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The rs-soroban-sdk #[contractimpl] macro calls inherent function instead of trait function when names collide

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 13, 2026 in stellar/rs-soroban-sdk • Updated Feb 19, 2026

Package

cargo soroban-sdk-macros (Rust)

Affected versions

>= 25.0.0, <= 25.1.0
>= 23.0.0, <= 23.5.1
<= 22.0.9

Patched versions

25.1.1
23.5.2
22.0.10

Description

Impact

The #[contractimpl] macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls.

In Rust, you can define functions on a type in two ways:

  • Directly on the type as an inherent function:
    impl MyContract {
        fn value() { ... }
    }
  • Through a trait
    impl Trait for MyContract {
        fn value() { ... }
    }

These are two separate functions that happen to share the same name. Rust has rules for which one gets called. When you write MyContract::value(), Rust always picks the one defined directly on the type, not the trait version.

The bug is that #[contractimpl] generates code that uses MyContract::value() style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function.

This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously:

  1. A impl Trait for MyContract block is defined with one or more functions, with #[contractimpl] applied.
  2. A impl MyContract block is defined with one or more identically named functions, without #[contractimpl] applied.

If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function.

For example:

#[contract]
pub struct Contract;

impl Contract {
    /// Inherent function — returns 1.
    /// Bug: The macro-generated WASM export is wired up to call this function.
    pub fn value() -> u32 {
        1
    }
}

pub trait Trait {
    fn value(env: Env) -> u32;
}

#[contractimpl]
impl Trait for MyContract {
    /// Trait implementation — returns 2.
    /// Fix: The macro-generated WASM export should call this function.
    fn value() -> u32 {
        2
    }
}

Patches

The problem is patched in soroban-sdk-macros version 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from <Type>::func() to <Type as Trait>::func() when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists.

Users should upgrade to soroban-sdk-macros >= 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function.

References

@leighmcculloch leighmcculloch published to stellar/rs-soroban-sdk Feb 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 17, 2026
Reviewed Feb 17, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Feb 19, 2026
Last updated Feb 19, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(10th percentile)

Weaknesses

Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation

The code contains a control flow path that does not reflect the algorithm that the path is intended to implement, leading to incorrect behavior any time this path is navigated. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-26267

GHSA ID

GHSA-4chv-4c6w-w254

Credits

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