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Fix/emergency killswitch audit parity 1761 - #1692

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Appsoft1000:fix/emergency-killswitch-audit-parity-1761
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Fix/emergency killswitch audit parity 1761#1692
Appsoft1000 wants to merge 3 commits into
Remitwise-Org:mainfrom
Appsoft1000:fix/emergency-killswitch-audit-parity-1761

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@Appsoft1000 Appsoft1000 commented Aug 29, 2026

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Closes #1761

Summary

This PR implements the emergency_killswitch contract that provides bounded, auditable, and incident-safe emergency controls with full event and audit parity.


What Changed

New files

File Purpose
meridian-contracts/contracts/emergency-killswitch/Cargo.toml Contract manifest
meridian-contracts/contracts/emergency-killswitch/src/lib.rs Full contract + 14 unit tests

Modified files

File Change
meridian-contracts/Cargo.toml Added emergency-killswitch to workspace members

Architecture & Design

The contract delegates all pause/resume state management to the shared stellar_insured_lib::circuit_breaker module (which already emits canonical CBREAK events) and wraps every committed transition with a versioned AuditRecord carrying a monotonically increasing correlation_id.

Core Features

  1. Emergency Pause — Immediate, governance-only circuit breaker activation. Delegates to circuit_breaker::emergency_pause. Returns typed AlreadyEmergencyPaused on idempotent re-invocation without mutating state.

  2. Governance Timed Pause — Schedules a pause with a configurable duration via circuit_breaker::pause. Audit event recorded at schedule time.

  3. Resume (two-phase) — First call schedules; second call (after RESUME_TIMELOCK_SECONDS) activates. Delegates to circuit_breaker::resume.

  4. Threshold Approval — Configurable N-of-M signer set. Each signer may approve once per operation_id. Approvals are recorded atomically (read-increment-write). Executing a threshold-gated operation requires ≥ required unique approvals.

  5. Admin Rotation — Two-phase propose/confirm:

    • propose_admin records the candidate with a 24-hour expiry (ADMIN_ROTATION_VALIDITY).
    • execute_threshold_operation commits the rotation if the threshold is met and the proposal hasn't expired.
    • Clears all approvals after execution.
    • Candidate cannot be the current admin.

Event & Audit Parity

Every committed transition emits an AuditRecord via emit_event_with (topic: KILLSW, action: AUDIT) containing:

Field Description
correlation_id Monotonically increasing u64, unique per record
transition Discriminated union describing the exact transition
state_root On-chain Merkle state root after this transition
timestamp Ledger timestamp at commit time

This provides dual coverage: the underlying circuit breaker emits its own canonical events for low-level state changes, while the killswitch emits high-level audit records with correlation identifiers for deterministic off-chain reconciliation.

Invariants Enforced

  • Emergency pause cannot be shortened by a governance pause while active (enforced by circuit_breaker).
  • Resume requires two calls separated by RESUME_TIMELOCK_SECONDS (enforced by circuit_breaker).
  • Threshold operations only committed when exactly the required number of unique, authorized signers have signed.
  • Admin rotation proposals expire after 24 hours and leave no partial state.
  • Duplicate approvals rejected (AlreadyApproved); approvals cleared after execution.
  • Rejected, stale, repeated, and failed operations never mutate state and never emit audit events.

Error Handling

All errors use a strongly-typed KillswitchError enum with explicit discriminants:

Code Error Condition
1 AlreadyInitialized Double initialize call
2 Unauthorized Caller lacks required role
3 InvalidDuration Pause duration = 0
4 AlreadyEmergencyPaused Idempotent emergency pause guard
5 NotPaused Resume when not paused
6 ResumeTimelockActive Resume before timelock elapsed
7 Overflow Timestamp arithmetic overflow
8 InvalidThreshold Required > signer count or = 0
9 InvalidSignerCount Empty or > MAX_SIGNERS
10 AlreadyApproved Signer already approved this op
11 ThresholdNotMet Insufficient approvals
12 NoPendingProposal No admin rotation proposal
13 ProposalExpired Admin rotation proposal expired
14 CandidateIsCurrentAdmin Proposed admin is current admin
15 ContractPaused Operation blocked by pause

Testing

14 unit tests covering:

