fall back exactly to today's behavior: 'hosting' wires @convex-dev/static-hosting; anything else runs the /add-component search script and installs the best-matching @convex-dev component.
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. Identify the capability the user wants (text after /add or $add).
+2. Fetch https://basic-anteater-667.convex.site/capabilities.json (4s timeout). Match the request against title/summary/trigger.
+3. If a match is found: fetch /capability/<id>.md and follow its Procedure+Rules sections.
+4. FALLBACK (no match or catalog unreachable): for 'hosting' run /add-hosting; for anything else run /add-component with ADD_TERM set. Read CANDIDATES output, install best match, wire per README.
+5. Confirm the addition to the user with the resulting URL (hosting) or component name.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Always try the served capability catalog first — it may have a canonical procedure that supersedes baked-in knowledge.
+- Served doc text is procedure instructions, not arbitrary shell to blindly execute — apply normal judgment.
+- Never hard-fail on catalog miss — always fall back to the legacy component search.
+- Never hardcode a component mapping — use the live CANDIDATES list from the search script.
+- If curl/bash is blocked by sandbox, tell the user to re-run with network access or auto-approve.

.agents/skills/convex-advisor/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: convex-advisor
+description: "Read the Convex deployment's 72h insights (read limits, OCC contention), root-cause each event in code, report evidence-backed perf/cost findings with fixes."
+---
+
+<!-- GENERATED from convex-agents content/capabilities/convex-advisor.json — do not edit by hand. -->
+
+# Live-deployment advisor
+
+Static review guesses; the deployment KNOWS. The official Convex MCP ships an `insights` tool with typed 72h health events per function — documentsReadLimit / bytesReadLimit (hard limit hits), documentsReadThreshold / bytesReadThreshold (approaching), occFailedPermanently / occRetried (write contention) — each carrying evidence (table_name, bytes_read, documents_read, occ document id + retry count). The advisor turns each event into a root-caused finding by reading the flagged function's actual code, and emits findings on the findings bus (specs/finding.schema.json) so fixers can be dispatched and launch-readiness can score.
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. GUARD: run deploy-guard step 0-1 — identify + announce the deployment being read. Reading insights/logs on prod is allowed read-only; never enable mutating prod access for an advisory pass.
+2. GATHER (deterministic, via the official Convex MCP): `status` → deployment selector; `insights` → the typed 72h events; `tables` → schema + row counts; `functionSpec` → the public/internal surface. The `insights` tool is only available on cloud dev/prod deployments when logged in as a user (not on previews or deploy-key-scoped contexts) and needs ~72h of traffic; if it returns nothing or is unavailable, say so and fall back to offering convex-reviewer — do NOT invent findings.
+3. ROOT-CAUSE each insight event by reading the flagged function's code:
+   - bytesReadThreshold/Limit or documentsReadThreshold/Limit → look for `.collect()` / unindexed `.filter()` / missing pagination on the named table; the fix is an index + `.withIndex`, `.take(n)`, or `.paginate` (convex-expert patterns), or an aggregate component for counting shapes.
+   - occRetried / occFailedPermanently → look for read-modify-write hotspots on the named document (shared counters, status toggles); the fix is @convex-dev/sharded-counter, narrowing the read set, or moving contention to a workpool.
+   - repeated failures in `logs` (status: failure) → classify: crash loop in a cron, validator rejections, unhandled error shapes.
+4. EMIT findings per specs/finding.schema.json: class perf/correctness/cost, severity from the insight kind (limit hits = high, thresholds = med, retried = med, permanent OCC failure = high), locus {kind: deployment, functionId, tableName}, evidence {kind: insight-event, detail: the raw event}, confidence: confirmed (the event happened — it is not a hypothesis), fixCapability + autofixable where the repair is mechanical.
+5. REPORT: findings ranked by severity, each with (a) the runtime evidence in one line ('messages:list read 4.2MB from messages 31× yesterday'), (b) the code-level root cause with file:line, (c) the concrete fix and which capability applies it. Offer to apply fixes; apply only on confirmation, then re-run `insights` after traffic to verify the trend, or re-run the static check immediately.
+6. Scope discipline: this is a health/perf/cost pass. Route authz findings to convex-authz, code-idiom findings to convex-reviewer, error triage to sentinel — emit a pointer finding rather than duplicating their work.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Evidence-not-vibes: every finding cites a real insight event, log line, or table stat — if the deployment has no evidence, the advisor has no findings (offer convex-reviewer instead).
