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zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 23, 2026 in zeroae/zae-limiter • Updated Feb 25, 2026

Package

pip zae-limiter (pip)

Affected versions

<= 0.10.0

Patched versions

0.10.1

Description

Summary

All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (namespace/ENTITY#{id}). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.

Details

Each acquire() call performs a TransactWriteItems (or UpdateItem in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing ProvisionedThroughputExceededException.

The library has no built-in mitigation:

  • No partition key sharding/salting
  • No write coalescing or batching
  • No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
  • RateLimiterUnavailable is raised but the caller has already been delayed

Impact

  • Availability: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
  • Fairness: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
  • Multi-tenant risk: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others

Reproduction

  1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
  2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
  3. Observe DynamoDB ThrottledRequests CloudWatch metric increasing
  4. Observe acquire() latency spikes and RateLimiterUnavailable exceptions

Remediation Design: Pre-Shard Buckets

  • Move buckets to PK={ns}/BUCKET#{entity}#{resource}#{shard}, SK=#STATE — one partition per (entity, resource, shard)
  • Auto-inject wcu:1000 reserved limit on every bucket — tracks DynamoDB partition write pressure in-band (name may change during implementation)
  • Shard doubling (1→2→4→8) triggered by client on wcu exhaustion or proactively by aggregator
  • Shard 0 at suffix #0 is source of truth for shard_count. Aggregator propagates to other shards
  • Original limits stored on bucket, effective limits derived: original / shard_count. Infrastructure limits (wcu) not divided
  • Shard selection: random/round-robin. On application limit exhaustion, retry on another shard (max 2 retries)
  • Lazy shard creation on first access
  • Bucket discovery via GSI3 (KEYS_ONLY) + BatchGetItem. GSI2 for resource aggregation unchanged
  • Cascade: parent unaware, protected by own wcu
  • Aggregator: parse new PK format, key by shard_id, effective limits for refill, filter wcu from snapshots
  • Clean break migration: schema version bump, old buckets ignored, new buckets created on first access
  • $0.625/M preserved on hot path

References

@sodre sodre published to zeroae/zae-limiter Feb 23, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Feb 25, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 25, 2026
Reviewed Feb 25, 2026
Last updated Feb 25, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(14th percentile)

Weaknesses

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-27695

GHSA ID

GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6

Source code

Credits

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