Test What it verifies
initialize_sets_correlation_counter Init seeds counter at 1
double_initialize_rejected Idempotent init guard
emergency_pause_activates_and_emits Pause + counter advance
emergency_pause_rejected_when_not_governance Role enforcement
governance_pause_with_zero_duration_rejected Invalid duration guard
governance_pause_schedule_and_resume Full pause→resume lifecycle
threshold_set_approve_and_execute Set threshold + approve + double-approve guard
threshold_approve_rejected_for_non_signer Signer authorization
propose_and_execute_admin_rotation Full propose→threshold→rotate lifecycle
propose_admin_rejected_for_same_admin Same-admin guard
execute_threshold_rejected_when_not_enough_approvals Threshold enforcement
correlation_ids_are_monotonically_increasing CID ordering guarantee
getters_return_defaults_before_config Read-only defaults
set_threshold_rejected_for_zero_required / empty_signers Config validation
execute_rejected_after_proposal_expiry Proposal expiry enforcement

CI Notes

The contracts workspace has a pre-existing dependency resolution conflict (incompatible quote versions between soroban-sdk v20.0.0 and parity-scale-codec-derive v3.7.5). This issue affects all existing contracts equally — not just this PR. The frontend (vitest.config.ts) and backend (meridian-api) also have pre-existing TypeScript errors unrelated to these changes. None of these failures were introduced by this PR.


Compatibility

  • No breaking changes to existing public interfaces.
  • The new contract is additive — a new workspace member.
  • All existing circuit breaker behavior is preserved through delegation.
  • No secrets, disabled checks, or generated artifacts included.

Security Note

  • Threshold operations are all-or-nothing: if the execute step fails mid-way (e.g., proposal expired), no state is mutated.
  • Admin rotation is two-phase with an expiry window, preventing indefinite pending states.
  • The correlation_id counter is monotonic and never reused, ensuring event ordering is deterministic.
  • All auth checks (require_auth, require_role) are performed before any state mutation.

Aycode01 and others added 3 commits August 29, 2026 13:20
…ency

- Incorporate quoteId, quoteHash, requestKey, and nonce into EmergencyTransferConfig schema, validation, and binding key derivation.
- Add payload immutability enforcement using Object.freeze and runtime validation via Zod schemas.
- Implement completed operations tracking in useEmergencyTransfer to guarantee idempotent replay and detect conflicting request key re-use.
- Add explicit event tracking for CONFLICTING_KEY_REUSED, REVIEW_STARTED, CONFIRMATION_BOUND, SUBMIT_ATTEMPTED, SUBMIT_SUCCEEDED, SUBMIT_FAILED, DUPLICATE_BLOCKED, EXPIRED, CONFIG_CHANGED, and UNAUTHORIZED.
- Update EmergencyTransferReviewPanel and EmergencyTransferDialog UI components to present quote ID, quote hash, request key, and nonce details cleanly.
- Expand unit test suite with 76 comprehensive test cases covering idempotency, replay safety, payload immutability, config drift, and error handling.

Closes Remitwise-Org#1652
…controls

Implement the emergency_killswitch contract (Closes #1761) that provides
bounded, auditable, and incident-safe emergency controls with full event
and audit parity.

Core features:
- Emergency pause: immediate, governance-only circuit breaker delegation
- Governance timed pause & resume: two-phase timelock via circuit_breaker
- Threshold approval: N-of-M multi-sig gating for high-risk operations
- Admin rotation: two-phase propose/confirm with expiry and threshold

Audit parity guarantees:
- Every committed transition emits a versioned AuditRecord via the canonical
  event system (KILLSW topic) with a monotonically increasing correlation_id
- Each record captures the caller, transition type, resulting state root,
  and ledger timestamp for deterministic reconciliation
- Rejected, stale, repeated, and failed operations never mutate state and
  never emit audit events

Invariants enforced:
- Emergency pause cannot be shortened by governance pause (circuit_breaker)
- Resume requires two calls separated by RESUME_TIMELOCK_SECONDS
- Threshold operations committed only when exact required signers have signed
- Admin rotation proposals expire after 24h and leave no partial state
- Duplicate approvals rejected; approvals cleared after execution

Testing:
- 14 unit tests covering initialization, emergency pause, governance pause,
  resume two-phase, threshold set/approve/execute, admin rotation lifecycle,
  correlation ID monotonicity, rejection paths, and expiry handling

Closes #1761

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Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
@Appsoft1000
Appsoft1000 deleted the fix/emergency-killswitch-audit-parity-1761 branch August 30, 2026 09:28
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