Summary
In affected versions of openclaw, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session.
Impact
This issue affects deployments that expose the Gateway behind a trusted reverse proxy and rely on browser origin checks such as controlUi.allowedOrigins to restrict browser access. An attacker who can cause a victim browser to load a malicious page that can reach the proxy endpoint could establish a cross-site WebSocket connection and call privileged Gateway methods.
In verified impact, the attacker-origin page was able to request operator.admin and successfully call config.get, exposing sensitive configuration. Depending on the deployment, the same authenticated operator path could also permit other privileged reads or mutations available to operator-class callers.
Affected Packages and Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm)
- Affected versions:
< 2026.3.11
- Fixed in:
2026.3.11
Technical Details
The WebSocket handshake logic treated proxy-delivered requests as exempt from the generic browser origin check whenever an Origin header was present alongside proxy headers. In trusted-proxy mode, that exemption allowed browser-originated connections to skip the normal origin-validation path even though they were still browser requests.
Because trusted-proxy authentication can produce a shared authenticated operator context, the affected path could retain requested operator scopes after the handshake. That made the browser origin check the missing boundary between an untrusted origin and an authenticated operator-class session.
Fix
OpenClaw now enforces browser origin validation for any browser-originated WebSocket connection regardless of whether proxy headers are present. The fix shipped in openclaw@2026.3.11.
Fixed commit: ebed3bbde1a72a1aaa9b87b63b91e7c04a50036b
Release tag: v2026.3.11
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, avoid exposing browser-reachable Gateway WebSocket endpoints in trusted-proxy mode to untrusted origins, and ensure reverse-proxy/browser reachability is restricted to trusted origins only.
References
yianworks Reporter
Summary
In affected versions of
openclaw, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation whengateway.auth.modewas set totrusted-proxyand the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session.Impact
This issue affects deployments that expose the Gateway behind a trusted reverse proxy and rely on browser origin checks such as
controlUi.allowedOriginsto restrict browser access. An attacker who can cause a victim browser to load a malicious page that can reach the proxy endpoint could establish a cross-site WebSocket connection and call privileged Gateway methods.In verified impact, the attacker-origin page was able to request
operator.adminand successfully callconfig.get, exposing sensitive configuration. Depending on the deployment, the same authenticated operator path could also permit other privileged reads or mutations available to operator-class callers.Affected Packages and Versions
openclaw(npm)< 2026.3.112026.3.11Technical Details
The WebSocket handshake logic treated proxy-delivered requests as exempt from the generic browser origin check whenever an
Originheader was present alongside proxy headers. Intrusted-proxymode, that exemption allowed browser-originated connections to skip the normal origin-validation path even though they were still browser requests.Because trusted-proxy authentication can produce a shared authenticated operator context, the affected path could retain requested operator scopes after the handshake. That made the browser origin check the missing boundary between an untrusted origin and an authenticated operator-class session.
Fix
OpenClaw now enforces browser origin validation for any browser-originated WebSocket connection regardless of whether proxy headers are present. The fix shipped in
openclaw@2026.3.11.Fixed commit:
ebed3bbde1a72a1aaa9b87b63b91e7c04a50036bRelease tag:
v2026.3.11Workarounds
Upgrade to
2026.3.11or later.If you cannot upgrade immediately, avoid exposing browser-reachable Gateway WebSocket endpoints in
trusted-proxymode to untrusted origins, and ensure reverse-proxy/browser reachability is restricted to trusted origins only.References