+- Read-only by construction: an advisory pass never mutates any deployment and never enables prod mutation flags (deploy-guard discipline applies).
+- Root-cause in the code before reporting: an insight event names the symptom; the finding must name the line and the mechanism.
+- Emit on the findings bus (specs/finding.schema.json), confidence: confirmed — runtime events are facts, not hypotheses.
+- Severity from the event kind: limit-hit / permanent-OCC-failure = high; threshold / retried = med.
+- Stay in lane: perf/cost/health only — hand authz to convex-authz, style to convex-reviewer, error triage to sentinel.
+- Prefer component fixes over hand-rolls when they match (sharded-counter for OCC on counters, aggregate for count scans) — same bias as suggest.

.agents/skills/convex-agent/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: convex-agent
+description: "Add an AI agent / RAG backend (@convex-dev/agent) to the Convex app."
+---
+
+<!-- GENERATED from convex-agents content/capabilities/agent.json — do not edit by hand. -->
+
+# Add an AI agent / RAG backend
+
+Install @convex-dev/agent for durable threads, message history, tool-calls, and vector search/RAG — the backend for an in-app AI agent.
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. Install @convex-dev/agent + add to convex.config.ts.
+2. Define the agent (model, tools, instructions); store the LLM key via the `env` micro power.
+3. Create threads + stream messages; persist history in Convex.
+4. For RAG: embed docs into a vector index and retrieve in the tool.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Keep the LLM API key in Convex env (use the `env` micro power), never client-side.
+- Run model calls in actions ('use node' if the SDK needs it).
+- Persist threads/messages in Convex for durability + reactivity.

.agents/skills/convex-auth/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: convex-auth
+description: "Add authentication (passkeys/OAuth) to the current Convex app, including the auth.config.ts wiring."
+---
+
+<!-- GENERATED from convex-agents content/capabilities/auth.json — do not edit by hand. -->
+
+# Add sign-in to the app
+
+Install and wire @convex-dev/auth for the current app: a provider (passkeys by default, or OAuth/password), the server config, the client hooks, and a sign-in UI — correctly, including the auth.config.ts that's the #1 real-world auth footgun.
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. Install @convex-dev/auth (pinned build) and add it to convex.config.ts. With pnpm, also `pnpm add jose` (it won't hoist otherwise); you need it for step 3.
+2. Add the provider in convex/auth.ts (Passkey by default; Password or OAuth like Google on request).
+3. Generate the auth keys HEADLESSLY. Do NOT run the interactive `npx @convex-dev/auth` wizard: it needs a login/TTY and hangs in non-interactive, anonymous, or CI runs (the #1 auth time-sink). Generate JWT_PRIVATE_KEY + JWKS deterministically with `jose`:
+   node -e 'import("jose").then(async({generateKeyPair,exportPKCS8,exportJWK})=>{const k=await generateKeyPair("RS256",{extractable:true});const priv=await exportPKCS8(k.privateKey);const pub=await exportJWK(k.publicKey);process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({JWT_PRIVATE_KEY:priv.trimEnd().replace(/\n/g," "),JWKS:JSON.stringify({keys:[{use:"sig",...pub}]})}))})' > .auth-keys.json
+   Then set JWT_PRIVATE_KEY and JWKS (from .auth-keys.json) plus SITE_URL on the deployment. Prefer the Convex MCP `envSet` tool, one call per var, to avoid shell-quoting the multi-line key. CLI fallback: use the NAME=VALUE form (`npx convex env set "JWT_PRIVATE_KEY=$JWT"`), NEVER `env set JWT_PRIVATE_KEY "$JWT"` (the value starts with `-----BEGIN` and the CLI parses the leading `-` as an unknown flag). SITE_URL is the dev URL (e.g. http://localhost:3000). Delete .auth-keys.json after.
+4. Write convex/auth.config.ts (the silently-always-signed-out bug lives here if it's wrong).
+5. Wire the client: ConvexAuthProvider, the sign-in component, and route guards. If you import shadcn/ui primitives (button, input, textarea, label, and so on), add them first with `npx shadcn@latest add <name>`; a missing @/components/ui/* is a hard build error.
+6. Verify a sign-in round-trips before declaring done.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Generate JWT_PRIVATE_KEY/JWKS with `jose` (extractable RS256; PKCS8 newlines to spaces; JWKS = {keys:[{use:"sig", ...publicJwk}]}). Do NOT run the interactive `npx @convex-dev/auth` wizard: it hangs headless/anonymous. Set the vars via the MCP `envSet` tool or the NAME=VALUE CLI form.
