Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /\evil.com/path slips through is_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.
Details
Vulnerable function: packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395
const is_relative_url = (url) => {
return typeof url === "string" && !url.includes(":/") && !url.includes("//");
};
The function's intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:
- backslash characters, which WHATWG URL parsing (used by every modern browser) treats as forward slashes for the special schemes
http, https, ftp, ws, wss. A URL parser fed /\evil.com/path with a base of http://victim/ resolves to http://evil.com/path.
- non-
http(s): schemes that do not contain :/. The strings javascript:alert(1), data:text/html,..., vbscript:... all pass.
Vulnerable callsite: packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376
} else if (
(req.body || {}).dest &&
is_relative_url(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest))
) {
res.redirect(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest));
} else res.redirect("/");
The body's dest is URL-decoded twice (once by body-parser, once by the explicit decodeURIComponent) and the same value is passed to res.redirect. Express 5's res.redirect runs the value through encodeurl@2.0.0, whose whitelist character class [^\x21\x23-\x3B\x3D\x3F-\x5F\x61-\x7A\x7C\x7E] includes \x5C (backslash). The backslash is therefore not percent-encoded and ends up verbatim in the Location response header.
PoC
poc.zip
Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding
- ./setup.sh
- ./poc.sh

Impact
Any user who can be lured into clicking a Saltcorn login URL crafted by the attacker will, after submitting their valid credentials, be redirected to an attacker-controlled origin. The redirect happens under the trusted Saltcorn domain, so the user has no visual cue that they are about to leave the site. Realistic abuse patterns:
- Credential phishing — the attacker's site renders a forged "session expired, please log in again" prompt to capture the password the user just typed.
References
Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login
destparameter with a string check that only blocks:/and//. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as/\evil.com/pathslips throughis_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTPLocationheader, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.Details
Vulnerable function:
packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395The function's intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:
http,https,ftp,ws,wss. A URL parser fed/\evil.com/pathwith a base ofhttp://victim/resolves tohttp://evil.com/path.http(s):schemes that do not contain:/. The stringsjavascript:alert(1),data:text/html,...,vbscript:...all pass.Vulnerable callsite:
packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376The body's
destis URL-decoded twice (once by body-parser, once by the explicitdecodeURIComponent) and the same value is passed tores.redirect. Express 5'sres.redirectruns the value throughencodeurl@2.0.0, whose whitelist character class[^\x21\x23-\x3B\x3D\x3F-\x5F\x61-\x7A\x7C\x7E]includes\x5C(backslash). The backslash is therefore not percent-encoded and ends up verbatim in theLocationresponse header.PoC
poc.zip
Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding
Impact
Any user who can be lured into clicking a Saltcorn login URL crafted by the attacker will, after submitting their valid credentials, be redirected to an attacker-controlled origin. The redirect happens under the trusted Saltcorn domain, so the user has no visual cue that they are about to leave the site. Realistic abuse patterns:
References