Impact
A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair> with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls TaggedSigned::verify, execution reaches Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap() in the TaggedPublicKey implementation for Ed25519PublicKey. The from_bytes call fails because ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the unwrap() panics. The BLS TaggedPublicKey implementation correctly returns false on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics.
Patches
The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.4.0.
Workarounds
No known workarounds.
Resources
See PR.
References
Impact
A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a
TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier callsTaggedSigned::verify, execution reachesEd25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()in theTaggedPublicKeyimplementation forEd25519PublicKey. Thefrom_bytescall fails becauseed25519_zebra::Signature::try_fromrejects slices not 64 bytes, and theunwrap()panics. The BLSTaggedPublicKeyimplementation correctly returnsfalseon error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics.Patches
The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.4.0.
Workarounds
No known workarounds.
Resources
See PR.
References