Summary
Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.
Affected versions
< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.
Patched versions
>= 7.5.0.
Impact
| # |
Item |
Affected |
Patched |
CWE |
| 1 |
MAP execution multi-tenant isolation. A body-supplied org_id could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. |
< 7.4.5 |
>= 7.4.5 |
CWE-863 |
| 2 |
Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers. The handlers behind /api/v1/evidence/* and /api/v1/decisions/*/explain failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. |
< 7.2.0 |
>= 7.2.0 |
CWE-200, CWE-863 |
| 3 |
License-validation bypass on onboard-customer. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. |
< 7.2.0 |
>= 7.2.0 |
CWE-862 |
| 4 |
Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain. Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. |
< 7.2.0 |
>= 7.2.0 |
CWE-862 |
| 5 |
Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes. Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass apiAuthMiddleware. |
< 7.2.0 |
>= 7.2.0 |
CWE-863 |
| 6 |
Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal. The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. |
< 7.1.3 |
>= 7.1.3 |
CWE-208 |
| 7 |
Portal DoS via unbounded request body. The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. |
< 7.1.5 |
>= 7.1.5 |
CWE-770 |
| 8 |
SQL-injection enforcement regression on try.getaxonflow.com. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the warn SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. |
< 7.5.0 (try.getaxonflow.com only) |
>= 7.5.0 |
CWE-89 |
Remediation
Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.
For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:
- Items 1–5: ensure the agent middleware sets
X-Org-ID / X-Tenant-ID from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.
- Item 8 (Community SaaS):
SQLI_ACTION=block can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.
Resources
Credit
Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.
References
Summary
Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.
Affected versions
< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.Patched versions
>= 7.5.0.Impact
org_idcould override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set.< 7.4.5>= 7.4.5/api/v1/evidence/*and/api/v1/decisions/*/explainfailed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope.< 7.2.0>= 7.2.0onboard-customer. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow.< 7.2.0>= 7.2.0< 7.2.0>= 7.2.0apiAuthMiddleware.< 7.2.0>= 7.2.0< 7.1.3>= 7.1.3< 7.1.5>= 7.1.5try.getaxonflow.com. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited thewarnSQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default.< 7.5.0(try.getaxonflow.com only)>= 7.5.0Remediation
Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.
For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:
X-Org-ID/X-Tenant-IDfrom authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.SQLI_ACTION=blockcan be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.Resources
Credit
Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.
References