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Spring Data: Unbounded property-path cache keyed by externally-supplied path string

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 9, 2026 in spring-projects/security-advisories • Updated Jul 31, 2026

Package

maven org.springframework.data:spring-data-commons (Maven)

Affected versions

>= 4.0.0, <= 4.0.5
>= 3.5.0, <= 3.5.11
>= 3.4.0, <= 3.4.13

Patched versions

4.0.6
3.5.12

Description

src/main/java/org/springframework/data/mapping/context/PersistentPropertyPathFactory.java:175 · Unbounded Resource Allocation (Algorithmic DoS)

Impact

When a consuming module routes user-supplied dot-paths (sort parameters, projection paths, PATCH paths) through MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class), each distinct string — including invalid ones — is cached forever. A remote attacker can send millions of requests with unique ?sort=aaaa<n> values and grow the heap until the service OOMs.

Description

PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths (line 53) is a ConcurrentHashMap<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> populated by getPotentiallyCachedPath() (line 174-177) via computeIfAbsent. The key is (TypeInformation, rawPathString). Crucially, unresolvable paths are also cached (as PathResolution.unresolved, line 204) so that the same InvalidPersistentPropertyPath can be re-thrown — meaning every distinct garbage string an attacker sends creates a permanent entry. There is no eviction. This is reachable from AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class) (AbstractMappingContext.java:345), which Spring Data REST and several store query mappers call with HTTP-request-derived sort/filter property names.

By contrast, the sibling SimplePropertyPath.cache was already hardened to use ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (soft refs); this cache was not given the same treatment.

Exploit scenario

Against a Spring Data REST endpoint, an attacker scripts GET /things?sort=<random-40-char-string> in a loop. Each request fails fast with InvalidPersistentPropertyPath, but each distinct random string leaves behind a TypeAndPath key, a PathResolution object holding the split segments list, and the source string in the map. After ~10M requests the JVM OOMs.

Preconditions

  • A downstream component (Spring Data REST, a store-specific QueryMapper, or application code) passes externally-supplied strings to MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...)
  • No upstream rate-limiting or path-string validation

How to fix

A cache whose key can be derived from external input must be bounded. Replace propertyPaths (line 53) with a ConcurrentLruCache<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> of fixed capacity, or ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (matching the sibling SimplePropertyPath.cache). Additionally, do not cache PathResolution.unresolved results at all (line 204 in createPersistentPropertyPath) — re-computing a failed lookup is cheap, and caching negative results for arbitrary attacker strings is what makes this exploitable.

Adversarial verification

Verdict: TRUE_POSITIVE (confidence: 7/10) — unbounded hard-ref ConcurrentHashMap keyed by raw path string, caches unresolved entries (line 204), reachable via public MappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...); sibling PropertyPath cache was already converted to soft-refs but this one was missed. -3 confidence because the HTTP-input wiring lives in downstream modules (Spring Data REST / store mappers), not verifiable in this repo.

Code at the line — CONFIRMED

  • Line 53: private final Map<TypeAndPath, PathResolution> propertyPaths = new ConcurrentHashMap<>(); — plain CHM, hard refs, no eviction, no size bound.
  • Line 175: propertyPaths.computeIfAbsent(TypeAndPath.of(type, propertyPath), ...) — every distinct (type, string) pair is inserted.
  • Line 204: return PathResolution.unresolved(parts, segment, type, currentPath); — returned from inside computeIfAbsent's mapping function, so unresolvable paths are cached. The PathResolution retains the full attacker string (source = StringUtils.collectionToDelimitedString(parts, "."), line 452).

Callers within spring-data-commons

  • AbstractMappingContext.getPersistentPropertyPath(String, Class<?>) (line 345) and (String, TypeInformation<?>) (line 350) → persistentPropertyPathFactory.from(type, propertyPath) → straight into the unbounded cache. No validation, no PropertyPath.from gate.
  • This is the public MappingContext interface (MappingContext.java:174,186), documented to throw InvalidPersistentPropertyPath on bad input — i.e., the contract explicitly anticipates being called with possibly-invalid strings.
  • No in-repo caller routes HTTP input directly into the String overload. The Sort.Order.propertygetPersistentPropertyPath(String, ...) bridge lives in store modules (Spring Data MongoDB QueryMapper, Spring Data REST sort translator). That wiring is out-of-repo as the finding states.

Protections — NONE on this cache
Contrast: SimplePropertyPath.java:52 (the PropertyPath.from cache) uses ConcurrentReferenceHashMap (soft refs, GC-evictable). Spring already hardened the sibling cache against exactly this pattern. PersistentPropertyPathFactory.propertyPaths was not given the same treatment.

Stress-test
Is this exclusion #3 (intended design)? The PathResolution javadoc (line 426-430) says caching unresolved paths is deliberate — to make repeated lookups of the same bad path cheap. But unbounded hard-ref caching of arbitrary attacker-chosen keys is not the intent; the sibling fix proves Spring considers this a bug class.

References

Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 10, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 31, 2026
Reviewed Jul 31, 2026
Last updated Jul 31, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(29th percentile)

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-41695

GHSA ID

GHSA-88fw-v6x4-3f58
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