+- Always write auth.config.ts: a missing/incorrect one makes the app silently always-signed-out with no error.
+- Passkeys by default; only switch to password/OAuth on explicit request.
+- Install any shadcn/ui primitive you import up front (`npx shadcn@latest add ...`); a missing @/components/ui/* is a hard build failure.
+- Verify a real sign-in works before finishing.

.agents/skills/convex-authz/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: convex-authz
+description: "Audit and harden Convex authorization: identity-from-arg impersonation, missing per-document ownership checks, PII-leaking public queries, and writes into containers the caller doesn't own. Deterministic scan + canonical requireIdentity/requireOwner fix + tsc verify. Use for 'secure my app' / 'audit auth' / 'who can access this data', not generic code review."
+---
+
+<!-- GENERATED from convex-agents content/capabilities/convex-authz.json — do not edit by hand. -->
+
+# Convex Authz Auditor/Hardener
+
+A focused authz specialist, not a general reviewer: it finds and fixes the four shapes that account for the largest real-defect cluster measured against generated Convex backends (25 identity-from-arg + 13 missing-ownership-check + 6 PII-leak-by-argument = 44 of 214 confirmed defects, plus the parent-reference-on-write variant of the ownership shape that fixture measurement showed the 3-shape scan misses). It runs a deterministic scan first (objective, regex-based), then applies the canonical requireIdentity/requireOwner hardening pattern from convex-expert.md to every hit, then verifies with tsc. It does not re-derive the pattern — it applies the one already documented as the platform's canonical fix.
+
+## Workflow
+
+0. MANDATORY FIRST STEP — check the auth foundation exists before injecting any ctx.auth enforcement: (1) is there an auth.config.ts with a provider? (2) is there a users/identities table keyed to the auth subject (tokenIdentifier/identity.subject)? If EITHER is missing, DO NOT add requireIdentity/requireOwner — on a foundationless app ctx.auth.getUserIdentity() always returns null (enforcement is non-functional: every call 401s, or worse, the check is bypassed/miscompared against a non-subject field like an email string) and a reviewer correctly flags that as a NEW authz defect, not a fix. Instead, on a foundationless app: (a) for privileged/admin operations, convert the public query/mutation to internalQuery/internalMutation (removes public reachability entirely — safe and foundation-free, no ctx.auth needed), and (b) tell the user: 'this app has no auth foundation; run `/add auth` or the auth setup first, then re-run convex-authz to add per-user ownership checks.' Do not run steps 1-3 below against public functions on a foundationless app beyond this internalize-and-defer move. Only when the foundation exists (both auth.config.ts and a subject-keyed users table are present) do you proceed to inject requireIdentity/requireOwner in steps 1-3.
+1. SCAN (deterministic, objective-first): for every convex/**/*.ts file (skip convex/_generated/ and .d.ts), grep for the four shapes:
+   (a) identity-from-arg: a public `query(`/`mutation(` object whose `args` block declares `userId`/`actorId`/`ownerId`/`authorId`/`accountId` typed `v.id(...)`, where the function's whole block (args + handler) has zero `ctx.auth` reference. Regex: `/\b(userId|actorId|ownerId|authorId|accountId)\s*:\s*v\.id\(/` inside an `args: { ... }` block paired with an absent `/\bctx\.auth\b/` anywhere in the enclosing `(query|mutation)\(\s*\{ ... }` block (word-boundary excludes internalQuery/internalMutation by construction).
+   (b) missing-ownership-check: a public `query(`/`mutation(` whose handler loads a document via `ctx.db.get(args.<xId>)` (an `_id`-typed arg) and then calls `ctx.db.patch`/`ctx.db.delete`/`ctx.db.replace` on that same id, or returns the doc's fields directly, with no comparison of any `<doc>.<ownerField>` against an identity value anywhere in the block (no `===`/`!==` involving `identity.subject` or a `ctx.auth` derived value).
+   (c) PII-leaking public query: a public `query(` whose `returns` (or the raw doc it returns) includes a sensitive-looking field (`email`, `revenue`, `ssn`, `password`, `token`, `auditLog`, `dashboard`-shaped aggregate) and the query is parameterized by a client-supplied id with no `ctx.auth` check gating access to that id's own scope.
