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PraisonAI `deploy --type api` emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 19, 2026 in MervinPraison/PraisonAI • Updated May 29, 2026

Package

pip PraisonAI (pip)

Affected versions

<= 4.6.39

Patched versions

4.6.40

Description

Summary

CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (praisonai deploy --type api) get a server that:

  • binds to 0.0.0.0 per the recommended sample YAML
  • exposes /chat and /agents endpoints
  • runs praisonai.run() on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment
  • does not require any authentication

The PyPI wheel praisonai==4.6.33 (current @latest) still ships the generator with auth_enabled defaulting to False. The fix shape is opt-in via APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...).

Details

Anchor (file:line:symbol)

  • Vulnerable artifact: praisonai==4.6.33 on PyPI.
  • Defaults: praisonai/deploy/models.py:29auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, ...); praisonai/deploy/models.py:30auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, ...).
  • Generator: praisonai/deploy/api.py:40AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled}; api.py:41AUTH_TOKEN = {repr(config.auth_token)}; api.py:43-49def check_auth(): if not AUTH_ENABLED: return True.
  • CLI entry: documented as praisonai deploy --type api (vendor README); produces the generator output above with no flag required to suppress the warning, because no warning is emitted.

Vulnerable code (verbatim from installed wheel)

# praisonai/deploy/models.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
class APIConfig(BaseModel):
    host: str = Field(default="127.0.0.1", description="Server host")
    port: int = Field(default=8005, description="Server port")
    cors_enabled: bool = Field(default=True, description="Enable CORS")
    auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, description="Enable authentication")     # line 29
    auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Authentication token") # line 30
# praisonai/deploy/api.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
code = f\'\'\'...
# Authentication
AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled}      # False by default
AUTH_TOKEN   = {repr(config.auth_token)}  # None by default

def check_auth():
    if not AUTH_ENABLED:
        return True                       # short-circuit, accept all
    token = request.headers.get(\'Authorization\', \'\').replace(\'Bearer \', \'\')
    return token == AUTH_TOKEN
...
\'\'\'

A default invocation of the deploy command emits a server whose check_auth() short-circuits to True and accepts unauthenticated /chat, /agents POSTs.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI 4.6.33 generates Flask API server with auth
disabled by default. Class H sibling of CVE-2026-44338.

Phase 1: reflect on praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig defaults.
Phase 2: call generate_api_server_code(default config) and assert the
         emitted source contains AUTH_ENABLED = False and the
         short-circuit return.
Phase 3: re-run with auth_enabled=True, auth_token='s3cret-bearer-value'
         and confirm the emitted source flips to the secure shape.

Exit code 0 = PASS = vulnerable defaults confirmed.
"""
import sys, traceback

def phase1_dataclass_defaults():
    print("PHASE 1 - praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig default values")
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    cfg = APIConfig()
    checks = [
        ("auth_enabled", cfg.auth_enabled, False),
        ("auth_token",   cfg.auth_token,   None),
    ]
    for name, observed, expected in checks:
        ok = observed == expected
        mark = "VULNERABLE" if name in ("auth_enabled","auth_token") and ok else "ok"
        print(f"  {name:14s} = {observed!r:18s}  (expected {expected!r})  [{mark}]")
        assert ok
    print("  >> APIConfig defaults reproduce the CVE-2026-44338 shape.")

def phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth():
    print("PHASE 2 - generate_api_server_code(default config) emits unauth server")
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
    src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=APIConfig())
    for needle in ["AUTH_ENABLED = False","AUTH_TOKEN = None","if not AUTH_ENABLED:","return True"]:
        assert needle in src, f"missing: {needle!r}"
        print(f"  [FOUND] {needle!r}")
    print("  >> Default-config generator emits Flask server with check_auth() short-circuit.")

def phase3_fix_shape_available():
    print("PHASE 3 - auth_enabled=True flips to secure shape")
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
    cfg = APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token="s3cret-bearer-value")
    src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=cfg)
    assert "AUTH_ENABLED = True" in src
    assert "AUTH_ENABLED = False" not in src
    print("  >> Fix shape works when toggled. Class H confirmed: default is insecure.")

def main():
    print("=" * 64)
    print("legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI default-config AUTH_ENABLED=False")
    print("=" * 64)
    try:
        phase1_dataclass_defaults()
        phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth()
        phase3_fix_shape_available()
    except Exception:
        traceback.print_exc()
        print("FAIL"); sys.exit(2)
    print("PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0.")
    sys.exit(0)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

PoC dependencies: praisonai==4.6.33 from PyPI. Tested on Python 3.11.

Run log verdict: PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0. — vulnerable-default shape confirmed. auth_enabled=False by default, check_auth() short-circuits to True, fix toggle exists but is opt-in.

Impact

An operator who runs the vendor-documented quickstart (pip install praisonai && praisonai deploy --type api) gets a network-reachable Flask server that invokes praisonai.run() on attacker-supplied JSON with the user's LLM API keys in the process environment. The attacker reaches arbitrary LLM-orchestration (including any tool-use the agents define, which in PraisonAI commonly includes python_repl, bash, file I/O, and HTTP calls), with the host's API-key credit billed to the operator.

  • Belief: CVE-2026-44338 was filed and triaged.
  • Reality: praisonai==4.6.33 is current @latest on PyPI (2026-05-16). The generator still defaults to auth_enabled=False.
  • Gap: The CVE acknowledges the fix shape exists. The fix is opt-in. The default-config consumer remains vulnerable.

Parent CVE: CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj

References

@MervinPraison MervinPraison published to MervinPraison/PraisonAI May 19, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 29, 2026
Reviewed May 29, 2026
Last updated May 29, 2026

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(24th percentile)

Weaknesses

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources. Learn more on MITRE.

Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the administrator, but the default is not secure. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-47393

GHSA ID

GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq

Credits

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