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NornicDB has Improper Network Binding in its Bolt Server, allowing unauthorized remote access

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 20, 2026 in orneryd/NornicDB • Updated May 13, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/orneryd/nornicdb (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.0.42-hotfix

Patched versions

1.0.42-hotfix

Description

Summary

The --address CLI flag (and NORNICDB_ADDRESS / server.host config key) is plumbed through to the HTTP server correctly but never reaches the Bolt server config. The Bolt listener therefore always binds to the wildcard address (all interfaces), regardless of what the user configures.

On a LAN, this exposes the graph database — with its default admin:password credentials — to any device sharing the network.

Version

  • nornicdb v1.0.39
  • Built from commit afe7c9d on main
  • Platform: macOS (darwin 25.4.0, arm64)

Reproduction

$ nornicdb serve --address 127.0.0.1 --bolt-port 7687 --http-port 7474 ...

Output claims Bolt is on localhost:

Bolt server listening on bolt://localhost:7687

But the actual socket:

$ netstat -an -p tcp | grep 7687
tcp46      0      0  *.7687                 *.*                    LISTEN

$ lsof -iTCP:7687 -sTCP:LISTEN -n -P
nornicdb ... IPv6 ... TCP *:7687 (LISTEN)

HTTP port is correctly bound:

tcp4  127.0.0.1.7474   *.*  LISTEN

Reachable from another host on the LAN:

$ nc -z 192.168.x.y 7687
Connection to 192.168.x.y port 7687 [tcp/*] succeeded!

Setting NORNICDB_BOLT_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 or server.host: "127.0.0.1" in config.yaml has no effect on the Bolt listener.

Root Cause

In pkg/bolt/server.go:774-776:

func (s *Server) ListenAndServe() error {
    addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port)
    listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
    ...
}

bolt.Config (line 474) has no Host/Address/Addr field — only Port. The CLI flag --address is stored in a local variable in cmd/nornicdb/main.go:80 and used to format user-facing log output (line 637–644), but is never copied into boltConfig at line 600–609 when Bolt is initialized.

Since ListenAndServe calls net.Listen("tcp", ":7687") with an empty host, Go binds the wildcard socket on all interfaces.

Suggested Fix

  1. Add a Host string field to bolt.Config (default "127.0.0.1", matching the CLI flag default).
  2. In cmd/nornicdb/main.go around line 601, wire it through:
    boltConfig.Host = address
    boltConfig.Port = boltPort
  3. In pkg/bolt/server.go:775, use the host:
    addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.config.Host, strconv.Itoa(s.config.Port))

Security Impact

  • Default admin:password credentials + wildcard binding = anyone on the same WiFi can issue arbitrary Cypher queries (read, write, delete nodes) against NornicDB instances running with default setup.
  • Users following the README will reasonably assume --address 127.0.0.1 (the documented default) binds both protocols to localhost.
  • Workaround: host-firewall rules (e.g. macOS pf) blocking non-loopback → 7687. Not discoverable from the docs.

References

@orneryd orneryd published to orneryd/NornicDB Apr 20, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Apr 22, 2026
Reviewed Apr 22, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database May 8, 2026
Last updated May 13, 2026

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(16th percentile)

Weaknesses

Use of Default Credentials

The product uses default credentials (such as passwords or cryptographic keys) for potentially critical functionality. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-42072

GHSA ID

GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54

Source code

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