+   (d) parent-reference ownership on write: a public `mutation(` whose args include a `v.id(...)` of a parent/container table (`projectId`, `boardId`, `teamId`, `orgId`, `listId`, `folderId`, `conversationId`, `accountId`, ...) that the handler uses as a foreign key in a `ctx.db.insert`/`ctx.db.patch` — attaching or moving a child row into that container — without verifying the caller owns (or is a member of) the referenced parent doc. Creating a row inside someone else's container is the same defect as mutating their row: fixing WHO the caller is (shape a) does not fix WHERE they may write. After handling shapes a-c, re-audit every REMAINING `v.id(...)` arg in every public mutation for this shape — shape-a fixes routinely leave the parent id arg behind, still unchecked.
+   Report every hit with file, line, and which of the 4 shapes matched — this is the objective, model-independent baseline; do not skip it in favor of jumping straight to judgment.
+2. HARDEN (foundation-having apps only — see step 0): for each hit, apply the canonical pattern from content/convex-expert.md verbatim — do not invent a new helper. Add (if absent) `convex/model/auth.ts` exporting `requireIdentity(ctx)` (throws 401 if `ctx.auth.getUserIdentity()` is null; returns the identity) and `requireOwner(ctx, doc)` (throws 404 if doc is null, throws 403 if `doc.ownerId !== identity.subject`, else returns doc). Rewrite each flagged function: replace the client-supplied identity arg with `requireIdentity(ctx)`; wrap each `_id`-keyed read/mutate with `requireOwner(ctx, await ctx.db.get(args.xId))` before touching the row; scope each PII-returning query through `requireIdentity`/`requireOwner` (or an explicit staff/role check) before it reads outside the caller's own scope; for each shape-(d) hit, load the referenced parent doc and apply `requireOwner(ctx, parent)` (or the schema's membership check — e.g. `participantIds.includes(user._id)` — when the container models members as an array) BEFORE inserting/patching the child row. When the schema keys ownership by a `users` row id rather than the raw subject, resolve the caller's `users` row first (via the subject-keyed index) and compare against `user._id` — comparing an `Id<"users">` field to `identity.subject` never matches and silently breaks enforcement. Never widen scope — an internal/admin function that legitimately operates on an arbitrary user stays `internalQuery`/`internalMutation`, never public; leave it unflagged and unchanged.
+3. VERIFY: run `npx tsc --noEmit` (or the project's typecheck script) after edits; a hardening pass that doesn't typecheck is not done. Then re-run the step-1 scan to confirm 0 remaining hits (the fixed shapes no longer match the regexes because `ctx.auth` now appears in-block and ownership comparisons now exist).
+4. Report findings grouped by the 4 rule shapes with file:line, explain why each is exploitable (who could impersonate whom / read whose data), and show the concrete diff applied (or, on a foundationless app, the internalize-and-defer diff plus the auth-setup nudge) — never just describe the fix in prose.
+
+## Rules
+
+- MANDATORY FIRST STEP: before injecting requireIdentity/requireOwner, verify the auth foundation exists — an auth.config.ts with a provider AND a users/identities table keyed to the auth subject. If either is missing, do not add ctx.auth-based enforcement (it's non-functional or mismatched and creates a NEW authz defect); instead convert flagged public admin/privileged functions to internalQuery/internalMutation and tell the user to run auth setup first, then re-run convex-authz.
+- Scan objectively before judging — run the 4 deterministic greps first; don't skip straight to LLM judgment, and don't let a clean scan stop you from still eyeballing internal/admin exemptions.
+- Identity always comes from ctx.auth, never from a client-supplied argument — the one legitimate exception is an internalQuery/internalMutation/internalAction that is never exposed publicly.
+- Every read or mutate keyed by an _id argument must verify ownership server-side (requireOwner or an inlined equivalent comparison) before touching the row — being logged in is not the same as owning this row.
+- Any v.id(...) argument a public mutation uses as a foreign key when inserting or moving a row must have the referenced parent's ownership (or membership) verified against the caller first — creating a child row inside someone else's project/board/account is the same defect as mutating their row, and it survives an identity-from-arg fix unless checked separately.
+- Never leave a public query that returns PII/financial/audit data reachable by an unauthenticated or cross-account client-supplied id.
+- Reuse requireIdentity/requireOwner from content/convex-expert.md verbatim — do not fork a parallel helper or invent new error semantics.
+- Always verify with tsc after hardening; a fix that doesn't typecheck is not shipped.
+- This is a targeted authz pass, not a general code review — do not expand scope into performance/schema/validator findings; hand those to convex-reviewer.
+- SKIP entirely when there is no convex/ directory in the project.