Summary
A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Image tool allowed attackers to force OpenClaw to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or restricted network targets.
Affected Versions
- npm: openclaw <= 2026.2.1
Patched Versions
- npm: openclaw 2026.2.2 and later
Fix Commits
- 81c68f582d4a9a20d9cca9f367d2da9edc5a65ae (guard remote media fetches with SSRF checks)
- 9bd64c8a1f91dda602afc1d5246a2ff2be164647 (expand SSRF guard coverage)
Details
The Image tool accepts file paths, file:// URLs, data: URLs, and http(s) URLs. In vulnerable versions, http(s) URLs were fetched without SSRF protections, enabling requests to localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata targets.
This was fixed by routing remote media fetching through the SSRF guard (private/internal IP + hostname blocking, redirect hardening, DNS pinning).
Exploitability Notes
- Requires attacker-controlled invocation of the Image tool (direct tool access, or a gateway/channel surface that forwards untrusted
image arguments into tool calls).
- The image tool expects the fetched content to be an image. Many high-value SSRF targets return text/JSON (for example cloud metadata endpoints), which will typically fail media-type validation. In practice, the most direct confidentiality impact comes from internal endpoints that actually return images (screenshots/renderers, camera snapshots, chart exports, etc.).
- Remote fetches are GET-only with no custom headers. Some metadata services require special headers or session tokens (for example GCP
Metadata-Flavor, AWS IMDSv2 token), which can further reduce the likelihood of direct credential theft in some environments.
- Despite the above constraints, SSRF remains a powerful primitive: it can enable internal network probing and access to unauthenticated/internal HTTP endpoints, and can chain with other weaknesses if present.
Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.
References
Summary
A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the Image tool allowed attackers to force OpenClaw to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or restricted network targets.
Affected Versions
Patched Versions
Fix Commits
Details
The Image tool accepts file paths, file:// URLs, data: URLs, and http(s) URLs. In vulnerable versions, http(s) URLs were fetched without SSRF protections, enabling requests to localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata targets.
This was fixed by routing remote media fetching through the SSRF guard (private/internal IP + hostname blocking, redirect hardening, DNS pinning).
Exploitability Notes
imagearguments into tool calls).Metadata-Flavor, AWS IMDSv2 token), which can further reduce the likelihood of direct credential theft in some environments.Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.
References